What a US military base in Poland may signal for NATO
| Brussels
As part of聽what鈥檚 billed as the biggest overhaul of聽NATO defenses since the Cold War, the United States is planning a permanent military base in Poland, its first in Eastern Europe.
While the U.S. troops headed to the new base 鈥渁ren鈥檛 massive鈥� in number, their presence 鈥渨ill have a pretty profound impact 鈥� an outsized impact 鈥� on security in Europe,鈥� says John Deni, research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, the research arm of the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
President Joe Biden told U.S. troops temporarily deployed to Poland earlier this year that they were 鈥渋n the midst of a fight between democracies and oligarchs.鈥�
Why We Wrote This
NATO members are teaming up in new ways in response to Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine. But they haven鈥檛 given up on the possible return of another kind of cooperation 鈥� some shared understanding with Russia on security issues.
The war in Ukraine has prompted the U.S. to reevaluate its military footprint in Eastern Europe despite a 1997 agreement, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, that ostensibly prohibits permanent U.S. bases in the region.
NATO officials have said that Moscow nullified the act with its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine this year. For now, an evolving cooperation within NATO 鈥� symbolized by the new base 鈥� is central to achieving the alliance鈥檚 goal of security,聽analysts say.聽聽
But U.S. officials have also been careful to point out the to-the-letter ways in which America has not abandoned the agreement, says Gavin Hall, teaching fellow in Political Science and International Security at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, Scotland.
It鈥檚 an indication, analysts聽add, that NATO allies haven鈥檛 lost hope in a founding act that鈥檚 still intact聽and could prove essential 鈥� perhaps when Russian President Vladimir Putin is no longer in power 鈥撀爐o one day rebuilding trust and cooperation beyond the alliance, between the two superpowers themselves.
Part of broader U.S. engagement
The permanent U.S. base in Poland was the marquee item in a series of new moves the U.S. will be taking to increase its military presence across Europe.
During a major NATO meeting in Madrid on June 29, President Biden announced that the U.S. will be sending warships to Spain, fighter jet squadrons to Great Britain, troops to Romania and the Baltics, and air defense systems to Germany and Italy.
鈥淚n a moment where Putin has shattered peace in Europe and attacked the very, very tenets of the rule-based order, the United States and our allies, we鈥檙e stepping up,鈥� Mr. Biden said.
Temporary deployments of thousands of American troops to central and Eastern Europe following the Russian invasion of Ukraine brought the U.S. force levels on the continent to roughly 100,000, up from 80,000 before February.聽
This is compared with some 370,000 U.S. forces in Europe in the late 1980s, before the fall of the Berlin Wall.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said the moves demonstrated America鈥檚 鈥渄ecisive leadership鈥� in 鈥渢he midst of the most serious security crisis we have faced since the Second World War.鈥澛�
President Biden 鈥渋s trying to meet the moment by making these announcements and recommitting to Europe,鈥� says Rachel Rizzo, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council鈥檚 Europe Center. But this comes with a concern, too, that the moves could give some NATO allies 鈥渢he impression that they can now back off the strides they鈥檝e made over the last few years,鈥� she warns.
These strides include hiking defense spending among NATO allies up to 2% of their gross domestic product, measures called for by the U.S. and designed in part to counter the impression among many that 鈥淓uropeans don鈥檛 view themselves 鈥� or each other 鈥� as legitimate security actors,鈥� Ms. Rizzo says. 鈥淎nd Putin doesn鈥檛 either.鈥�
As a result, there鈥檚 a widespread sense that 鈥渋f Europe is to be defended, it鈥檚 the U.S. that has to be present,鈥� she adds.
But while it鈥檚 true that the gold standard of deterrence has long been U.S. boots on the ground, Eastern European countries like Poland, in particular, have been bolstering their defense posture in 鈥渋mpressive鈥� ways, says Luke Coffey, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
In fact, the planned U.S. base accentuates what鈥檚 already a source of tension for Russia: the way that Poland, historically cast in the role of a buffer zone between Russia and Germany, has shifted since 1989 from being a Soviet ally to a full-fledged member of NATO, starting in 1999.聽
Poland announced plans聽last month to increase its defense spending to 5% of its GDP. 鈥淭hey take defense seriously. If anything [the permanent U.S. base in Poland] is a reward for good behavior for countries who鈥檝e shown a genuine commitment to the alliance,鈥� Mr. Coffey says.聽聽
Still, history has shown that U.S. troops on the continent lessen the chances of wider war, he argues.聽
鈥淥bviously, outside areas of NATO responsibility there鈥檚 been fighting. But in areas where the U.S. has a military presence there has been relative peace, security, and stability,鈥� he says. 鈥淚t鈥檚 because of the large U.S. military presence in Europe that most of the continent has experienced relative peace for the past seven-and-a-half decades.鈥澛犅�
鈥淎 big deal鈥� as a precedent
Located at the permanent U.S. base will be the headquarters of the U.S. Army鈥檚 V Corps, consisting of some 600 to 800 troops.
These forces will 鈥渜ualitatively improve鈥� U.S. operations in Europe, the U.S. Army War College鈥檚 Dr. Deni says, especially when it comes to so-called command and control capabilities. This includes directing the use of the U.S. military鈥檚 resources on the continent, including tanks, cyber teams, logistical operations, and air power.
鈥淯.S. Army headquarters in Europe was frankly really strapped trying to pull off this mission of telling brigades what to do when it came to looking at all the big intelligence picture and signals we get from around the theater,鈥� Dr. Deni says.聽
Establishing a permanent U.S. military base in Poland is also 鈥渟ignificant as the first step towards the possibility of other permanent presence across Eastern Europe,鈥� he adds. 鈥淭his is precedent, and frankly I kind of hope that Moscow perceives it this way 鈥� we want them to perceive this as a big deal.鈥澛�
At the same time, U.S. officials have also taken care to not abandon the NATO-Russia Founding Act completely. U.S. officials were quick to point out that the V Corps forces are not combat troops, which are prohibited under the parameters of the act.聽
Keeping some semblance of the act intact is important for future security in Europe, Dr. Hall says.聽
It is part of a strategy outlined in a pivotal 1967 NATO document called the Harmel Report, which emphasizes the necessity of both deterrence and detente. The ideal, it argues, is to maintain military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression, while simultaneously pursuing, as the report puts it, a 鈥渟earch for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.鈥�
NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg 鈥渉as referred to this repeatedly,鈥� Dr. Hall says. 鈥淵ou present a nice, strong, united front 鈥� which arguably this permanent U.S. base is. This enhances NATO鈥檚 ability to defend itself. But you also pursue detente to try to influence Russia鈥檚 actions.鈥�
Having a founding act 鈥渢hat can at least be reformed and renegotiated with Russia,鈥� he adds, 鈥渋s signaling some kind of hope that it could be used to rebuild cooperation and trust 鈥� someday.鈥�
