海角大神

Russia鈥檚 Venezuela motives: It鈥檚 about the US, not Maduro.

Many of the hallmarks of a classic great power rivalry between Russia and the United States are on display in Venezuela鈥檚 ongoing crisis: competing proxy forces on the ground, diplomatic finger-pointing, and starkly divergent visions of world order.

But while it may look and sound like a Cold War standoff, for Russia it is really about the simpler issue of establishing rules for competing big powers in a post-Cold War world.

In Venezuela, and between the U.S. and Russia generally, there is no sharp ideological divide over world-shaping doctrines like communism versus capitalism. The substantial stake Russia has accumulated in Venezuela over the past two decades has much to do with geopolitical and economic opportunities, but Russian affinity for former Venezuelan leader Hugo Ch谩vez鈥� has no part in it.

Rather, the issue聽coming to a head amid Venezuela鈥檚 crisis is this: The U.S. demands that Russia stop meddling in the Western Hemisphere, or at least stop aiding regimes that are at odds with the U.S. National security adviser John Bolton recently went so far as to invoke the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine to justify that. The Russians counter that the U.S. needs to end its two-decade-old binge of regime-change operations, which includes supporting anti-Moscow revolutions in Russia鈥檚 own backyard.

Otherwise, who rules in Venezuela is of no special interest to Russia, experts say.

鈥淭he relationship that emerged between Russia and Venezuela was an accident. It was mainly the initiative of Hugo Ch谩vez, who was seeking counterbalances to his country鈥檚 dependence on the U.S.,鈥� says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a leading Moscow-based foreign policy journal. 鈥淥f course this was enthusiastically supported in Moscow. But it should be pointed out that at that time, the early 2000s,聽Ch谩vez was rich and could pay for Russian arms and advice. Since聽Ch谩vez died, and his successor has not proven so adept or popular, many in Moscow have been worried about our heavy investments in a potentially unstable regime.鈥�

Russia鈥檚 financial exposure in Venezuela , including at least $17 billion in loans to purchase Russian weaponry and develop Venezuela鈥檚 oil industry. Most of those debts remain outstanding, and any new Venezuelan government might refuse to pay them back. Russia鈥檚 state oil company, Rosneft, is heavily invested in Venezuela鈥檚 PDVSA oil firm, which could also be in doubt after a regime change.

In one strange wrinkle, Rosneft took a nearly 50% stake in Citgo, the Venezuelan-owned, U.S.-based refiner and gas station operator, as collateral for a loan to PDSVA. That could create a national security dilemma for the U.S. if Russia tried to take ownership.

Regime change presently seems off the table, after several days of intense diplomacy that saw Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov meet with his U.S. counterpart Mike Pompeo in Finland (and with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza in Moscow for consultations). Russian analysts say they deeply doubt that the U.S. is planning a military intervention of Venezuela in the style of the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989-90. And, even if that happened, Russia would be unwilling to do much to oppose it.

Analysts say there are no Russian troops in Venezuela, but there have long been Russian military advisers with the Venezuelan army, and private contractors may also be operating there.

鈥淭here are Russian military personnel in Venezuela, but not very many of them,鈥� says Vladimir Borodaev, an expert with Moscow State University. 鈥淭hey are mainly there to teach the Venezuelans how to operate the Russian air defense systems they bought. They don鈥檛 have any special role or influence.鈥�

Two Russian Tu-160 strategic bombers visited Venezuela amid a burst of media attention and , but experts say it was just a public relations exercise, and the planes soon returned home.

Cuba and China also have major stakes in any Venezuelan outcome. The U.S. often seems to conflate that with Russian support for the government of Nicol谩s Maduro, especially Cuba鈥檚 involvement, but Russian analysts say Cuba has its own separate relationship with Venezuela, and there is little coordination with Russia.

鈥淓ven in Soviet times Cuba pursued an independent policy in Latin America,鈥� says Mr. Borodaev. 鈥淭hey pretty much do what they want, and probably keep big secrets from us.鈥�

At the heart of the political dispute between Moscow and Washington over Venezuela is the issue of 鈥渕eddling鈥� in other peoples鈥� regions. Andrey Kortunov, director of the Russian International Affairs Council, which is affiliated with the Russian Foreign Ministry, says the U.S. is flouting its own principles of liberal world order when it demands that Russia stop supporting Mr. Maduro鈥檚 government.

鈥淭he traditional liberal position, supported by all U.S. presidents before Donald Trump, renounced all 鈥榮pheres of influence鈥� and held that sovereign nations should make their own choices,鈥� he says. 鈥淭hat鈥檚 the view behind NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, and U.S. claims that Russia鈥檚 strategic interests in places like Ukraine and Georgia are irrelevant. So, if we are talking about universal rules, those should apply to everyone, shouldn鈥檛 they?鈥�

Ironically, Mr. Bolton鈥檚 reference to the Monroe Doctrine could provide a diplomatic opening to Moscow, which still clings to the idea of a Russian-led sphere of influence in its own former-Soviet region.

鈥淭his citing of the Monroe Doctrine is something quite intriguing, and it would be warmly welcomed in Moscow if we thought the Americans took it seriously,鈥� says Mr. Lukyanov. 鈥淲e could talk in that language with them. Of course, it鈥檚 funny that they say it, but nobody here thinks they mean it.鈥�