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Russia鈥檚 abrupt withdrawal of its expeditionary forces from Syria beginning this week came as a surprise at the White House and in other world capitals.

But to understand what Russian President Vladimir Putin is up to, look back to Mr. Putin鈥檚 intervention in eastern Ukraine two years ago, some regional analysts say.

鈥淓ssentially Putin is saying, 鈥楳y model is that you go in quick, you go in dirty, you stick to limited goals and you get out 鈥� and that鈥檚 how you鈥檙e successful,鈥� 鈥� says Nikolas Gvosdev, a Russia specialist at the United States Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

In Ukraine, 鈥渉e went in to prevent the collapse of the separatists, just as in Syria he shored up a staggering鈥� President Bashar al-Assad, he adds. 鈥淭hen you stay just long enough to ensure that the party you rescued is in a better place to negotiate a settlement that achieves their needs and your interests.鈥�

Putin鈥檚 broader ambition is to send the message that 鈥淩ussia is back鈥� as a world power, says Paul Stronski, a senior associate of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

Indeed, Russia鈥檚 Syrian actions enhanced its relations with some regional powers that are traditional US partners, he says. Putin has basked in contrasting his model of intervention with what the US and West have done recently in Iraq and Libya.

He 鈥渋s encouraging people to compare what he鈥檚 accomplished with the missions carried out by Western powers in Iraq or Afghanistan, where they stayed too long and the limited success they had quickly fleeted away.鈥�

But that very success also points to how Western foreign policy priorities have changed. Putin鈥檚 intervention comes from the imperialist playbook: supporting a dictator with indiscriminate and devastating force. Particularly under President Obama, the US has pivoted away from using the military as a blunt force of raw power.聽聽

Secretary of State John Kerry will travel to Moscow next week to try to take advantage of Russia鈥檚 pullback to advance peace talks. His trip contrasts sharply with the fallout from Ukraine, when the West shunned Russia.

鈥淭he backdrop to all of this diplomacy, at least in Putin鈥檚 view, is that when the US gets involved in places it makes these sweeping and dramatic promises about what it鈥檚 going to do 鈥� and then it turns into a quagmire,鈥� he says. 鈥淚 think he very much has in mind the US intervention in Iraq, and then the Western entry into Libya, which for him was a complete disaster.鈥�

By comparison, Putin鈥檚 specific aims in Syria, as in Ukraine, are limited and focus on Russia鈥檚 strategic interests 鈥� not promoting democracy or values. To do this, he was willing to prop up a brutal regime and was not concerned with major collateral damage.

Though Russia鈥檚 2014 intervention in Ukraine played out differently, the aims were similarly limited only to promoting Russia鈥檚 strategic interests.

鈥淚nitially there were desperate warnings that Russian troops would soon be marching into Kiev, but that never happened,鈥� Dr. Gvosdev says. 鈥淲hat Putin does want is a decentralization of Ukraine so it won鈥檛 have a strong central government that can align with the West, and he wants neutrality for Ukraine.鈥�

鈥淚n Syria, it鈥檚 also not 鈥楢ssad must stay at any cost,鈥� but some kind of unity government that preserves the Syrian state and recognizes Russia鈥檚 interests in Syria and the region,鈥� he adds.

There remain caveats to Putin鈥檚 declaration of 鈥渕ission accomplished鈥� in Syria, says Mr. Stronski. He notes that Russian efforts to woo Turkey and reorient its Western leanings have been shattered by the Syria intervention. And there is nothing to guarantee that Mr. Assad鈥檚 advances under Russian airstrikes won鈥檛 be reversed.

But Putin no doubt feels justified in concluding overall success.

Gvosdev says: 鈥淚 think Putin stands back and says. 鈥楾wo years ago we were marginalized, and now we鈥檙e back in the center of things.鈥� 鈥澛�