Could Ukraine take back Russian-occupied Crimea?
As their closely watched summer counteroffensive extends into autumn, Ukrainian forces struggling for a breakthrough have been stepping up attacks on the Russian stronghold of Crimea. Allies are hoping that the recent arrival of American long-range missiles could help bolster their efforts.聽
Invaded and illegally occupied in 2014, Crimea is Russian President Vladimir Putin鈥檚 prized strategic possession and the Achilles鈥� heel of his war effort, military analysts say.聽
Its geography as a peninsula makes it vulnerable to being isolated. But its warm-water harbor and access to the Black Sea make it vital to Russian fighting forces. It鈥檚 an attractive target, in other words, for Ukrainian war planners 鈥� particularly as home to a major Russian air base and the Black Sea Fleet, which docks at the deep-water port of Sevastopol. Severing Russia鈥檚 land bridge to Crimea has been a key objective of Ukraine鈥檚 counteroffensive.
Why We Wrote This
Ukraine has repeatedly attacked targets on the Russian-occupied peninsula of Crimea 鈥� which is of vital strategic importance to Moscow. These attacks are not just pinpricks, say experts.
The peninsula is also connected directly to Russia by the 12-mile-long Kerch Strait Bridge. Commissioned by Mr. Putin in 2016, it鈥檚 a vital supply line, and Ukrainian special forces have hit it repeatedly with everything from explosives to jury-rigged drones. Ukraine鈥檚 defense minister recently promised that his country would keep on doing that until the bridge is destroyed.
How has Ukraine attacked Russian forces in Crimea?
In one of the most high-profile missile strikes of the war, Ukrainian officials in September claimed to have killed dozens of officers as well as Adm. Viktor Sokolov, head of Russia鈥檚 Black Sea Fleet. Moscow denied these claims, releasing unverified videos of the admiral in meetings as proof of life.聽
What鈥檚 clear from satellite imagery is that the strike left the fleet鈥檚 headquarters in Sevastopol caved in and smoking. This happened, significantly, despite robust Russian air defenses and electronic warfare capabilities, notes a report this month from the Institute for the Study of War think tank in Washington.聽
Ukrainian long-range missiles also took out an amphibious assault landing ship and an attack submarine in Sevastopol last month. These were 鈥渋ncredible鈥� hits, says retired Lt. Gen. Frederick 鈥淏en鈥� Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe 鈥� particularly since Russian ships are one of the main platforms Moscow uses to shoot its own missiles into Ukraine.
Kyiv has also continued to target the Kerch bridge. A July strike left a span dangling precariously, and a massive explosion last October shut down heavy traffic on it for months.聽
Are these attacks pinpricks or serious blows?聽
Though Russia routinely claims to have repelled most of the Ukrainian military鈥檚 attempted attacks 鈥� and it has 鈥� it is clear that defending Crimea is siphoning off its resources.聽
To protect the Kerch bridge from Kyiv鈥檚 tenacious naval drones, Russian forces built an extensive underwater barrier of submerged ships. They have also stationed missile defense batteries, attack helicopters, and even truck-mounted smoke generators there.聽
Recent missile strikes have also forced Moscow to move a number of ships out of Sevastopol. This has diminished the effectiveness of the Black Sea Fleet, including its ability to enforce blockades on Ukraine鈥檚 exports, according to a recent British defense intelligence report.聽
At minimum, analysts say, Crimea is no longer the safe harbor it once was. This is in large part because Western long-range missiles, which can travel up to 150 miles, are increasingly allowing Ukraine to strike 鈥渉igh-value targets鈥� in attacks that are far from pinpricks, Mr. Hodges says.
As a result, although Russia鈥檚 extensive air defenses are still able to thwart most missile attacks, Russian ships and anti-aircraft systems that were once safely out of range are now in the crosshairs of Ukrainian forces.
At the same time, Ukraine has long been lobbying for the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System, known as ATACMS (pronounced 鈥渁ttack-鈥檈ms鈥�). The Biden administration, in the face of growing congressional opposition to Ukraine aid, quietly greenlighted a small number of these long-range missiles in September. They turned up on the battlefield this month. But U.S. defense officials also warn that America鈥檚 stockpiles of the weapon are low.聽
Still, Ukraine had hoped this U.S. pledge would inspire Berlin to share its own long-range Taurus missiles. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in early October nixed this, however, reportedly expressing concern Kyiv might use them to blow up the Kerch bridge.
Could Ukraine take back Crimea?聽
To have a chance of this, analysts tend to agree that Ukrainian forces must fight their way to the Sea of Azov in order to cut off the land bridge to the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia now occupies.
This is a tall order, to put it mildly: Russians have dug in and fortified their front lines there with minefields and other heavy-duty barriers. It鈥檚 far tougher, military strategists know, for attackers to dislodge such positions than it is for defenders to hold them.聽
Tanks help with an offense, of course, which is why Kyiv lobbied so hard to get them last year. What delayed their arrival was in large part concern about Mr. Putin鈥檚 redlines: Crimea is sacred to him, and threatening it could push him to use his nuclear arsenal, the thinking goes.
Western officials don鈥檛 want to be 鈥渋rresponsible,鈥� but believing this theory is to some extent also buying into Mr. Putin鈥檚 hype, says Iulia-Sabina Joja, director of the Black Sea program at the Middle East Institute in Washington. He has 鈥渟aid he really cares about Crimea 鈥� but so does he care about a lot of things that aren鈥檛 his,鈥� Dr. Joja says.
Still, while ATACMS are manufactured to have a maximum range of some 180 miles, the ATACMS recently delivered to Ukraine from the United States have a shorter range of some 100 miles, in order to guard against the possibility that they could be used to strike across the actual Russian border and further escalate the war.聽
That said, Mr. Putin won鈥檛 lose leadership of Russia if he鈥檚 forced to surrender Crimea, argues Mr. Hodges. He adds that the exodus of Russian men fleeing conscription bears out a deep disinterest in fighting for the territory among Mr. Putin鈥檚 political base, even as Russian tourists continue to flock there for vacations.聽
At the same time, fighting spirit has achieved the near-impossible on the battlefield before, analysts note, and for this reason, it鈥檚 important to examine what Crimea means to Ukraine, too.
Specifically, Russia is determined to economically strangle Ukraine. It purposely built the Kerch bridge low enough, for example, to block 30% of Kyiv鈥檚 maritime cargo traffic. 鈥淯kraine cannot survive economically鈥� without Crimea, Dr. Joja says.
Officials in Kyiv know, too, that military campaigns are fought not just to achieve battlefield objectives, but also to set political conditions for peace. If Kyiv can demonstrate that it can credibly threaten Russian control of Crimea, Ukrainian forces not only alarm vacationing Muscovites and boost Ukrainian morale, but also can potentially strengthen Kyiv鈥檚 position in future negotiations.聽
To this end, Crimea is 鈥渄ecisive terrain,鈥� Mr. Hodges posits. 鈥淲hoever controls Crimea is going to win this war.鈥澛�
