Peace through strength? US rattles China with new defenses near Taiwan.
When an American four-star general warned his commanders in a leaked letter last month that, while he hoped he was wrong, his 鈥済ut鈥� told him the United States will be at war with China in a couple of years, Pentagon officials publicly insisted the comments do not represent their view of the matter.
That said, they also announced an increase in the U.S. military鈥檚 footprint in Asia last week, with more troops headed to the Philippines as part of a new basing agreement 鈥� a handy setup should Beijing, say, try to invade Taiwan.聽聽
Chinese officials called the move 鈥渟elfish,鈥� adding that it 鈥渆ndangers regional peace鈥� and 鈥渆scalates tensions.鈥� From the Pentagon鈥檚 perspective 鈥� particularly on the heels of scrambling to shoot down a suspected spy balloon loitering over U.S. nuclear silos 鈥� that鈥檚 Beijing鈥檚 forte.
Why We Wrote This
A story focused onThe announced return of U.S. military forces to the Philippines comes at a time of rising U.S.-China tensions. A key question is whether this will escalate the rivalry or send signals that reduce the chances of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Stationing some U.S. forces at Philippine military bases, about three decades after large American bases there closed, is widely viewed as an effort to contain Chinese aggression in the region by projecting U.S. power. It will better allow U.S. forces to launch operations in the event of a crisis in Taiwan or the South China Sea. 聽
Yet as Beijing ramps up its saber rattling toward Taiwan, the move has raised questions about how best to manage the risk of superpower conflict in the region.
While it鈥檚 not hard to see why the new announcement on bases seems hostile to Beijing, 鈥渨e鈥檙e not talking about putting intermediate-range ballistic missiles there, which would look like an ability to attack targets in China,鈥� says Eugene Gholz, associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana. 聽
Should China become an implacable aggressor, however, the Pentagon does have war plans in place to attack China鈥檚 defensive bubble. The current U.S. footprint in the region fishhooks from Japan through Guam to the coming presence in the Philippines, creating the capability to launch airstrikes to destroy thousands of communications systems, missile launchers, and radars. As China鈥檚 military isn鈥檛 currently built for power projection, Beijing could easily interpret these plans as U.S. intent to destroy China鈥檚 defenses in a first strike.聽
This all creates a 鈥渟piral of hostility鈥� that has the potential to create a 鈥渄ownright dangerous, use-it-or-lose-it鈥� situation when it comes to Beijing鈥檚 nuclear arsenal, Dr. Gholz says.
Should they fear a U.S. first strike, Chinese leaders may decide to launch one of their own while they still have control of their weapons, he notes.聽
For this reason, analysts say, China is ramping up its production of nuclear warheads. It now has more intercontinental ballistic missile launchers than the U.S., according to a U.S. military report to Congress released this week, prompting Republican leaders to call for 鈥渉igher numbers and new capabilities鈥� in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.聽
Still, the Biden administration has largely continued the tough stance that the Trump administration took before it, approving Pentagon moves that have been called everything from a cynical play for more defense dollars to smart power projection in a bid to curb Beijing鈥檚 aggression.聽
The question, analysts say, is what might these moves achieve, and whether there is a way forward that combines strategic restraint with cleareyed realism in an effort to temper the dangerous and often outrageous expense of escalation.聽
Chinese self-assessments
High up on the list of Pentagon concerns is that although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, it has never renounced the use of military force despite clear indications that invasion would come with an enormous price.聽
President Joe Biden has pledged that U.S. forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. A war game conducted last year by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded that the U.S. would win, but with losses that 鈥渨ould damage the U.S. global position for many years.鈥� China would fare worse, with its navy 鈥渋n shambles鈥� and tens of thousands of troops taken prisoners of war.
The question, analysts say, is whether China takes these sorts of lessons to heart. Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, after all, has shown that leaders can have an outsize view of what their militaries can easily accomplish.聽
鈥淚 have a lot of concerns about the Chinese military, but the big question is, what do the Chinese think about their prospects themselves?鈥� says Mike Sweeney, a fellow at the Defense Priorities think tank in Washington who has served as聽rapporteur for the Pentagon鈥檚 Defense Policy Board.聽
鈥淭his notion that the Russians believed the Ukraine war would be over in weeks 鈥� do the Chinese have the same delusions about Taiwan? Does the PLA [People鈥檚 Liberation Army] have the gumption to go to senior leadership and say how difficult this is?鈥� he adds.
It is a concern shared by top U.S. officials as well. 鈥淚f the political leadership turned to the [PLA] today and said, 鈥楥an you invade right now?鈥� it鈥檚 my assessment that the answer would be a firm yes,鈥� Lonnie Henley, a former intelligence officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in a 2021 congressional hearing.聽
But, as with Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, it would not occur without warning. While Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley said that he 鈥渄id not dismiss at all鈥� that the PLA has a goal of developing the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027, he added, 鈥淚 don鈥檛 see it happening right out of the blue.鈥�
Geography constraints
That鈥檚 in large part because the basic facts of geography naturally constrain Beijing鈥檚 potential efforts to project power.
Its ships and submarines must sail through relatively shallow waters and distinct choke points to reach the broader Pacific, which means that even East Asian nations 鈥渨ith extremely limited military capabilities鈥� can create highly effective defensive networks with anti-access weaponry like missiles and mines, backed up by sophisticated networks of sensors, Dr. Gholz says.聽
Given these constraints, the Pentagon has been charged with threat inflation for its tendency to, as Dr. Gholz puts it, 鈥渆quate security with total military dominance.鈥�
Accustomed to being the premier naval presence in the Pacific, 鈥淯.S. defense planners tend to see any diminution of military advantage as a disaster鈥� 鈥� including China鈥檚 heightened ability to defend itself against the U.S., he adds.
China鈥檚 military capabilities
To this end, it鈥檚 helpful to soberly assess the capabilities of China鈥檚 military, analysts say 鈥� including its status, for example, as home to the world鈥檚 largest navy, which might seem reasonably alarming at first glance.聽
鈥淏ut you don鈥檛 even have to scratch the surface very much before you realize, 鈥榃ait a minute 鈥� China isn鈥檛 building a military to invade the West Coast of the U.S. They鈥檙e building a military to keep us out of China,鈥欌�� says Dan Grazier, senior defense policy fellow at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) and a former Marine Corps captain.
What the U.S. fleet lacks in total numbers it makes up for in tonnage, which is more than double that of China鈥檚 ships, he points out in a POGO analysis published in December. This means that the Pentagon鈥檚 ships are literal heavyweights, able to make longer voyages, carry more fuel and munitions, and project power in a way that Chinese vessels simply cannot.
China鈥檚 two aircraft carriers, in particular, are frequently invoked as a sign of the ascendance of its military might, since it鈥檚 often assumed they are roughly equivalent to their U.S. counterparts, Mr. Sweeney says.
They鈥檙e not.聽The carriers aren鈥檛 nuclear-powered, nor do they have steam catapult technology, which is what allows U.S. fighter jets to fly, slingshot-style, off the deck. Based on a 40-year-old Soviet design, China鈥檚 carriers instead have curved, ski-jump fronts.聽
These two traits are important: Without nuclear power, carriers are limited in their range, and without catapults, the aircraft on board are limited in the amount of fuel and ordnance they can carry.聽
So while 鈥渋t would be wrong to call China鈥檚 aircraft carriers mere status symbols without any combat function at all,鈥� Beijing is 鈥渕ore likely to deploy their fighters in an air defense role rather than strike deep into an opponent鈥檚 territory,鈥� Mr. Sweeney writes in a 2020 Defense Priorities analysis.
Beneath the surface, the Chinese submarine force is about the size of America鈥檚, but only six of its 66 submarines are nuclear-powered. All of the U.S. Navy鈥檚 subs are nuclear-powered, which, among other things, gives them far greater range.聽
Chinese submarines also make a lot of noise compared with the U.S. fleet, which makes them easier to detect with the Pentagon鈥檚 substantial network of undersea sensors.
At the lower-tech end of the spectrum, it is 鈥渂affling鈥� 鈥� but encouraging 鈥� to many military analysts that China 鈥渟imply has not built enough basic transport ships to ferry a sufficient number of troops鈥� to Taiwan should it decide to invade its shores, he adds. 鈥淭he math simply does not work.鈥�
Constructive engagement
That is not to say that there haven鈥檛 been troubling developments. In the CSIS war game, China simply commandeered commercial vessels to ferry its troops when it decided to invade Taiwan.聽
China is also building a third aircraft carrier that promises to be 鈥渕uch larger鈥� than the first two and what analysts call 鈥渄ecent destroyer ships鈥� to escort their carriers.聽
At the same time, the PLA has increased provocative actions in and near the Taiwan Strait.
鈥淭he PLA鈥檚 not 20-feet tall, but they鈥檙e not 4-feet tall, either,鈥� Mr. Sweeney says.
Though nuclear uncertainties, coupled with China鈥檚 gray-zone activities and 鈥渉am-fisted bullying鈥� of its neighbors, tend to discourage constructive engagement, the two nations should continue to work toward engagement anyway, Mr. Sweeney says.
This could include military-to-military exchanges and other confidence-building measures that could 鈥渃reate a pathway for deescalating a crisis if one begins,鈥� Mr. Sweeney says. 鈥淚鈥檇 still very much like us to have perspective 鈥� and for us not to go too far down the road into unnecessary confrontation.鈥澛�
Conflict with China, he adds, need not be a foregone conclusion.
Editor's note: The description of Mike Sweeney has been corrected in regard to his role (as the rapporteur) with the Pentagon鈥檚 Defense Policy Board.
