海角大神

President Trump loves to play golf, so he should understand when some describe the second summit he plans to hold with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un next month as a 鈥渕ulligan.鈥�

In the parlance of recreational golf, a mulligan is a redo, a second attempt generously granted when a first shot is badly whiffed or otherwise doesn鈥檛 end up so well.

鈥淭rump, an avid golfer, might claim that first summit as his mulligan,鈥� says Bruce Klingner, a longtime CIA Korea analyst who is now a Korea and Japan specialist at the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington. 鈥淏ut he can鈥檛 afford to land in the rough or get outplayed again in his second match with Kim Jong-un.鈥�

Few were surprised when the White House announced Friday that Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim will meet again in February, less than a year after the two leaders鈥� groundbreaking Singapore summit last June. The administration had been hinting for weeks that a second summit was likely in the first quarter of 2019. (The location of the second summit has yet to be announced, although Vietnam is widely seen as a likely venue.)

But most Korea and nuclear proliferation analysts part company with the administration over its characterization of the second summit as an opportunity to 鈥渂uild on the progress鈥� made toward North Korea鈥檚 鈥渇inal, fully verified denuclearization鈥� in the seven months since Singapore.

On that score there has been no progress, they say. 鈥淵ou don鈥檛 give away a first summit with an opponent for nothing, and unfortunately, Trump got nothing,鈥� Mr. Klingner says. 鈥淭here has been no progress since Singapore, so the risk is that we end up with a second summit that is once again just style over substance.鈥�

What worries some experts is that Trump may settle again for a summit with few or no serious denuclearization steps 鈥� even as he agrees to give Kim concessions he seeks but which risk sowing fears of abandonment among regional allies like South Korea and Japan. 鈥淭here are a number of scenarios for either a successful or an unsuccessful second summit,鈥� Klingner says, 鈥渂ut the real disaster would be if Trump gives away more concessions, particularly in terms of the US involvement in regional security.鈥�

At the first summit, experts say, Trump accepted a communiqu茅聽that used far more vague language than previous agreements聽the US has struck with the North. And Trump has curtailed US-South Korea joint military exercises, to Kim鈥檚 great satisfaction.

North Korea did indeed suspend the nuclear testing and missile launches that fueled the pre-Singapore war of words between Trump and Kim. In the eyes of some analysts, that鈥檚 progress to build upon.

鈥淛ust the fact that both sides have agreed to a second summit is a clear step in the right direction, far from the days of 鈥榝ire and fury鈥� threats or missile tests,鈥� says Harry Kazianis, director of defense studies at the Center for the National Interest. 鈥淣ow the hard work begins. Both nations must now show at least some tangible benefits from their diplomatic efforts during a second summit, or risk their efforts being panned as nothing more than reality TV.鈥�

Mr. Kazianis says he鈥檚 hopeful the two sides can come to an 鈥渋nterim agreement鈥� 鈥� for example, closing the Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for some initial sanctions relief 鈥� that would allow for something to build on going forward.

North Korean operations

Since the first summit, however, North Korea has continued developing its nuclear arsenal and missiles, and stockpiling nuclear fuels, at dozens of sites across the country, experts point out.

Indeed, some of those secret sites were revealed publicly by think-tank researchers following Friday鈥檚 announcement of a second summit.

鈥淭he inconvenient truth for the Trump administration is that the North Koreans are not putting their nuclear and missile programs fully on the table, so [the US negotiators] are still not working with a full data declaration even while the stated goal remains full and verified denuclearization,鈥� says Victor Cha, a former White House director for Asian affairs who now holds the Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington.

Dr. Cha is one of the authors of a CSIS report released Tuesday that claims to reveal nearly two dozen undeclared and secret ballistic missile bases and development sites in North Korea 鈥� including one base about 160 miles north of Seoul, the South Korean capital, which the report says is the headquarters of the North鈥檚 strategic missile force.

Cha鈥檚 group released another list of what it called secret nuclear and missile sites in December, which Trump quickly blasted as 鈥渇ake news鈥� 鈥� not because they don鈥檛 exist, but apparently because the sites are not all 鈥渟ecret鈥� to US intelligence agencies.

But North Korea鈥檚 unwillingness to declare the full extent of its existing sites and capabilities gets to the crux of the problem the US faces, Cha says.

Political value

The North Koreans 鈥渁re very interested in negotiating, but the key question here is, with what do they want to negotiate?鈥� he says. 鈥淭hey鈥檙e willing to negotiate about future capabilities and future production, and then about past capabilities 鈥� in other words, things they don鈥檛 need anymore.

鈥淲hat they鈥檙e not putting on the table,鈥� Cha adds, 鈥渁re their existing capabilities and stockpiles 鈥� and that鈥檚 the inconvenient truth.鈥�

A second summit in February seems ill-timed to those who say there is no progress to build on. But to others it makes sense from a US political perspective, especially since much of Trump鈥檚 base sees Singapore as a shining success 鈥� and since an embattled president may be keen to enhance that perception.

鈥淭hings were bogged down, but then the North Korean leader came out with his December statement and his New Year鈥檚 Day address that Trump liked for some reason, and that gave energy to the process,鈥� Cha says. 鈥淭he timing was fortuitous for Trump. He鈥檚 dealing with the shutdown, Syria, Mueller and the whole Russia investigation, and a hostile Congress, so he kind of needs something,鈥� he adds. 鈥淎nd that鈥檚 when [Kim] offered an opportunity to try to move forward.鈥�

In announcing the second summit, the White House cited as progress North Korea鈥檚 release of American 鈥渉ostages,鈥� but no mention was made of progress on the North鈥檚 denuclearization 鈥� which national security adviser John Bolton had once said could be completed within a year.

Spokeswoman Sarah Sanders did say, however, that the US would maintain sanctions on North Korea until denuclearization is complete. That sets up a tough bargaining session with Kim, given persistent reports that sanctions relief is the North Korean leader鈥檚 top goal.

An America-only deal?

Clearly Trump wants a second summit to show progress. And it鈥檚 that need for a positive outcome that is emerging as a top pre-summit concern for analysts (and, indications are, for some US diplomats and intelligence officials as well): that the 鈥淎merica First鈥� president could accept what some are calling an 鈥淎merica only鈥� deal with Pyongyang and declare it a success.

One example? Trump settles for nipping North Korea鈥檚 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program in the bud, in the interest of safeguarding the American 鈥渉omeland,鈥� while leaving the North鈥檚 shorter-range missiles threatening South Korea and Japan untouched.

An ICBMs-only deal 鈥渨ould be decoupling of US security in a narrow sense from the security of our allies and America鈥檚 broader security interests, and decoupling is exactly what the North Koreans want and the Chinese would like,鈥� says Cha. 鈥淭he North Koreans want to show the South Koreans that 鈥榯he Americans don鈥檛 care about you,鈥� and the Chinese would love it because it would weaken our alliances in Asia.鈥�

Feeding the concerns about an America-only deal are signs that the renegotiating of the deal that keeps about 28,000 US troops in South Korea is not going well. Under the current five-year deal, South Korea pays about $850 million annually toward the cost of hosting US forces. The Trump administration initially wanted Seoul to double its contribution, but lowered its demands when the South Koreans balked. Those talks continue.

Another source of worry are repeated statements from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that the administration is seeking a deal with North Korea that delivers a 鈥渟afer America鈥� 鈥� no mention of America鈥檚 allies or regional security.

Ideally, a second summit would deliver a full declaration of North Korea鈥檚 nuclear and missile capabilities and sites, agreement on a clear and unambiguous definition of denuclearization, and a 鈥渞obust verification regime鈥� for ascertaining the data declaration, says Klingner from Heritage.

But just as important is what the summit should not include, he adds. There should be no peace declaration with the North at this point, no ICBMs-only deal, no agreed reduction in US forces in the region, and 鈥渘o sanctions relief until the behavior that tripped those sanctions is eliminated.鈥�

If Trump鈥檚 second summit with Kim makes some people nervous, it鈥檚 because America for the first time has a president who Klingner says 鈥渜uestions the utility of our alliances and of stationing US troops overseas鈥� and who seems capable of accepting a deal that many others say shouldn鈥檛 even be on the table.

鈥淎ny kind of threat from North Korea you can reduce is a good thing, but if it comes at the expense of our allies and our forces on the ground there, that鈥檚 not a good thing,鈥� says Klingner. 鈥淵ou don鈥檛 want to sacrifice the security of our allies and the security of our forces there on the altar of security for the homeland.鈥�