海角大神

There鈥檚 an old adage about London buses: You can wait forever and, all of a sudden, three show up at once. Yet for President Joe Biden and America鈥檚 allies, the sudden concern isn鈥檛 buses. It鈥檚 a trio of military flashpoints 鈥� in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East 鈥� involving three increasingly assertive U.S. rivals: Russia, China, and Iran.

Each daunting enough on its own, the simultaneous challenges amount to the stiffest overseas test yet for the new administration in Washington.

They鈥檙e also a reminder of a key, often-overlooked measure of successful diplomacy: not how leaders respond to a crisis when it erupts, but whether they can navigate geopolitical rivalries to prevent the crisis. In other words, can they keep political showdowns from becoming military ones?

That is often hard and doesn鈥檛 always work. But it鈥檚 what the U.S. administration is hoping and planning for as it responds to this trio of seismic rumblings.

Russia has moved tens of thousands of well-armed troops to its border with Ukraine, the largest buildup since it intervened in the largely Russian-speaking east of the country and seized Crimea seven years ago.

China is ramping up pressure on the island democracy of Taiwan, which it considers Chinese territory and has vowed eventually to annex, by force if necessary. Last week, two dozen Chinese military jets flew into Taiwan鈥檚 air defense zone, the largest such incursion in a year.

In the Middle East, the focus is on Iran鈥檚 drive toward nuclear weapons capability. There, the danger of full-scale military confrontation seems less immediate, but Washington may have less ability to influence events. Its ally Israel recently mounted a cyberattack on a nuclear facility in central Iran. The Iranians vowed 鈥渞evenge鈥� and later announced that they had enriched a small quantity of uranium to 60% purity, an important step toward weapons-grade fuel.

In dealing with both Russia and China, Washington has embarked on a strategy best described as 鈥渃lear but calibrated,鈥� tinged with a suspicion that Moscow and Beijing may be coordinating their actions in order to stretch the United States.

The clarity is in the message: that Washington is deeply concerned by, and firmly opposed to, the military activity both on Ukraine鈥檚 frontier and in the Taiwan Strait off eastern China.

Press Service General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine/Reuters

Ukrainian tanks on exercise near the border of Russia-annexed Crimea. Russia has massed troops in Crimea and on its border with Ukraine, sparking fears the Kremlin may be planning an invasion.

In a phone call last week with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Mr. Biden stressed Washington鈥檚 鈥渦nwavering commitment to Ukraine鈥檚 sovereignty and territorial integrity.鈥� Secretary of State Antony Blinken denounced China鈥檚 鈥渋ncreasingly aggressive actions鈥� toward Taiwan and added, 鈥淚t would be a serious mistake for anyone to try to change the status quo.鈥�

But there鈥檚 also been calibration: Washington has been reluctant to threaten retaliation, at least publicly, out of concern that could trigger a mutual escalation and lead to just the armed confrontation the U.S. hopes to prevent.

That strategy hinges on a critically important assumption: that Russia and China, too, want to avoid military conflict. And despite the rising tension, there are reasons to suggest the Biden administration could be right about that.

Russia鈥檚 2014 intervention in Ukraine was cloaked in stealth. This time, Moscow has been open, even obvious, in its buildup, a possible indication the aim is less military than political. It鈥檚 almost as if Mr. Putin is trying to tell the Americans, 鈥淗ey, look at me,鈥� in response to their growing focus on a more powerful rival: China.

China has no such concerns. But the COVID-19 pandemic, and the government鈥檚 oppression of Muslim Uyghurs, have weakened its international standing and favored Washington鈥檚 efforts to repair alliances frayed during the Trump years. Regardless of Beijing鈥檚 rising economic strength, a full-scale attack on Taiwan would provoke, at the very least, international isolation on a level that the Chinese have not faced since the Tiananmen Square crackdown three decades ago.

It was partly to signal his hope for a gradual de-escalation that the U.S. president also used his phone call with Mr. Putin to suggest a face-to-face summit. And he sent his climate envoy, John Kerry, to China to try to chart a joint path forward ahead of this week鈥檚 White House virtual summit on that issue.

Mr. Putin鈥檚 response to the proposed bilateral meeting was cool: His spokesman said he鈥檇 think it over. But both Mr. Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have accepted Mr. Biden鈥檚 invitation to the climate summit, indicating they are still open to cooperation on some issues. Iran has shown no sign of moderating its positions, but has so far not walked away from talks in Vienna aimed at bringing Tehran and the U.S. into compliance with their 2015 nuclear deal.

It could be that all parties are abiding by another bit of common British lore, a pithy aphorism attributed to former Prime Minister Winston Churchill that is often repeated by contemporary politicians.

鈥淛aw-jaw is better than war-war.鈥�