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The conflict against the Islamic State is casting Syria as the newest test of America鈥檚 attempt to redefine what 鈥渨inning鈥� looks like in the war against terror.

The lesson from the long and inconclusive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was that the United States could approach 鈥渨inning鈥� only so long as it kept large numbers of forces on the ground. But maintaining those troop levels involved unsustainable costs 鈥� economically, politically, and militarily.

More recently, President Obama had tried walking away from the region, but in the face of a humanitarian crisis in Syria and the rise of the Islamic State, that approach, too, proved unsustainable.

鈥淔or a while, the policy was 鈥楯ust Say No,鈥� but they couldn鈥檛 do it,鈥� says Stephen Biddle, a political scientist at George Washington University.

Now, Syria is emerging as a laboratory for a 鈥済ood enough鈥� approach in places where 鈥� as with the fight against the Islamic State 鈥� American interests are real but limited. The idea is to start small and build on what works.

Mr. Obama鈥檚 goal is to turn the Islamic State campaign 鈥渙ver to the next president in a way that鈥檚 sustainable,鈥� says Derek Chollet, assistant secretary of Defense for international security affairs from 2012 to 2015, and now senior adviser for security and defense policy at the German Marshall Fund.聽

The Islamic State, he says, will remain 鈥渁 chronic problem, but is it a problem that we can live with for a while?鈥�

If the answer is yes, that sort of sustainability may be what amounts to 鈥渨inning鈥� for the US in many of its foreign policy challenges, where the best path is one between full-scale war and doing nothing.

鈥淭hey鈥檙e trying to find out what this model is,鈥� says Paul Scharre, who worked as a policy adviser in the Pentagon from 2008 to 2013, 鈥渁nd come up with a new approach that we haven鈥檛 had before.鈥�

鈥⒙� 鈥� 聽鈥⒙�

Soon after Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced that the number of US troops on the ground in Syria would grow from 50 to 600, Sen. John McCain (R) of Arizona weighed in: This was 鈥渢he kind of grudging incrementalism that rarely wins wars, but could certainly lose one.鈥澛�

But behind the scenes in background briefings, Defense officials pushed back. The Pentagon鈥檚 approach in Syria, put forward by Secretary Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joe Dunford, was not incrementalism, they argued, but rather a 鈥渟tep-by-step campaign.鈥�

鈥淎s we鈥檝e pushed out and built on our successes, we鈥檙e just reevaluating what different means we might need to take things to the next step,鈥� said a senior Defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. 鈥淎nd that鈥檚 where I think 鈥榮tep-by-step鈥� differs from 鈥榠ncrementalism,鈥� which carries a pejorative tone.鈥�

That may sound like a distinction without much of a difference, but for a Pentagon tasked with carving out achievable goals in a war where they have repeatedly proven elusive, the distinction is crucial. The approach is deliberate, not reactive.

鈥淓very single time we鈥檝e gone to the White House, we鈥檝e gotten what we鈥檝e asked for,鈥� the senior defense official noted.

From his years as a Pentagon technocrat, Carter is clearly aware of both the White House鈥檚 marching orders and the Department of Defense鈥檚 limitations. 鈥淭he bottom line is this: We can鈥檛 ignore this fight, but we also can鈥檛 win it entirely from the outside in,鈥� he recently told lawmakers.

The approach involves changing the way the Pentagon 鈥� and America at large 鈥� has thought about war.聽The US military has long excelled at defining its objectives in negative terms, says Mr. Scharre, now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Back in 2001, 鈥淲e went in thinking, 鈥榃e don鈥檛 want Saddam; we don鈥檛 want Al Qaeda.鈥澛�

That has been the case with the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) as well. 鈥淲e want to defeat ISIS, but what comes in its place?鈥�

And, when the US has figured that out, the question becomes how to make it sustainable.聽鈥淭hat might involve small numbers of US military personnel鈥� for some period of time, says Scharre.聽

鈥淚 think there鈥檚 been a consensus across the political aisle that there is sort of a 鈥榞ood enough,鈥� 鈥� says John Deni, professor of national security studies at the US Army War College鈥檚 Strategic Studies Institute.

The key is to 鈥渂etter define what we鈥檙e doing at the outset, and lower expectations 鈥� be a little bit more grounded in what we can achieve,鈥� he says. 鈥淚 think the Obama administration has been ruthlessly realistic in these sorts of problems.鈥�

鈥⒙� 鈥⒙� 鈥⒙�

This has involved developing a sliding scale for US troop involvement. If an approach proves effective, add more. If it doesn鈥檛, pull back.

The White House 鈥渉as certainly shown that it鈥檚 capable of learning, doubling down on what works, and moving away from what doesn鈥檛,鈥� adds Scharre.聽

Initially, the Defense Department spent $500 million on a training program for so-called moderate Syrian rebels. The US general in charge later acknowledged to Congress that the program had produced only 鈥渇our or five鈥� anti-Islamic State fighters.

So the Pentagon revamped the program with a contingent of 50 US Special Operations Forces to identify rebel groups that could benefit from more US aid and mentoring.聽

These Special Operations troops 鈥減roved extremely valuable to both identifying and then enabling local forces of the kind that were successful,鈥� Carter told the Monitor on a trip to Stuttgart, Germany, this month to meet with his anti-ISIS coalition.聽

Today, other countries 鈥渁re sending special forces doing the exact same thing.鈥�

A large part of the new Special Operations mission, he adds, involves serving as liaisons for these allied troops.聽

鈥淚鈥檝e asked Gulf countries and European members to do more in Syria, and this is our way of providing the liaison and the people who will enable them, in turn, to make their contribution,鈥� Carter says. 鈥淲e want to build on success 鈥� that鈥檚 the reason, that鈥檚 our approach.鈥澛�

The 50 US Special Forces on the ground have also allowed the US to increase the pace of its airstrikes, 鈥渂ecause we have better intelligence that allows us to be more effective from the air,鈥� Carter explains. 鈥淵ou can鈥檛 drop more bombs than there are targets.鈥澛�

It is an approach that, in short, has allowed the US military to take advantage of its 鈥渃ompetitive advantage,鈥� in the region, Carter told lawmakers last month.聽

A larger contingent of US ground forces 鈥渨ould be ceding our competitive advantage of special forces, mobility, and firepower, instead fighting on the enemies鈥� terms,鈥� he said. Local populations have, in the past, 鈥渞esponded violently鈥� to larger-scale ground combat.聽

In the long term, the key is 鈥渟ecuring and governing the territory recaptured, which in the end must be done by local forces.鈥�

鈥⒙� 鈥⒙� 鈥�

To do this, these local forces need training. As a result, a key question in Obama鈥檚 鈥済ood enough鈥� strategy has become: 鈥淗ow do I use the military tool in a way that doesn鈥檛 commit the US to these prolonged occupations?鈥� says Scharre. 鈥淗ow do we get US boots on the ground without enmeshing it in a quagmire?鈥�

On this question, Obama has drawn a fairly clear line for his administration.

鈥淲hen it comes to drone strikes or Special Operations raids, the president is very willing to use military force. He鈥檚 willing to put boots on the ground to nab or kill terrorist leaders when it doesn鈥檛 involve staying. When it comes to people staying on the ground, even in an advising capacity, there鈥檚 been hesitation,鈥� Scharre adds.聽

There is some reason for this. 鈥淲hat everybody wants is real but limited means for pursuing real but limited interests,鈥� Dr. Biddle of George Washington University notes.

The problem is the US and its partner countries don鈥檛 often have the same priorities, he says.聽

What looks to the US 鈥渓ike a swell way to deal with ISIS 鈥� to train, advise, equip and professionalize the Iraqi Army 鈥� looks dangerous to everybody else.鈥� To the Shiite elite 鈥� many of whom have their own militias 鈥� the Iraqi Army represents 鈥渁 constant threat of political violence.鈥澛�

For Obama, the key is for the US not to have unrealistic expectations of its partners on the ground, and not to allow itself to be drawn into a conflict where the size of the force exceeds the interests the US has at stake.

鈥淚 suspect that the White House looks at this 300 SOF [Special Operations Forces] as a way of not sending 25,000 more troops.鈥� It sees 鈥渟mall commitments as a way to avert much larger sacrifice and investment.鈥澛�

Some military analysts suggest the model could be pushed further.

Scharre proposes a dozen-strong US Special Forces A-team closer to the front lines, alongside a battalion of several hundred local forces 鈥� advising, coordinating US air power, and relaying intelligence to provide 鈥渞eal-time鈥� help on the fly.

Beyond that, US troops help provide a 鈥渂ackbone鈥� for local forces. 鈥淢orale frankly matters,鈥� Scharre adds, and US forces, even in small numbers, can help with that. 鈥淵ou know if you have a US [military] adviser with you, he comes with a US Air Force behind him. He鈥檚 got a radio and he can call up an F-16. That鈥檚 pretty cool.鈥澛�

For now, having US troop advisers on the ground helps mitigate the worst sectarian influences.

As the drumbeat begins in the looming the fight to retake Iraq鈥檚 second-largest city of Mosul, the even larger challenge will be strategic patience.聽

鈥淚t鈥檚 tough, because in America we want quick wins 鈥� beat ISIS and we can go home,鈥� Scharre says. But the timeline in which the US and its Iraq partners roll back ISIS territory isn鈥檛 the point. 鈥淲hat really matters is who takes the territory back 鈥� and how.鈥澛�

The hope for the Obama administration is that, with that patience, 鈥済ood enough鈥� can become good.