Proxy war or not, US and NATO allies get creative in aid for Ukraine
Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly accused the United States of waging a proxy war in Ukraine 鈥� most recently on July 7 鈥� and he鈥檚 not entirely wrong, U.S. military analysts say.
But proxy war is a very loose thing in international law, and whether the U.S. is in one with Russia, many add, matters less than whether the U.S. and its NATO allies can continue to push red lines without prompting a Russian reprisal that officially draws the alliance into war.
鈥淚f you ask lawyers, or a military general, they all have a different answer on whether or not this is a proxy war. It鈥檚 very relative,鈥� says Sean McFate, a professor at National Defense University who served in the U.S. Army. 鈥淭he answer is that it鈥檚 where Putin鈥檚 ego ends and Russian foreign policy begins. It鈥檚 a moving line that depends very much on perception.鈥�
Why We Wrote This
Does the term 鈥減roxy war鈥� apply to a conflict that is formally between Russia and Ukraine? Whatever you call it, the U.S. and NATO are using ingenuity to affect the outcome while keeping war at arm鈥檚 length.
True, if Russia was giving aid to Al Qaeda in Iraq, 鈥渨e鈥檇 view this as going over some line perhaps,鈥� Dr. McFate notes. That said, while the U.S. was attacked by Al Qaeda, Russia invaded Ukraine without provocation and against international warning 鈥� and NATO is not arming proxies to stir up wars they wouldn鈥檛 otherwise be engaged in.聽
And while the U.S. and NATO are 鈥渙bviously pushing some red lines,鈥� he adds, 鈥渨e ought to do that.鈥� To date, this has involved tapping into a deep well of ingenuity to do everything from getting weapons into the hands of fighters to training them off the battlefield.聽
As fighting in Ukraine stalemates, 鈥渃overt鈥� resourcefulness should increasingly come into play as well, many military analysts say. 鈥淲e will need to fight a sneaky war, with maximum plausible deniability,鈥� says Dr. McFate. 鈥淲e layer the fog of war and move through it for our red-line pushing.鈥澛�
At the same time, this will necessarily involve asking some to help Kyiv win. 鈥淚t鈥檚 one thing to say that the U.S. and Ukraine share an interest in ensuring that Russia isn鈥檛 able to wage future aggression,鈥� says聽Anthony Pfaff, the research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics聽at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.聽
鈥淏ut the kinds of costs we may be willing to pay for those things is very different.鈥�
A Twitter-based handbook
When war broke out in Ukraine, retired Maj. John Spencer started tweeting advice for civilians who wanted to 鈥済o out and resist鈥� the Russian invasion in any way they could.聽
Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at West Point鈥檚 Modern War Institute, Mr. Spencer, who had served two combat tours in Iraq, sought to encourage would-be fighters by noting that in 2016, it took more than 100,000 U.S. and coalition troops nine months to recapture Mosul from an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 Islamic State fighters, many of whom were wearing flip-flops.
The tweets were collected into a 鈥渕anual for the urban defender,鈥� which was posted online by the Ukrainian government. (Mr. Spencer signed over the copyrights for free.)
The handbook urges Ukrainians to block roads with anything available, from dump trucks to trash, and never to sit around. 鈥淵ou鈥檇 be surprised at the depth and length of a tunnel a team of civilians can dig in just a few days,鈥� he writes.
To address dire defensive circumstances, the manual offered tips for booby-trapping homes, including knocking out floorboards beneath easy-to-access windows, cutting electricity at night (since dark offers an advantage to homeowners), and running razor wire at neck level across doorways to slow down intruders and provide a brief window for escape from Russian soldiers.
With weapons and advice flowing into Ukraine, Mr. Spencer is philosophical about whether it qualifies as a proxy war. 鈥淭he definition of 鈥榩roxy鈥� is very loose. Clearly Ukraine is fighting Russia for us, for Europe, for democracy,鈥� he says. 鈥淲hen we supply them with weapons, how is that different to supplying the mujahideen?鈥澛�
That said, it鈥檚 鈥渘ot like they鈥檙e asking anyone to fight for them,鈥� he notes. 鈥淎nd it鈥檚 not like we鈥檙e arming proxies to start and fight wars that they wouldn鈥檛 otherwise be engaged in.鈥澛�
Past lessons on insurgency
In the months to come, Mr. Spencer imagines that Ukrainian fighters will draw upon 鈥測ears of Special Forces and paramilitary lessons going back to World War II about how to create resistance in occupied areas.鈥澛�
The U.S. practiced counterinsurgency warfare for nearly two decades in its most recent wars. Now NATO needs to turn those lessons around fighting as insurgents, says Dr. McFate of National Defense University.
There was an old adage in Kabul, for example, that while the Americans had the watches, the Afghan insurgents had the time.
鈥淚f you鈥檙e David and the enemy is Goliath, you can weaponize time, and win by not losing,鈥� he says. 鈥淎s long as there鈥檚 a resistance movement 鈥� even if Russia does take Kyiv 鈥� Russia can never claim victory. And we can easily maintain that.鈥澛�
Poland and Romania could also host NATO bases where Ukrainian 鈥済uerrillas can cross the border covertly. We arm, equip them, give them rest. We keep them alive,鈥� Dr. McFate adds. 鈥淎nd as long as they鈥檙e alive, Putin isn鈥檛 winning.鈥澛�
At the same time, 鈥渨e shouldn鈥檛 be stupid,鈥� he warns.
Reckless measures, in his estimate, include NATO 鈥渙vertly placing soldiers in Ukraine, or boots in the air, or boots at sea.鈥� If NATO vehicles or vessels were fired upon, it could launch 鈥渁 tripwire that sucks NATO officially into that war 鈥� and that is really bad news, especially if Putin thinks he can get away with a limited nuclear war in the name of defense.鈥澛�
What role for a rocket system?
In an existential war, Ukraine is going to be willing to pay a far higher price for its freedom than NATO. And so, given the support they鈥檙e providing Kyiv, the U.S. and its NATO allies must be clear with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy about what the alliance is willing 鈥� and not willing 鈥� to do, says Dr. Pfaff of the U.S. Army War College.
Ukrainian forces, for example, have been supplied with their most advanced weapons system to date, courtesy of the U.S. government.
The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, developed for the U.S. Army, is now the longest range of Ukraine鈥檚 ground weapons, at nearly 50 miles. The U.S. has supplied it with the understanding that it be used to strike Russian targets within Ukraine 鈥� but not within Russia.
鈥淕iving them HIMARS is a fine thing to do if you just have dead Russian soldiers, but not if you have dead Russian civilians鈥� as a result of artillery barrages into Russian territory, says Dr. Pfaff.
Yet Kyiv could easily argue that using HIMARS against Russians outside Ukraine is the only way to win, he adds.聽
鈥淭hey haven鈥檛 made that argument yet, but I can see them turning around and looking at us and saying, 鈥榃e need to do this.鈥欌��
The U.S. and NATO must plan for these scenarios in advance 鈥� and make clear their own red lines with Kyiv 鈥� particularly since the West鈥檚 military intervention allows Ukraine 鈥渢o do things it might not otherwise do,鈥� Dr. Pfaff notes.
These are key considerations as Mr. Putin promised recently that his war has just begun. 鈥淓verybody should know that largely speaking, we haven鈥檛 even yet started anything in earnest,鈥� he told Russian parliamentary leaders.聽
鈥淏asically, it鈥檚 kind of a simple formula,鈥� Dr. Pfaff says. 鈥淭he more support we give Ukraine 鈥� and the more effective that is 鈥� the more the Russians are going to want to escalate.鈥�
Editor鈥檚 note: A sentence in this article has been updated to correct John Spencer's rank; he is a retired major.
