China鈥檚 new world order: What Xi鈥檚 vision would mean for human rights, security
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Ann Scott Tyson Staff writer
| Beijing
Chinese leader Xi Jinping is pushing forward what he casts as an ambitious blueprint for reshaping the world order, urging developing countries to join Beijing in leading an overhaul of the international system.
Over the past year, Beijing鈥檚 authoritarian leadership has grown increasingly bold in challenging the U.S.-led, post-World War II international order and the liberal values that underpin it. Depicting the United States and its allies as defending an unfair and exclusive status quo, it asserts that the Chinese Communist Party has the vision to remake the world system, with China at the center.
In his latest pitch, Mr. Xi called on the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to rally around China to become the 鈥渃onstruction team鈥� of a new, multipolar order.
Why We Wrote This
China鈥檚 road map for a new, multipolar world order raises questions of fairness, cooperation, and good governance.
鈥淲e should actively participate in reforming and developing the global governance system鈥� to make it 鈥渕ore balanced and effective,鈥� Mr. Xi told a conference of hundreds of foreign dignitaries, Chinese officials, and scholars gathered Friday in Beijing鈥檚 imposing Great Hall of the People. 鈥淚nternational rules should be made and observed by all countries ... not dictated by those with more muscles.鈥�
Without naming the U.S. or Europe, Mr. Xi criticized what he called 鈥渂loc confrontation, creating small circles, and forcing others to pick sides鈥� 鈥� references to Washington鈥檚 network of security alliances, which China opposes. As an alternative model, he upheld his own plan to create 鈥渁 community with a shared future for mankind,鈥� first announced in 2013. Since then, China has expanded its international influence through a series of sweeping, global development programs, including the infrastructure-focused Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).聽
China鈥檚 long-range goal is a system, with the rights of sovereign states at the center, that better comports with Beijing鈥檚 economic interests, authoritarian political values, and national security priorities. Yet while welcomed by some countries, Mr. Xi鈥檚 blueprint also faces pushback from a world that, on the whole, remains wary of China鈥檚 rise and intentions, public opinion polls show.
鈥淲hat we are talking about really is not China鈥檚 vision for how the world should work better; it鈥檚 a vision for China at the center of the world,鈥� says Nad猫ge聽Rolland, distinguished fellow in China Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research. 鈥淎ll the global initiatives are really about supporting China鈥� and propelling its rise.
Spotty leadership record聽
Under Mr. Xi, China has invested and loaned an estimated $1 trillion throughout the Global South, mainly via the BRI but also via the Global Development Initiative (started in 2021), the Global Security Initiative (2022), and the Global Civilization Initiative (2023). These four programs now involve about 150 countries, in varying capacities.
China, which has the world鈥檚 second-largest economy and a rapidly growing military, is the best country to lead the charge for global governance reform, Mr. Xi asserted Friday. 鈥淎mong the world鈥檚 major countries, China has the best track record with respect to peace and security,鈥� he said. 鈥淓very increase of China鈥檚 strength is an increase of the prospects of world peace.鈥�
Mr. Xi announced that China will deepen ties with the Global South by creating a Global South research center and offering 1,000 scholarships and 100,000 training opportunities over the next five years. China will seek more free-trade arrangements with developing countries, as China鈥檚 imports from the Global South are expected to exceed $8 trillion between now and 2030.
鈥淐hina has answered the call of the times,鈥� Mr. Xi told the audience from a podium decked with roses.
Yet the appeal of China鈥檚 overseas programs has been mixed.
While the BRI and development initiatives have helped meet massive infrastructure needs and advanced connectivity in poorer countries, some have generated criticism for worsening debt burdens and environmental pollution, and lax labor protections.
Also controversial are China鈥檚 efforts to promote an international system in which each state defines human rights as it sees fit. This undermines the United Nations鈥� concept of universal human rights, as well as the U.N.鈥檚 鈥渞esponsibility to protect,鈥� which justifies outside intervention in the case of mass atrocities and rights abuses.
鈥淐hina emphasizes development and security but not the human rights pillar of the U.N.,鈥� says Rosemary Foot, author of 鈥淐hina, the UN, and Human Protection: Beliefs, Power, Image.鈥�
For example, in September, China released a white paper in which it attacked 鈥渢he exclusive rules of bloc politics, the notion of might makes right, and the 鈥榰niversal values鈥� defined by a handful of Western countries.鈥� Yet Dr. Foot calls this 鈥渁 big distortion,鈥� noting that a Chinese representative was involved at the creation of the U.N.鈥檚 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and that China has signed a number of core human rights treaties.
Navigating conflict
On the topic of security, China鈥檚 stress on sovereign states also raises questions about how to handle disputes.聽
鈥淚f a state breaches an international treaty ... China emphasizes dialogue 鈥� which is great but it doesn鈥檛 deal with the hard questions,鈥� says Dr. Foot, professor and senior research fellow in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. China鈥檚 decision not to condemn Russia鈥檚 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while advocating talks, illustrates the limits to Beijing鈥檚 approach, she says.
Indeed, as Mr. Xi pledged that China would remain peaceful and never seek hegemony, tensions simmered closer to home over China鈥檚 territorial disputes with India, the Philippines, and other Asian neighbors, leading some conference participants to appeal for restraint by Beijing.
After the morning meeting, Rommel Banlaoi, president of the Philippine Society for International Security Studies, told a government-organized forum that 鈥減eaceful coexistence is all the more relevant in the context of Philippines-China relations.鈥� The escalation of tensions between Chinese and Filipino forces in the South China Sea is 鈥渞egrettable,鈥� he added.
鈥淚t鈥檚 imperative for China and the Philippines to explore ways to meet halfway ... to avoid violent conflict at sea,鈥� he said at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing.
Friday鈥檚 conference 鈥� including Mr. Xi鈥檚 speech and the subsequent expert panels 鈥� was held to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the 鈥渇ive principles of peaceful coexistence,鈥� a concept adopted by India, China, and other countries. The broad guidelines for relations between nations emphasize state sovereignty, nonaggression, and noninterference in each other鈥檚 internal affairs, and were later adopted by the nonaligned movement.
At the same afternoon forum, Indian scholar Avijit Banerjee, a professor of Chinese language at Visva-Bharati University, also raised concern over territorial disputes in Asia, including the border conflict between India and China that has led to deadly clashes in recent years. 鈥淎ll disputes should be settled peacefully, without the use of force,鈥� he said.
Need for cooperation
Ultimately, experts stress, reforming global governance will require greater cooperation between China, the U.S., and other major powers, as well as from smaller countries.聽
鈥淐hina is trying to showcase some more ambitious goals on global governance,鈥� says Cui Hongjian, professor at Academy of Regional and Global Governance at Beijing Foreign Studies University and a former Chinese diplomat, who attended Mr. Xi鈥檚 speech. But overcoming intense mistrust and competition between the U.S. and China is 鈥渁 very, very important precondition鈥� for reform at the U.N., he adds.聽
Both countries consider themselves 鈥渆xceptional,鈥� and as a result 鈥渋t鈥檚 going to be difficult within one system to put these two countries together and have them cohabit,鈥� says Susan Thornton, a retired senior U.S. diplomat and senior fellow at the Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center. 鈥淏ut,鈥� she says, 鈥渨e don鈥檛 have a choice.鈥�
For some time, she predicts, the U.S. is likely to remain the de facto leader of the international system, given what she described as China鈥檚 reluctance to dive into resolving crises.聽
鈥淲e鈥檝e worked really hard ... to get China to answer the fire alarm in the past on some issues and [have] not gotten a lot of response,鈥� she says. 鈥淐hina tends to not want to stick its neck out and get involved in mediating disputes that are very thorny and risky,鈥� she says. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think China鈥檚 ready to be a leader of the international system.鈥�
