North Korea summit: So what would a nuclear deal look like?
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Howard LaFranchi Staff writer
| Washington
With President Trump鈥檚 June 12 summit with Kim Jong-un back on track, attention has turned once again to what a denuclearization deal between the United States and North Korea might look like.
As the two countries labor to reduce the wide gap between them over what denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula even means, one thing seems certain about a potential deal: Forget the Libya model, in which Muammar Qaddafi gave up his weapons-of-mass-destruction program, lock, stock, and barrel, before receiving any benefits in return.
It鈥檚 been the new White House national security adviser, John Bolton, who has pressed for a deal with Mr. Kim on the order of what Mr. Qaddafi agreed to in 2003 with the Bush administration. Even Vice President Mike Pence started touting the model.
Why We Wrote This
Patience will be a virtue, it seems, in reaching a denuclearization deal with North Korea. While the outline of such a deal is still hazy, the path is becoming clearer: a drawn-out process of give-and-take.
But it was also all the White House talk of applying that pattern to North Korea that spooked Kim and nearly jettisoned plans for the summit. The clear message from Pyongyang: We are not Libya, so citing it is a dead end.
The result? By the time Mr. Trump announced Friday that the summit he had abruptly canceled a week earlier was back on, the talk had veered sharply from quick action to gradual steps. Trump now speaks of a 鈥減rocess鈥� and a likely series of summits instead of just one, with references to incremental implementation of any accord.
Yet while the timing of any deal may now be clear 鈥� good-bye 鈥渁ll at once,鈥� hello process and step-by-step 鈥� there is still little clarity just a week before the leaders are to meet in Singapore on what the specific steps in any deal might be.
However experts in North Asian and nonproliferation issues, some with decades of experience dealing with North Korea, say there are some key elements that will almost certainly be part of any deal.
Moreover, many experts now say, it is likely to resemble past US deals with North Korea 鈥� including those launched with fanfare, only to collapse later.
First among key elements, the US and North Korea would have to narrow the gap between them over just what 鈥渄enuclearization鈥� means. Mr. Bolton and others in the administration have shifted to speaking of the 鈥渃omplete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization鈥� of the Korean Peninsula, or 鈥淐VID鈥� for short.
For its part, North Korea has consistently spoken of denuclearization as a long-term and aspirational concept, encompassing the US nuclear presence on the peninsula as well as its own programs.
Verification
鈥淭he biggest gap in all of this is how we define denuclearization, and how the North Koreans define it,鈥� says Victor Cha, who served in the George W. Bush White House as the National Security Council鈥檚 director for Asian affairs. 鈥溾�橠enuclearization of the Peninsula鈥� is a phrase the North Koreans have used for decades.鈥�
One reason the North Korea case is so complicated is that Pyongyang already possesses nuclear weapons and some sophisticated means, including long-range missiles, of delivering those warheads. North Korea openly compares itself to India, which weathered a period of international rejection of its nuclear arsenal.
Any deal would have to include a full and verifiable accounting of the North鈥檚 nuclear arsenal, delivery systems, and technologies 鈥� in other words, Pyongyang would have to come clean on what it possesses in a way it never has before, these experts say.
Moreover, a deal would include a set of timelines for reducing the warheads and weapons delivery systems the North possesses 鈥� for example, the US is keen to remove the long-range ballistic missiles the Kim regime tested over the first year of Trump鈥檚 tenure and which may be capable of reaching the US West Coast.
Virtually no one 鈥� including the US intelligence community in a recent assessment 鈥� sees Kim agreeing to give every piece of his nuclear program. For example, Dr. Cha says convincing Kim to give up every one of his estimated two to five dozen nuclear warheads is 鈥渘ot going to happen,鈥� given the central place Kim sees an established nuclear status playing in his regime鈥檚 survival.
But if the hurdle of defining 鈥渄enuclearization鈥� can be crossed in a way that meets both sides鈥� needs, experts say, then a historic deal incorporating the other key elements might indeed be attainable.
The step-by-step plan
鈥淚n the end, the most important first indicator of whether there is something everyone can agree with will be whether the North can agree to a full and verifiable declaration of their capabilities,鈥� says Cha, now the Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. It was over the prickly issue of a full and verifiable declaration of North Korea鈥檚 nuclear assets that the Bush administration鈥檚 negotiations with the North broke down in 2007, he notes.
Then comes the question of arms and facilities鈥� reduction and dismantlement. And increasingly analysts say that if the 鈥渁ll at once鈥� Libya model is off the table, what has replaced it is a 鈥渟tep-by-step鈥� plan that follows each step the North takes toward 鈥渄enuclearization鈥� with an incentive 鈥� the lifting of some sanctions, the delivery of some humanitarian assistance 鈥� to keep the process going.
鈥淚t鈥檚 clear by now that the North Koreans aren鈥檛 going to do a Libya kind of deal, but on the other hand if Kim Jong-un sticks to 鈥榃e鈥檒l do it someday,鈥� then Trump鈥檚 not going to be interested, either,鈥� says Harry Kazianis, director of defense studies and Asian security specialist at the Center for the National Interest in Washington.
鈥淏ut the plan that could work is a step-by-step approach,鈥� he adds. 鈥淭he North gives up a few nuclear weapons first, at which point the US drops a few sanctions,鈥� Mr. Kazianis offers as an example. 鈥淭hen they give up a few ICBM missiles, and the US takes another agreed step. That鈥檚 the only way out of this trap."
He adds: 鈥淚 really believe that if they can come up with a step-by-step plan that yields some significant results by January of 2021 [the end of Trump's first term], then I think it鈥檚 a pathway that could work.鈥�
How big a downpayment?
One thing the past month of intense diplomacy has revealed, specialists say, is that Kim appears to be less interested in the kind of economic carrots that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other US officials have been dangling as incentives, and more focused on attaining the security guarantees that would definitively take his regime out of US cross-hairs.
US officials have been mum on what security guarantees the US would be willing to offer to the North as part of a step-by-step plan. But even before Trump began referring to a 鈥減rocess鈥� last week, some US officials have hinted at a growing openness on the US side toward incremental implementation of actions 鈥� as long as a synchronized plan starts off with the bang of major action and not with easily reversible baby steps.
鈥淭he question is what could be front-loaded in a process that鈥檚 inevitably going to go on for some time, and then what would be acceptable to the North Korean side in return for that front-loading,鈥� the chief US diplomat for East Asia, Susan Thornton, said in remarks in Tokyo in May. As long as the North is willing to make a 鈥渂ig down payment,鈥� she said, the US could be open to a phased implementation.
But even if an accord kicks off with the kind of 鈥渂ang鈥� the Trump White House wants, the pace of follow-on steps is going to be a key negotiating point, some analysts say.
Frank Aum, a former Pentagon North Korea adviser now at the US Institute of Peace in Washington, notes that many experienced diplomats are speaking of a 15-year timeline for achieving the Korean Peninsula鈥檚 as yet undefined denuclearization. Mr. Aum says a key part of negotiations will be 鈥渉ow much you can accelerate the steps right now.鈥�
