As Ukraine war drags on, NATO steps up war readiness
| MONS, Belgium
When two Russian fighter jets forced down an American surveillance drone above international waters a week ago, U.S. officials warned that the 鈥渞eckless鈥� move ratcheted up the risk of 鈥渕iscalculations鈥� and 鈥渕isunderstandings鈥� between the two nuclear powers.聽
Back at NATO鈥檚 strategic headquarters in a small village an hour southwest of Brussels,聽it was yet another incident driving home聽the urgency of the question聽keeping its planners busy around the clock: How, precisely, will NATO respond if Russia, either accidentally or intentionally, attacks a member the alliance has pledged to defend?
鈥淣ow this is a personal opinion,鈥� Lt. Gen. Hubert Cottereau, vice chief of staff at NATO鈥檚聽strategic headquarters,聽told the Monitor last week. 鈥淏ut I don鈥檛 know if we have already entered the third world war.鈥澛燞is point is not that NATO will soon be enmeshed in a far wider conflict, but rather to drive home how seriously military professionals take the risk of such a possibility. War preparation is a pathway, if not to peace, then to security.
Why We Wrote This
A story focused onThe NATO alliance has taken efforts to avoid being drawn directly into the conflict over Ukraine. Yet the longer war there goes on, the more urgent readiness becomes for alliance commanders.
One of the great hazards of war, after all 鈥� strategists throughout history have stressed 鈥� is their awful tendency to escalate suddenly. 鈥淒o you know what General MacArthur said? The biggest catastrophes can be summed up in two words: Too late,鈥� notes Lieutenant General聽Cottereau, who聽recently聽served as the first-ever French deputy commander of a U.S. infantry division. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 want to be too late. I want to be ready, if necessary, to fight tonight.鈥�
For this reason, NATO has been quietly taking the step of putting its strategic headquarters聽on聽what military officials here聽are describing as 鈥渨ar fighting footing.鈥� While it鈥檚 a shift being made without public proclamation聽or formal status,聽some of its elements were authorized聽by the alliance鈥檚 political council last year.聽Officials聽here聽characterize the move as a major one and key to what NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg calls the 鈥渂iggest overhaul of [NATO鈥檚] collective defense since the聽Cold War.鈥澛犅�
It entails聽everything聽from reorganizing how NATO forces are commanded,聽to weaving聽artificial intelligence into planning in an effort to help predict the unpredictable, to聽introducing聽cultural shifts that make it easier to, say, ask staffers to work weekends.
Such聽steps become聽鈥渕ore and more urgent鈥� with each passing week of war in Ukraine, says Ian Lesser, vice president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.聽
Poland鈥檚 pledge last week, for example, to send fighter jets to Ukraine 鈥� the first NATO nation to do so聽鈥� while welcomed by Kyiv, carries with it a danger of escalation that makes some NATO allies nervous.聽(Slovakia followed Poland鈥檚 lead late Friday.)聽It was, in fact, a step roundly rejected by the United States and other nations a year ago for precisely this reason.聽
鈥淎s the conflict drags on, the accumulated risks of something going wrong 鈥� whether accidentally or deliberately that would involve the defense of NATO more directly 鈥� will grow,鈥� Dr. Lesser says.
NATO鈥檚聽current shifts are聽meant to mitigate these risks, says retired Gen. Frederick 鈥淏en鈥� Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe.聽
鈥淭he Russians are going to see what they might have hoped would be an alliance that was unsure of itself leaning forward even more,鈥� he聽says. 鈥淎nd that is the best way to make sure the Russians don鈥檛 make a terrible miscalculation and attack any part of NATO.鈥�
Given all of this, there鈥檚聽widespread support within聽NATO聽among both uniformed personnel and civilian officials for the moves,聽says聽Lieutenant General Cottereau. 鈥淓verybody is convinced that something has to change 鈥� and has to change very, very rapidly.鈥�
Centralizing resources
These changes started in Madrid last June with a NATO conference in which the North Atlantic Council, the alliance鈥檚 political body, agreed to put forces currently numbering some 41,000 鈥� up from 4,650 in 2021 鈥� under the command of U.S. Gen. Christopher Cavoli, NATO鈥檚 Supreme Allied Commander. The plan in the years ahead is to continue to grow these forces to 300,000.
This is necessary,聽alliance officials say,聽because after the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO鈥檚 far-flung stability operations and diffuse聽anti-terrorism efforts聽meant that NATO鈥檚 top commander had for years 鈥渞etained less control over the national armed forces of member countries,鈥� says Rafael Loss, coordinator for pan-European data projects at the European Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin.聽
In the wake of聽the Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, officials at聽NATO鈥檚 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)聽grappled with a realization: 鈥淲e can鈥檛 order anybody to do anything. We build plans, we build strategy, we do all of those things, but the headquarters itself doesn鈥檛 issue orders,鈥� a NATO military official says, adding that the thinking was, 鈥淭hat鈥檚 not going to work.鈥�
The war in Ukraine is also consuming weapons and equipment at a pace 鈥渕any times higher than our current rate of production,鈥澛燬ecretary-General聽Stoltenberg聽has warned. So SHAPE is now building future war plans to 鈥渃entralize the allocation of scarce resources鈥� since, should conflict erupt, there 鈥渨ill be tensions鈥� on them, Lieutenant General聽Cottereau says. It is also encouraging the defense industrial complexes of member nations to produce more arms.
At the same time, NATO鈥檚 strategic headquarters, as part of its war fighting footing, has become 鈥渕uch more ambitious in exercising its forces and capabilities,鈥� Mr. Loss says. This is important because in the post-Cold War years, though SHAPE developed training regimes,聽鈥渋t had very little say over what forces it could draw on to implement鈥� them.
Now if NATO is聽practicing a聽maritime amphibious assault, for example, 鈥渢hen it can say that it would be a good idea to have a battalion of Dutch forces participate as well,鈥� he notes.
Such exercises have aims beyond just reinforcing readiness: NATO planners work closely with strategic communications teams to 鈥渄evelop exercises around certain messages they want to send to Russia,鈥� Mr. Loss adds. 鈥淎nd one of the messages they regularly intend to send is that NATO is able to do things that Russia is not.鈥�
To aid聽commanders聽in the face of myriad complex demands, the headquarters will integrate artificial intelligence into its strategizing, Lieutenant General聽Cottereau says, with the ultimate aim of being able, 鈥渙n the fly, to war-game the decisions we鈥檙e making during the fight.鈥�
The goal is to use AI to 鈥渁ccelerate the decision-making process as well as to challenge what our military science tells us to do,鈥� he adds. 鈥淲ith the AI we can cross-check our decisions.鈥澛�
The war footing considerations also run to the low-tech, as SHAPE advises member states of the need to do things like invest in their old train tracks and roads.聽
Patriot missile systems and tanks have in some cases been sent to Ukraine聽via highways and byways聽because there isn鈥檛 enough railway capacity, a senior NATO military official notes. 鈥淚f we let all these sophisticated weapons drive on the street鈥� 鈥� exposing them to wear and tear 鈥� 鈥渢hat reduces their fighting power at the front line.鈥�
鈥淲e鈥檙e thinking big鈥�
Even in the service of quotidian demands, putting NATO鈥檚 strategic headquarters on war fighting footing has not been without controversy. There were those who initially bristled at the martial implications for an alliance that remains 鈥� officially, at least 鈥� at peace. Early in the invasion, enthusiasm for the idea tended to correspond with member nations鈥� proximity to Ukraine, NATO officials say. Yet as Russian brutality there continued unabated, members grew to overwhelmingly support the shift, they add.聽
But while the move may have made some member nations鈥� political leaders 鈥渦neasy鈥� at first, says Mr. Hodges. 鈥淵ou can believe that the chiefs of defense鈥� for these countries 鈥渦nderstand exactly why this needs to be done.鈥�
And they do, says Lieutenant General聽Cottereau, who led strategic planning for the Army鈥檚 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, from 2019 to 2021. During that time, he took only the American standard-issue vacation of two weeks in two years and soaked in some of the lessons America tends to impart.聽
鈥淚f you want to transform an organization, you have to think big,鈥� he says. 鈥淎nd that鈥檚 what we鈥檙e doing 鈥� we鈥檙e thinking big.鈥澛�
Even simply calling SHAPE a strategic 鈥渨ar fighting headquarters鈥� within the alliance conveys a sense of urgency, he adds, and signals the need for empathy in the shared experience that comes with it.
鈥淭here is a huge distance not only physically but mentally between the strategic staff officer and the warfighter in the field who is freezing during the night, who is seeing his comrades dying, who is yelling for ammunition,鈥� he says. 鈥淎nd that distance is the problem.聽
鈥淭he people who are working in their warm offices might not sense the urgency. That鈥檚 totally human as a tendency,鈥� he adds. 鈥淏ut they have to be convinced of the necessity 鈥� the absolute necessity 鈥� of what they are doing.鈥�
