Israel aims to defeat Hamas, then leave Gaza. Who would fill vacuum?
Israeli tanks are seen in a staging area outside the Gaza Strip, as Israel prepares its response to the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, at Kibbutz Be'eri, in southern Israel, Oct. 14, 2023.
Violeta Santos Moura/Reuters
JERUSALEM
In September of 2014, Barack Obama gave a White House address in which he pledged that the United States and its allies would 鈥渄egrade and ultimately destroy鈥� the Islamic State.
The world could not tolerate a terrorist organization that kidnapped and killed innocents in the most barbaric of manners, the president said, or that possessed a base from which to launch its attacks and spread its poisonous ideology.
After several years, heavy destruction of several Iraqi cities, and the loss of many innocent lives, ISIS was substantially degraded and denied the 鈥渃aliphate鈥� it briefly declared in parts of Iraq and Syria.
Why We Wrote This
As Israel prepares to launch a ground invasion of Gaza, its challenge is more than military. A long, costly battle could both remove Hamas and pave an ideological path for its return.
But it was not eradicated, and it remains active today.
Now Israel, in the wake of the worst terrorist attack of its 75-year history 鈥� with more than 1,400 people killed, thousands wounded, and more than 220 taken hostage 鈥� is promising its citizens something similar to what Mr. Obama pledged: the destruction of Hamas, the militant Palestinian organization that rules the Gaza Strip and calls for Israel鈥檚 destruction.
But questions over the feasibility of 鈥渄estroying鈥� Hamas and its ideology, as well as over the moral issues raised by the high price that both sides 鈥� and in particular, civilians in Gaza 鈥� will pay in the war, are being asked as people anticipate Israel鈥檚 ground invasion of the enclave.
鈥淲hat Israel aims to do is not unlike the U.S. going in against Al Qaeda and ISIS,鈥� says Jonathan Schanzer, senior vice president for research at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington. Those groups 鈥渨ere severely weakened,鈥� and in a similar way, 鈥淗amas seems very unlikely to survive this or ever return to anything near its power鈥� today, he adds. But 鈥渢hat will still leave the question of Palestinian nationalism, which will not go away.鈥�
The U.S.聽 to delay the offensive to facilitate diplomatic efforts to secure the release of more hostages and deliver more humanitarian aid to southern Gaza. But reports in Israeli media Monday suggested the Israeli military was pressing the government to authorize the start of the invasion.
No one should expect the delay to last much longer, Israeli officials said.
Biden鈥檚 caution to Israel
The heavy weight of this war鈥檚 moral dilemmas was one of the main drivers behind President Joe Biden鈥檚 extraordinary wartime visit to Israel last week.
While offering Israel full-throated support, and ordering a show of force intended to discourage additional entrants into the conflict, Mr. Biden sought to caution one of America鈥檚 closest allies 鈥渘ot to be consumed鈥� by its outrage nor to make the mistakes the U.S. made in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
If anything, Israel will face far more daunting odds than the U.S. and its allies did against ISIS. That鈥檚 because Hamas is not a carpetbagger extremist group, but a deeply implanted governing organization espousing a brand of Palestinian nationalism that won鈥檛 be extinguished with regime change in Gaza.
Given those realities, the promised Israeli ground invasion may indeed topple Hamas from power and destroy much of its military apparatus, some Israeli military veterans and longtime analysts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict say.
But in the process, Israel will also kill many more thousands of Gaza residents 鈥� more than 5,000 people have already been killed, Gaza health ministry officials say 鈥� and destroy much of the densely populated territory鈥檚 physical infrastructure.
That severe toll is likely to create more sympathizers for whatever remnants of Hamas survive. And when the invasion is over, Israel and the international community will be left with the daunting question of who administers the 2.2 million people who have been under Hamas rule since 2007.
鈥淥f course this goal of destroying Hamas is realistic. It just depends on the price you are willing to pay to achieve this. After what took place Oct. 7, Israel does not have any other choice,鈥� says retired Maj. Gen. Gadi Shamni, commander of the Israel Defense Forces鈥� Gaza Division in the early 2000s.
鈥淏ut we recognize that Gaza will be piles of rubble after this war,鈥� he says. 鈥淚t won鈥檛 be short, and even if you kill and capture all the leadership and take out the weapons production, you can鈥檛 reduce to zero the Hamas supporters.鈥� If anything, he adds, 鈥渢here may well be even more supporters after this.鈥�
How Hamas can declare victory
As difficult as toppling Hamas will be, the challenges that will surface when the ideas behind the organization are perhaps invigorated will be no less daunting, some experts say.
鈥淲e do ourselves no favors by underestimating the ideological commitments that will be there no matter the outcome of the war,鈥� says David Makovsky, director of the Koret Project on Arab-Israel Relations at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
All it will take will be one senior Hamas leader able to emerge from hiding after Israel鈥檚 onslaught for Hamas to declare, 鈥淲e survived; therefore we won,鈥� he says.
Israel is at some risk of 鈥渞aising the bar too high鈥� with its rhetoric of destruction, Mr. Makovsky says.
鈥淭he Israelis know they are not going to take out every Hamas foot soldier,鈥� he says, 鈥渂ut they are aiming to take out the governing apparatus that directed this attack.鈥�
Others are even less sanguine about the prospects of eliminating Hamas.
鈥淚 understand the desire to destroy the Hamas apparatus, but I just don鈥檛 think it鈥檚 doable,鈥� says Benjamin Friedman, policy director at Defense Priorities, a Washington think tank promoting a realist foreign policy. 鈥淚f you envision any degree of Palestinian self-rule, then I think some version of Hamas 2.0 remains in power,鈥� he adds, 鈥渁nd Gaza goes back to what it was, but with fewer people and buildings.鈥�
It鈥檚 worth considering the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mr. Friedman says, noting they were deposed by a superior military power 鈥� only to return and take back control of the country.
Some Israelis refer to the U.S. campaign against ISIS not as a cautionary tale but as an example of what Israel intends to accomplish.
鈥淭he U.S. said it was going to destroy ISIS, and essentially it was destroyed,鈥� says Maj. Gen. Amos Gilad, a former head of politico-military affairs at the Ministry of Defense. 鈥淔or Israel, what 鈥榙estroy鈥� means is that all the relevant leaders need to disappear.鈥�
In addition, Israel will aim to take out as many Hamas fighters as possible, destroy Hamas鈥� weapons production infrastructure, and find and destroy the underground military infrastructure and extensive tunnel system, military experts say.
In many cases that infrastructure is located under residential buildings and public services like hospitals and schools.
Appeal to Israel鈥檚 neighbors
In terms of what comes after the invasion, there is near unity among officials and experts: Israel does not intend to stay in Gaza long as an occupying power.
Secondly, Israel is likely to call on its Arab neighbors 鈥� and in particular those Gulf countries with which it recently established diplomatic relations 鈥� to formulate an administrative authority for Gaza and begin funding reconstruction.
鈥淭he exit strategy will rely on intensive discussion with our American friends and with our Arab neighbors,鈥� says Major General Gilad, who is now executive director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel.
Mr. Makovsky co-authored a Washington Institute plan that envisions a 鈥渃onsortium鈥� of Arab countries acting as something of a bridge administrator. That consortium would take over policing and public order functions and begin work on the long rebuilding process 鈥� while ultimately turning the reins over to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which governed Gaza until it was chased out by Hamas in 2007.
The PA is the logical alternative for governing a demilitarized Gaza, Major General Shamni says, although he acknowledges there will be challenges to that plan. Foremost will be the widespread perception of the PA as a corrupt and unpopular governing entity in the West Bank that was already 鈥渒icked out鈥� of Gaza once.
Others doubt that Arab countries will be enthusiastic about joining a plan to administer a devastated Gaza, as they would risk a perception of bailing out Israel when anti-Israel sentiment in Arab publics is likely to have spiked.
Indeed, many military and diplomatic experts assert that how Israel carries out its war on Hamas and how Gaza emerges from it will go far in determining the Middle East鈥檚 trajectory: stability and even fresh paths to peace, or further violence and chaos.
鈥淭he real question will be whether the dismantling of Hamas and the destruction that accompanies it leaves a horrible taste in the mouths of the Palestinians and their supporters in the Arab and Muslim worlds,鈥� says the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies鈥� Dr. Schanzer. 鈥淚f any part of Hamas is left standing, that taste could allow [it] to reconstitute itself somewhere else.鈥�