海角大神

Checking China鈥檚 military: Biden鈥檚 next challenge

The response that mattered most after last week鈥檚 European summitry between President Joe Biden and America鈥檚 allies came roughly 48 hours later and 10,000 miles away.

It was the roar of 28 Chinese bombers and fighter jets crossing the narrow strait off China鈥檚 coast and breaching the air-defense zone of the island democracy of Taiwan.

That was Chinese leader Xi Jinping鈥檚 answer to the allied criticism of his economic, security, and human-rights record, and its meaning was clear: 鈥淐hina has become incomparably more powerful, self-assured, internationally assertive, and ambitious during my nine years in power.鈥� Or more bluntly: 鈥淒on鈥檛 dare lecture us.鈥�

China is the United States鈥� only true rival world power and by far its most daunting foreign policy challenge. It poses a conundrum that the Biden administration will be trying to work out ahead of the president鈥檚 next big geopolitical encounter, likely to come this fall: a face-to-face meeting with Mr. Xi. And the puzzle shows no signs of it getting easier to solve.

Mr. Xi has vowed to reunify Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a renegade province, with the mainland. By force, if necessary.聽

The hope remains in Washington 鈥� and among its allies 鈥� that all sides will want to avoid the nightmare scenario of military confrontation. But the very fact that such a scenario is no longer unthinkable is a reminder that China鈥檚 hardening stance on Taiwan is part of a more fundamental shift under Mr. Xi.

His stated aim is the 鈥渞evival of the Chinese nation鈥� to a point when China would take the dominant geopolitical role currently played by the democratic market economies of the West, which he believes are in inexorable decline.聽

Mr. Biden has called Mr. Xi鈥檚 domestic rule authoritarian, and it鈥檚 certainly that. But in recent years it has become nearly totalitarian, demanding total fealty to the Communist Party and to Mr. Xi himself 鈥� underpinned by the world鈥檚 largest and most pervasive system of electronic surveillance and control.

Internationally, he has greatly expanded Chinese influence, partly by leveraging an increasingly powerful economy, the world鈥檚 second largest, which gives Beijing a major role in world trade and finance. He has also championed a $1 trillion overseas infrastructure program called Belt and Road, involving a mix of funding, loans, and construction projects that give China new political sway, and financial influence, in dozens of developing countries worldwide.

And he has added military muscle to his foreign affairs toolbox, reorganizing and modernizing the country鈥檚 land, air, and naval forces, and developing cyberwarfare capability.

The significance of Taiwan is that it鈥檚 an issue where domestic and international, military and political, elements all intersect.

For Mr. Xi, it is both a domestic and international cause. Central to his vision of national revival is the nonnegotiable assumption that Taiwan鈥檚 people 鈥� ethnic Chinese 鈥� are part of 鈥淥ne China.鈥� And it鈥檚 a priority with new importance for Beijing since Taiwan鈥檚 establishment of a thriving democracy in the mid-1990s.

Experts differ over whether Mr. Xi is ready to reckon with the international political and economic costs China would pay for invading Taiwan 鈥� and, indeed, whether his military modernization has reached the point where he can be fully confident of succeeding.

But no one believes the U.S. response to the last major Taiwan crisis 鈥� in 1996, when two aircraft carrier battle groups persuaded Beijing to back down from efforts to influence the island鈥檚 first full democratic election 鈥� would be a sufficient deterrent now.

It鈥檚 not just that China鈥檚 military now has 鈥渃arrier-killing鈥� missiles. It鈥檚 the political shift. Any illusion that Mr. Xi鈥檚 鈥淥ne China鈥� policy is mere rhetoric has been shattered by the crackdown on pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong. Just last week, police there raided the offices of its main independent newspaper and arrested its top editors. The authorities also froze the paper鈥檚 funds, forcing the paper to close at the end of this week.

President Biden鈥檚 short-term hope is not so much to mount an effective response if China does move against Taiwan, though U.S. planners have long been working through the options. It is to deter China from taking military action and avoid such a confrontation in the first place.

With this in mind, Washington has begun redirecting military assets toward the Asia Pacific region. Politically, it鈥檚 also been strengthening ties with Asian allies and seeking a shared China policy on issues ranging from trade to human rights.

But Mr. Biden鈥檚 fundamental China policy aim seems broadly similar to what motivated his talks last week with another U.S. adversary, Russia鈥檚 Vladimir Putin.

There, Mr. Biden鈥檚 declared goal was to restore 鈥減redictability and stability鈥� to relations with Moscow, by setting out agreed rules of the road, being explicit about where Washington opposed Russian actions and also exploring areas where the two countries could act together.聽 聽

That鈥檚 a difficult enough task with Russia. It is likely to prove even more daunting with Xi Jinping鈥檚 China.