Long in Russian orbit, Georgia tilts West
| Tbilisi, Georgia
Nestled in a fairy-light-strewn park along the riverbank, near a street vendor proffering a chipped-nose statuette of native son Josef Stalin, a pub has posted a notice.
Russia is an 鈥渙ccupier,鈥� and its President Vladimir Putin is 鈥渆vil.鈥� 鈥淚f you do not agree,鈥� it warns, 鈥減lease do not come in.鈥澛�
It鈥檚 a serious statement in a country that prides itself on its smothering hospitality.聽
Why We Wrote This
A story focused onSunny Georgia鈥檚 freedoms and quest for membership in the European Union attract Russian exiles but risk provoking Vladimir Putin鈥檚 imperial designs.
Proprietor Data Lapauri is speaking in part to potential patrons fleeing Moscow in the wake of the war in Ukraine to avoid conscription and prosecution for dissent, or on the lookout for a better life.聽
These Russians are, on the whole, richer, if more politically oppressed, than their Georgian neighbors, and have been driving up the cost of living here in the capital. Rents have more than doubled since 2022, and lattes are approaching London prices.聽
With a penchant for silent meditation retreats and potted fern-forward decor, Mr. Lapauri doesn鈥檛 seem prone to martial pronouncements. Nonetheless, he detects existential threat in these developments: 鈥淓very Russian is a soldier. Some come with guns, others come with money 鈥� and they鈥檙e expanding the Russian empire.鈥澛�
Across town, at a new Russian-owned cafe with views overlooking the stylish cobblestoned old city, a 20-something couple from St. Petersburg marvel at the balmy breezes. They are digital nomads who no longer want to live in the authoritarian state Mr. Putin has created. They also understand the frustration of Georgians like Mr. Lapauri who question why Russians like them don鈥檛 depose their leader.聽
But the state 鈥渋s so strong, so corrupt, [with] so many weapons,鈥� says Katya, who has compatriots in prison for engaging in political protests and prefers not to share her last name. 鈥淭he police and soldiers, they are so ...鈥� Katya struggles for the right word, 鈥渋mpossible.鈥�
Her boyfriend abridges, putting his hand on her shoulder: 鈥淚t鈥檚 pain.鈥澛�
The dynamic between these young Russians and the Georgian cafe owner is playing out throughout the former Soviet satellites of the Caucasus and Central Asia, where many of nearly聽1 million Russians have self-exiled. Here, across the Black Sea from Ukraine, where Mr. Putin is prosecuting war, these people are reminders of the dangers of Russian imperial designs on states desiring democracy over dictatorship.聽
Perhaps nowhere is this more critically clear than in Georgia, which faces a key inflection point later this year: The European Union will decide whether to grant the Caucasian nation鈥檚 long-coveted candidacy status in the Western partnership.聽
鈥淭his is, without exaggeration, a very important historic moment for Georgia,鈥� says Ana Natsvlishvili, an opposition party member of Georgia鈥檚 Parliament. 鈥淲e are at a crossroads.鈥�
Just 45 minutes north of this capital city, EU monitors with high-powered binoculars peer over bucolic rolling meadows and point out armored Russian vehicles parked near a shooting range and camouflaged tower.聽聽
They watch a Russian military supply truck wind its way down to a village where residents, who once made a living with cattle or fruit orchards, woke up one day to find that Russian forces had laid down barbed wire and dug ditches, separating them from their property and livelihoods.
Russia occupies 20% of the country 鈥� a stake in Georgian ground that has acted as a tacit threat for 15 years, since a short but deadly war launched by Mr. Putin in the summer of 2008. Russian troops routed the country in a conflict that lasted five days, killing hundreds and displacing tens of thousands.聽
It was a battle Moscow ostensibly waged to support separatists in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian regions of northern Georgia. Viewing the situation through the lens of Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, however, many now believe Mr. Putin pounced on long-held plans to weaken Russia鈥檚 former republic after NATO officials in the spring of 2008 pledged to one day make Georgia a member.
The founder of the ruling Georgian Dream political party, Bidzina Ivanishvili, accused Georgia鈥檚 leaders at the time of waving this NATO membership push in Russia鈥檚 face like 鈥渁 red cloth in front of a bull.鈥澛�
Yet even as the war in Ukraine has raised the specter of Mr. Putin鈥檚 ability 鈥� and proclivity 鈥� to assert power, many Georgians are preparing to fight what they see as a critical battle for freedom.
Polls show that 85% of citizens want a West-facing future 鈥� and membership in the European Union. But since the Georgian Dream party won democratic elections in 2012, there has been backsliding in anti-corruption, press freedom, and justice.
For those 15% of Georgians who don鈥檛 support EU membership, the reasons vary, from nostalgia, to genuine disdain for what they see as the decadence of the West, to disappointment with the economic hardships and challenges聽wrought by market reform.聽
Whether the party is edging closer to Moscow and authoritarianism, as critics say, or playing the delicate chess of not upsetting its superpower neighbor and sparking war, as it claims, many Georgians fear the government is sabotaging their decadeslong dream of EU membership.聽
This quest was dealt a blow last year when Moldova and Ukraine were granted EU candidacy status, but Georgia was not 鈥� a devastating development in a country that had long considered itself ahead of this pack on the path to democracy.
鈥淕eorgia has been 鈥� I wouldn鈥檛 say a beacon of democracy, but still really kind of a standout case of a democratic state in transition,鈥� says Irakli Porchkhidze, the country鈥檚 former first deputy state minister for reintegration. 鈥淣owadays we really haven鈥檛 been fitting the bill for that.鈥�
The question is whether the EU will grant the country candidate status anyway 鈥� if only to prevent disillusioned Georgians from looking eastward for consolation.
Indeed, EU candidacy would sustain pro-European Georgian advocates fighting for their country鈥檚 freedom, says Nona Kurdovanidze, chair of the Georgian Young Lawyers鈥� Association. 鈥淲e鈥檙e not Russians 鈥� we鈥檙e not leaving. We will fight to the end.鈥澛犅�
EU candidacy status is not membership but the first of several progressive moves toward it 鈥� including adopting EU laws and standards 鈥� that can take more than a聽decade to complete. To qualify for that initial entry step, which the full 27-member union votes on, Georgia was given a to-do list of 12 democratic priorities. They involve promoting open society development, rooting out corruption, protecting freedom of the press, and implementing judicial reform. But that list instead has 鈥渂ecome an instructional manual for how to destroy Georgia鈥檚 European path,鈥� says Giorgi Vashadze, chair of the Strategy Builder opposition party.聽 聽
As a case in point, critics point to a bill put forward last year requiring media and nongovernmental groups that get more than 20% of their funding from the West to declare themselves 鈥渇oreign agents.鈥�
The proposal appeared to be ripped straight from Mr. Putin鈥檚 power-consolidating playbook; the term itself echoed 鈥渢he Stalin era, when people called this were shot,鈥� says Eter Turadze, editor-in-chief of the independent newspaper Gazeti Batumelebi.
And as in Soviet days of old, it brought back memories of betrayals and efforts to break free of not only Russian mastery, but also the Russian mindset.聽
As a child in the 1990s, George Melashvili grew up in this capital city, which was ideologically free but in economic crisis, with Mafia-like clans battling for power and even a civil war early in the decade. His home didn鈥檛 have reliable running water or electricity. But it was filled with classic novels his beloved grandmother managed to procure, and by candlelight they worked their way through the Western canon: Charles Dickens, 鈥淩obin Hood,鈥� 鈥淭he Three Musketeers.鈥�
These stories sparked in him a sense of 鈥渢he way institutions are supposed to serve society and restrain people with great power 鈥� and that, in the face of injustice, one person can make a change,鈥� says Mr. Melashvili, now a German Marshall Fund fellow and founder of the Europe-Georgia Institute.
And so it was with some hope that he and his fellow university alumni approached their old professor, Nikoloz Samkharadze. He had become chair of the Parliament Foreign Relations Committee and a member of the ruling Georgian Dream party.聽
Mr. Samkharadze was known for his egalitarian teaching style. 鈥淗e was very close with his students,鈥� emphasizes Mr. Melashvili, a courtly 20-something alternately teased and revered by friends for his unassuming command of his country鈥檚 history.
A Europe specialist who studied in Germany, Mr. Samkharadze 鈥渒new perfectly well what this law was supposed to do,鈥� Mr. Melashvili says. And he had the power to quash the foreign agents bill in committee.聽
In an open letter, more than 100 of his former students urged Mr. Samkharadze to do just that.
When their former professor ultimately rejected their pleas, 鈥渁 lot of people who considered him a mentor 鈥� and adored him 鈥� were devastated,鈥� Mr. Melashvili adds.
Privately, many speculated that Georgian Dream officials had chosen to send their bill through the committee chaired by the pro-European Mr. Samkharadze as a party loyalty test.
The students, along with thousands of others, took to the streets in March in a massive uprising that ultimately pressured the government into withdrawing the law.
鈥淚t was very inspiring for us,鈥� says Tamar Oniani, human rights program director at the Georgian Young Lawyers鈥� Association. 鈥淚t was a rebirth of Georgian civil society.鈥澛�
Mr. Samkharadze, in a recent interview with a group of Western reporters, described the outcry as a misunderstanding about what the law was designed to do. He says it was to promote transparency 鈥� and certainly not a Russian-backed effort to block Western funding to organizations critical of the government.聽
Still, he argues, it鈥檚 generally important that the country take a 鈥渧ery pragmatic approach鈥� to Moscow: 鈥淲e are under enormous pressure, and under a big, big risk of being attacked.鈥�
Give Russia an hour, after all, and they could have tanks in Tbilisi. 鈥淭hen it鈥檚 a dilemma: If you shoot, it鈥檚 a war 鈥� and if you don鈥檛 shoot, you are not a state,鈥� Mr. Samkharadze adds.
When the Russian forces descended on the town of Akhalgori in 2008, a neighbor burst through Nana Chkareuli鈥檚 door. 鈥淭hey鈥檙e coming!鈥� she yelled. They took off running toward the woods to hide.聽
Ms. Chkareuli now lives in Tserovani, a Georgian settlement for thousands of people who fled during the war.聽
After 15 years of development, Tserovani is dotted with modest homes, some inhabited by avid gardeners tending grapevines, and even a handful of聽Airbnb properties.聽
Still, the 2008 war looms large in the collective consciousness. On clear days, Ms. Chkareuli can see the hills of what was her hometown 鈥� since renamed Leningor 鈥� in the distance. She longs for a day she can return, and she is not alone. During a visit to a high school just up the road from Ms. Chkareuli鈥檚 nongovernmental organization offices supporting people who have been displaced, one student recounts stories grown-ups have told her about her old village and sighs: 鈥淚 know it was something like heaven.鈥�
These towns remain occupied and considered, by Mr. Putin at least, to be Russian soil. And in the meantime, those who cross the boundary line of the Russian-occupied zone 鈥� whether to visit a loved one or to shoo back a cow that has strayed 鈥� are routinely held by Russian authorities for what EU monitors here call 鈥渞ansoms.鈥�
The EU decision not to punish Moscow for its Georgian incursion emboldened Mr. Putin, Georgian officials often argue 鈥� and their Western counterparts tend to agree. Even after Russian forces invaded Georgia in 2008, France sold Moscow an amphibious assault ship, for example (prompting a Russian general to remark that having that in the military鈥檚 arsenal at the time of the war with Georgia would have made defeating the country even easier). And the following year, in 2009, the Obama administration launched its reset with Russia. 聽
An EU statement criticizing the invasion 鈥渨as predictably tepid,鈥� former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates writes in his 2014 memoir: 鈥淪o as much as most of us wanted strong action against Russia, we suppressed our feelings.鈥澛�
When the Georgian Dream party came to power in 2012, it introduced 鈥渁 new approach 鈥� we call it strategic patience,鈥� Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili explained at the Bratislava Global Security Forum in May. Through it, 鈥渨e managed to achieve peace and stability.鈥�
It is, to be fair, a considerable feat, deftly walking a line between a looming Russian threat and a West demanding reform. It is also, analysts note, an adroitness for which Georgians are known: The Mother of Kartli monument overlooking Tbilisi holds a wine glass for guests in one hand and a sword for enemies in the other.聽
Perhaps because of and not despite this, Georgians have served as influential Soviet leaders, from the brutal premier Mr. Stalin to the elegant perestroika supporter and door-opener-to-the-West Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.
Yet a historical talent for savvy maneuvering doesn鈥檛 explain the extent to which the government appears to be instrumentalizing fear, says Dr. Porchkhidze, now vice president of the Georgian Institute for Strategic Studies.聽
Critics charge that Mr. Ivanishvili, a billionaire who made his money in banking and metals in Russia in the 1990s and became prime minister in 2012, is an oligarch beholden to Moscow.
But Moscow can鈥檛 render Georgians anti-Western overnight, given their overwhelming support for EU membership, says Tinatin Bokuchava, who chairs the United National Movement opposition party. So Mr. Putin鈥檚 strategic goal must be, she says, 鈥渢o systematically erode democratic institutions鈥� to guarantee Georgia can鈥檛 become an EU member.
Others say Georgian Dream may indeed be reasonably pro-Western but uses anti-democratic moves simply to hold on to power. Eyeing elections in 2024, the party must project a pro-European stance to win. But reforms demanded by the EU jeopardize its chances by stripping it of tools like media control and judicial coercion 鈥� so it is resisting them, says Sergi Kapanadze, a former member of Parliament and spokesperson for the European Georgia party.
Georgian Dream is also using nationalism and xenophobia to fire up its base, he argues: 鈥淭hey say, 鈥業鈥檓 pro-Europe, but Europe wants to get us into war in Ukraine because they have different values. We鈥檙e protecting identity, statehood, sovereignty, peace in this country.鈥櫬�
鈥淭his is a very pragmatic thing to do,鈥� he continues. 鈥淣ow enemies are defined as anyone who wants to 鈥榙rag鈥� Georgia into war with Russia.鈥澛�
Aiding their campaign is a 鈥渉umongous propaganda machine,鈥� including several state-owned television stations, Dr. Kapanadze adds. 鈥淪o they can take even the most outrageous idea and spin it.鈥�
As deputy director of Formula TV, Georgia鈥檚 largest independent broadcast station, Giorgi Targamadze sees alarming and familiar attempts to restrict freedom of the press.
His first ID card growing up was as a Soviet citizen: 鈥淚 remember it well. We were isolated from the civilized world,鈥� he says.聽
When reporters from Russia began streaming into Georgian exile after the invasion of Ukraine, the Formula TV network headquarters here provided them studio space, equipment, and other technical support.
But the resolve of Mr. Targamadze and his colleagues to document their leaders鈥� crimes and shortcomings is proving increasingly harrowing.
Reporters here cite July 5, 2021, as a turning point in their coverage of the news. It was the day of a gay pride demonstration that the government used, they say, as an excuse to beat up more than 50 journalists. One camera operator was killed.
The courts convicted 14 far-right perpetrators, but critics counter that they were actually recruited by officials who wanted the press targeted. The government says the attacks were random.
They certainly fit a pattern of growing harassment and violence against journalists 鈥渄ue to increased political polarization and uncertainty鈥� in the country, notes a 2022 Freedom House report.
A particularly infamous case was the conviction last year of Nika Gvaramia, general director of an opposition broadcast company, for misusing a company car 鈥� a spurious charge, concluded Transparency International, a Berlin-based anti-corruption nongovernmental organization.
He was sentenced to 3 1/2 years in prison and served one before the country鈥檚 French-born President Salome Zourabichvili, who is not a Georgian Dream party member, pardoned him in June.聽
The point of this intimidation has been to cow independent media, journalists here say, and it has not been without effect.
鈥淭he main idea is to have this kind of self-censorship,鈥� says one Formula TV reporter. 鈥淵ou start thinking about your own safety and the safety of your family members 鈥� and then I guess at some point you say, 鈥楳aybe it鈥檚 not the right time to be in this profession.鈥欌�� 聽
At the offices of Gazeti Batumelebi, one of the country鈥檚 largest independent newspapers 鈥� based in the palm tree-lined Black Sea resort of Batumi 鈥� a leak of thousands of secret state security service files in 2021 confirmed the fears of journalists: Their increasingly skittish sources were being scared or blackmailed into not talking 鈥� and they were being surveilled, too.
The trove included recordings of confessions heard by Catholic clergy, an elected figure privately wrestling with whether to seek an abortion after an extramarital affair, and newsroom discussions of sources coming forward with proof of votes being traded for prison sentence commutations.聽
Reporters feel equal parts exhausted and galvanized, says their editor Ms. Turadze, whose traffic-cone-orange hair seems聽custom-designed to capture the newsroom鈥檚 cautionary mood. The government鈥檚 recent initiatives have 鈥渇orced us to become activists 鈥� this is so not comfortable for us. ... But this is about survival.鈥澛�
The real damage 鈥� and the point of disinformation efforts, critics say 鈥� is that the truth can come to seem unknowable.聽
Such powerlessness is precisely the feeling authoritarian leaders like to cultivate in their citizens, says Lika Mkhatvari, a child psychologist and proud native of the ancient city of Kutaisi that is now known for its style and a direct flight to Paris.
At an hourslong dinner with groaning boards of khachapuri 鈥� gooey, cheese-filled bread 鈥� eggplant with walnuts, pomegranate-marinated pork, and clay pots of stewed beans, Ms. Mkhatvari sits beside her friend Nino Tvaltvadze, former deputy mayor of Kutaisi.聽
Ms. Tvaltvadze鈥檚 husband fought Russia in 2008 when her eldest daughter was聽3 months old. She understands intimately the pressures on the Georgian government to avoid war: 鈥淚 was thinking, what would I do if I were a decision-maker, if you believe you could cause war 鈥� if you really believe that?鈥澛�
But, she adds, despite the risk, the public will to join the EU is 鈥渟o strong, because we also see the solution in that, the protection in that.鈥�
It鈥檚 a stance that has garnered some sympathy among EU officials. A June EU report on Georgia鈥檚 progress in meeting the dozen candidacy criteria concluded that three of the 12 are completely addressed, seven saw 鈥渟ome progress,鈥� and one in the category of 鈥渄e-oligarchization鈥� saw 鈥渓imited progress.鈥� On the final indicator of 鈥渕edia pluralism,鈥� 鈥渘o progress鈥� was achieved. 聽 聽
The decision on Georgia鈥檚 candidacy status is expected later this year. Many democracy advocates are hopeful that EU officials will conclude that whether or not the government deserves EU membership, the people of Georgia certainly do.聽
There is precedence for granting EU candidacy under these conditions, they say, pointing to a decision made in Bosnia-
Herzegovina鈥檚 favor in 2003.聽
If it doesn鈥檛 happen, Georgia is likely to be pulled back into Russia鈥檚 orbit, Ms. Tvaltvadze says. 鈥淎nd we know how Russia wants its neighborhood to look: without any ambition, without any future.鈥�
With this, the two women lead the table in a Georgian toast. It roughly translates as, 鈥淚 hope you win鈥� 鈥� a nod, they say, to a storied history of what amounts to bare-knuckled brawls for survival. It is not for nothing, analysts note, that almost all of Georgia鈥檚 Olympic medals have been for fighting sports like boxing, judo, and wrestling 鈥� or for the brawn of weightlifting.
It is also no coincidence that Georgians have sent droves of soldiers to help Ukraine repel the Russian invasion. 聽
At today鈥檚 feast among friends in Kutaisi, it is a toast to Georgia鈥檚 quest for EU membership. The guests raise their glasses, responding with the traditional, 鈥淚 hope you win, too.鈥�
鈥淲e need hope,鈥� Ms. Tvaltvadze says. 鈥淲e need this.鈥澛�
On-scene reporting was facilitated through a study trip sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a trans-
Atlantic think tank. 聽
