In Iran, assassination shock spurs calls to rethink security
| London
Nearly a decade ago, after a string of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists shook Tehran, Iran鈥檚 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was assigned the task of guarding them.
The very presence of the powerful IRGC was meant to be deterrent enough to prevent enemy intelligence operatives from further killings, conducted as part of a covert war waged in earnest at the time by Israel and the United States to slow down Iran鈥檚 nuclear advances.
鈥淚srael targeted the nuclear scientists because it understood that they did not have the security protection of the IRGC,鈥� Gen. Mohammad Hassan Kazemi, the deputy commander of the IRGC security branch, boastfully announced in late 2013.
Why We Wrote This
Security vigilance is a relentless pursuit that is mentally draining. Did Iran鈥檚 yearslong state of alert against Israeli and American infiltration lead to complacency and vulnerabilities?
But any claim such a deterrent effect still existed disappeared Nov. 27, when the brazen killing in broad daylight of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh 鈥� long reputed to be the 鈥渇ather鈥� of Iran鈥檚 nuclear program 鈥撀爀xposed deep vulnerabilities in Iran鈥檚 security and intelligence apparatus.
The scientist is often described as being in charge of a clandestine weapons effort until it was shelved in 2003. But in 2018 he was mentioned pointedly by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he presented Iranian nuclear files stolen from a Tehran warehouse that he said proved that aspects of a weapons program headed by Mr. Fakhrizadeh were ongoing. 鈥淩emember that name,鈥� he said.
Though close to retirement and using a cover story as an academic 鈥撀爓hich was used to deny inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to him, despite repeated requests 鈥撀燤r. Fakhrizadeh in fact held the rank of deputy defense minister and was given a dayslong state funeral.
He was a known target, and would have been well protected by the IRGC鈥檚 Ansar-ol-Mahdi 鈥渟ecret service鈥� unit. Amid a wave of internal Iranian finger-pointing that has followed the attack, analysts say Iran鈥檚 intelligence apparatus often appears to be looking in the wrong places for threats.
鈥淭he Fakhrizadeh assassination came as a shock, not because [they] didn鈥檛 expect it, but exactly because they did expect and prepare for it, and yet they couldn鈥檛 prevent it,鈥� says Maysam Behravesh, an intelligence analyst on contract with Iran鈥檚 Ministry of Intelligence and Security from 2008 to 2010, and now a Sweden-based researcher with Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
鈥淭his and past hostile operations could not have been carried out successfully, against all odds, had there not been a complex network of spies and moles deep in Iran鈥檚 security structure and intelligence community,鈥� says Mr. Behravesh.
Bodyguards tipped off
The dozen assassins that took part in the ambush of Mr. Fakhrizadeh鈥檚 convoy of four armored vehicles melted away after the attack, according to a detailed account posted by Javad Mogouei, a documentary filmmaker who has worked for the IRGC, that was backed up by eyewitnesses and family members quoted by Iranian media.
The hit team deployed a car bomb, a machine gun, assault rifles, and two snipers on a barren rural road near the town of Absard, 40 miles east of Tehran. Officials say Mr. Fakhrizadeh鈥檚 bodyguards had been given explicit tipoffs from other Iranian intelligence agencies that they would be hit.
Iran鈥檚 supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed 鈥渄efinite punishment,鈥� but said the first priority was finding and prosecuting the 鈥渕urderous and brutal mercenaries.鈥�
鈥淏reaches, holes, and infiltrations鈥� led to the assassination, Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan, a military adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei and former defense chief, told state TV. General Dehghan, a candidate in Iran鈥檚 June 2021 presidential election, called on security officials 鈥渢o answer as to how such infiltration occurs.鈥�
Analysts say the killing of Mr. Fakhrizadeh will complicate efforts by President-elect Joe Biden to resuscitate the landmark, multilateral 2015 Iran nuclear deal. President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA in 2018, in favor of a 鈥渕aximum pressure鈥� campaign of punishing sanctions.
On Wednesday, Iran鈥檚 conservative Guardian Council approved a parliamentary bill requiring the government to boost uranium enrichment and stop IAEA inspections if sanctions aren鈥檛 lifted by February. Such a step would remove Iran further from the limits of the deal.
String of breaches
The assassination, meanwhile, is the latest in a chain of security breaches that indicate how agents of Iran鈥檚 archfoes, Israel and the U.S., have found ways to penetrate Iran鈥檚 intelligence infrastructure and operate relatively freely.
In August, for example, Israeli operatives in Tehran gunned down Al Qaeda鈥檚 second-in-command, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, one mastermind of the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa, 鈥渁t the behest of the United States,鈥� The New York Times .
In July, amid a summer of unexplained explosions across Iran, a mysterious fire damaged Iran鈥檚 uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Officials attributed it to 鈥渟abotage.鈥�
This past January, a U.S. drone killed the commander of Iran鈥檚 IRGC Qods Force, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, in Baghdad.
The latest killing 鈥渋s expected to prompt some serious soul-searching within the leadership as the enemy is apparently 鈥榗loser to them than their necks鈥� veins,鈥� as some in Tehran like to put it,鈥� says Mr. Behravesh.
Iran blames Israel鈥檚 Mossad intelligence agency, which has a decadeslong history of conducting targeted assassinations across the Middle East and beyond. Israel has not denied a role, nor sought to dispel the sense that it operates with impunity in the Islamic Republic.
鈥淭he truth of the matter is that there are people inside the regime that are likely leaking this information,鈥� says Afshon Ostovar, an Iran expert at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
鈥淭hey鈥檝e got a leaky ship, and I think that鈥檚 the scariest issue for them, because there鈥檚 no clean way to deal with that. It鈥檚 going to be messy,鈥� says Dr. Ostovar, author of 鈥淰anguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran鈥檚 Revolutionary Guards.鈥�
鈥淚f Israel really is behind all of these assassinations over the years, they鈥檝e obviously got it down pretty well,鈥� says Dr. Ostovar. 鈥淏ut when you combine this with the Al Qaeda assassination, with the stealing of the nuclear documents ... it鈥檚 kind of like Iran is going to school every day and doesn鈥檛 know when the bully is going to take its lunch money.
鈥淚 don鈥檛 know if that is how the Islamic Republic sees it. But if I鈥檓 in the security forces I鈥檓 really frustrated, because this stuff is just not being prevented,鈥� he says.
A specific alert
Ali Shamkhani, chief of Iran鈥檚 Supreme National Security Council, told state TV that Iran鈥檚 intelligence agencies had 鈥減recisely predicted鈥� the attack and its location, and the scientist鈥檚 security had been boosted. But 鈥渄ue to the frequency of reports [about attacks on him] over a 20-year period, precautions were unfortunately not observed, and the enemy succeeded this time,鈥� he said.
Government spokesman Ali Rabiei went further, saying the Ministry of Intelligence had collected specific details about the pending attack and shared them as a 鈥渢error operation alert鈥� with the security organ in charge.
鈥淭hey could have made the crime fail if they had been a bit careful and followed the security protocols,鈥� Mr. Rabiei told a virtual news briefing.
The backlash has been fierce, with groups of protesters 鈥� most of them hard-liners 鈥撀爂athering outside the president鈥檚 office, Foreign Ministry, and Parliament, demanding revenge and calling on Iran to spurn the nuclear deal.
For Iran, with its 鈥減owerful system equipped with thousands of skilled [intelligence] forces, a security breach is not acceptable,鈥� wrote the hard-line newspaper Kayhan, noting that producing someone of 鈥渟uper-strategic importance鈥� like Mr. Fakhrizadeh was a 50-year project.
鈥淭here is no chance we can look the other way in the face of mistakes and failures that have been committed with regard to infiltration,鈥� Kayhan wrote.
Looking at the wrong targets
But looking in the wrong direction may be part of the problem, says Dr. Ostovar. IRGC intelligence has invested heavily in rooting out 鈥渋nfiltrators,鈥� but for years pulled in dual-citizen academics and journalists.
鈥淭hey鈥檙e just spending time on the wrong targets,鈥� he says. 鈥淲hat gets in their way, probably more than anything, is that they really misunderstand the adversary. When they arrest [journalists] like Jason Rezaian and Maziar Bahari, they legitimately thought these guys were part of some spy network.鈥�
鈥淭hey really are paranoid, the IRGC in particular,鈥� adds Dr. Ostovar. 鈥淵ou wonder if the omnipresence of the threat that they perceive actually obscures the threat in their midst. They only see the forest; they don鈥檛 see the trees.鈥�
In the most recent example, a Swedish Iranian disaster medicine scholar, Ahmadreza Djalali, reportedly faces execution this week. He was arrested in 2016 after being invited to a conference in Tehran, then sentenced to death in 2017 on charges of spying for Israel. A group of 153 Nobel laureates signed a letter calling for his release.
Meanwhile, on the ground in Iran, actual foreign operatives appear to work with few limits.
鈥淚t鈥檚 been just like American action movies,鈥� wrote Mr. Mogouei, the pro-regime filmmaker. 鈥淭he whole file tells us that the intelligence apparatus has suffered serious holes for years, very deep ones. We need to drive back and cleanse the system.鈥�
