NATO says 鈥榶es, but鈥� to Ukraine; 鈥榥o, but鈥� to Putin
| Brussels
If Russian President Vladimir Putin鈥檚 mass deployment of troops on his country鈥檚 border with Ukraine is meant to deter NATO from allowing the former Soviet republic to join its ranks, the Western alliance says聽publicly that it won鈥檛 be pushed around.聽
鈥淯kraine has the right to choose its own security arrangements,鈥� NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reassured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Thursday. 鈥淎nd the decision on whether Ukraine can join NATO will be taken by Ukraine and 30 NATO allies alone.鈥�
But that does not mean that the allies are ready to make the former Soviet republic a member.聽Indeed,聽behind the scenes聽鈥渢here鈥檚 very little enthusiasm鈥澛爓ithin NATO for bringing in Ukraine, says Ian Lesser, president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a transatlantic聽think tank.
Why We Wrote This
NATO wants to protect Ukraine but is not ready to welcome it as a member. How can the Western alliance walk that line without seeming to bow to Vladimir Putin?
That leaves NATO with a balancing act to retain its credibility: How to reflect the deep doubts within the alliance about the advisability of Ukraine joining, without appearing to bow to Mr. Putin鈥檚 insistence that NATO renounce such a step forever.
Plausible steps
NATO has been divided over Ukrainian membership since 2008, when President George W. Bush failed to persuade an alliance summit to invite Ukraine and Georgia聽into the club immediately. Instead, NATO promised the two states that they could join one day, but without specifying when or how.
That reticence derives from a rarely voiced acknowledgement by some members that Mr. Putin聽may actually have a point聽in seeing Ukraine鈥檚 potential NATO membership as provocative. 鈥淭here are a lot of people in powerful positions who think that NATO has pushed things too far,鈥� notes Michael O鈥橦anlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
There is, however, 鈥渁 consensus on the need to support [Ukraine] politically, economically, and, to the extent they can, in security terms,鈥� says Mr. Lesser.
Today, key to maintaining the alliance鈥檚 reputation聽will be making clear the plausible steps it will take to deter Russia, which means that NATO must聽鈥渕ake clear the difference,鈥� between what it will do for its allies, and what it will do for non-member partners, argues Rachel Ellehuus, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Pentagon鈥檚 principal director for European and NATO policy in the Obama administration.聽
鈥淲hile there鈥檚 quite a bit that NATO can do,鈥� she adds, 鈥淯kraine is not going to get that Article 5 commitment,鈥� the principle of collective defense at the heart of NATO鈥檚 founding treaty, by which an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all.
鈥淚f NATO鈥檚 going to respond militarily, it鈥檚 going to be (through) assistance to (countries) who share a border with Ukraine鈥� to prevent instability in a member state, 鈥渨hich is important to maintaining credibility鈥� within the alliance, Ms. Ellehuus adds.
In NATO鈥檚 favor, the Ukrainian armed forces 鈥渁re far better trained, equipped and resourced, and are more motivated than they were in 2014,鈥� when they failed to repel Russian attacks on Crimea and the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, Luke Coffey, director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation, said in a panel discussion聽in Washington, D.C.聽 this week. 鈥淭he Ukrainians can fight for themselves.鈥�
Talks on the agenda
Meanwhile, Russia鈥檚 military moves do appear to be bringing some new NATO thinking to the surface, observers say.
鈥淚 think that NATO leaned too far forward鈥hen it said that Ukraine will become a member someday,鈥� Ms. Ellehuus says. 鈥淭hey keep saying the door to membership is open when in reality it isn鈥檛. A little more honesty and pragmatism is in order.鈥�
Retracting the promise of membership would likely be impossible. 鈥淚t would look like a reward for Putin鈥檚 bad behavior,鈥� says Mr. O鈥橦anlon. But U.S. President Joe Biden has already indicated that he is prepared to listen to Moscow鈥檚 concerns.聽
A day after his conversation with Mr. Putin, Mr. Biden said he hoped to convene high level talks between NATO allies and Moscow 鈥渢o discuss the future of Russia鈥檚 concerns relative to NATO writ large.鈥� The talks would explore 鈥渨hether or not we can work out any accommodation as it relates to bringing down the temperature along the eastern front,鈥� Mr. Biden added.
On Thursday, NATO鈥檚 top body pledged that 鈥渨e are ready for meaningful dialogue with Russia. We are aware of Russia鈥檚 recent European security proposals. We are clear that any dialogue with Russia would have to proceed on the basis of reciprocity.鈥�
That suggests that Mr. Putin has achieved the first goal of his military saber-rattling: to make his voice heard.聽
Russia may seek 鈥渃ertain commitments over Ukraine, and we鈥檙e probably not willing to provide those,鈥� says Mr. Lesser. 鈥淏ut above all, Russia wants to feel as if it has a seat at the table and is taken seriously as a great power, which its nuclear status certainly gives it,鈥� he adds. 鈥淭here has been a tendency not to take Russia very seriously over the past decades, rightly or wrongly.鈥�
Top-level talks between NATO and Russia 鈥� and especially between Washington and Moscow 鈥� are 鈥渂adly needed,鈥� says Mr. Lesser. 鈥淭here was more strategic dialogue, more understanding of what we meant when we said certain things鈥� at the height of the Cold War than there is today, he laments.
The key to NATO credibility聽in future聽will be framing the conversation in terms favorable to the alliance, suggests Mr. O鈥橦anlon. 鈥淲e should begin by saying that we are actually in the driver鈥檚 seat. We鈥檙e not asking Putin for favors, and he鈥檚 not winning,鈥� he says.
At the same time, it may be helpful 鈥渢o remind people that NATO allies have been successful in punishing Russia for its provocations,鈥� he adds. Recent annual GDP growth rates have averaged below 2%, a reflection of long-stagnant oil prices and corruption, but also the result of sanctions and a lack of Western investment.
And, as President Biden has reiterated, things could get聽far worse financially for Moscow, Mr. O鈥橦anlon points out. 鈥淚f he were to do something more dramatic, like the invasion of Ukraine, we would respond more strongly and place Russia on a path to recession,鈥� he predicts. In聽such a scenario, European allies have warned Moscow of 鈥渕assive鈥� economic consequences.
