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Trump, Iran, and the logic of a new nuclear deal

As President Barack Obama was pursuing a diplomatic solution to Iran鈥檚 nuclear program during his second term, he waged a rearguard battle with hawkish Republicans in Congress who tried to scuttle his accord. Among the loudest critics was Donald Trump, who decried a 鈥溾�� that would provide $150 billion to 鈥渢he No. 1 terrorist state.鈥� Once he was in the Oval Office, Mr. Trump pulled out of the 2015 multilateral agreement.

Now in his second term, after failing to inflict a military defeat, President Trump is giving diplomacy with Iran a chance.

And his negotiators are taking a familiar approach of offering sanctions relief to Iran in return for limits on its nuclear program, just as Mr. Obama鈥檚 team did more than a decade ago in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. Vice President JD Vance has spoken of a deal that would 鈥�.鈥� The United States has already begun to relax sanctions on Iranian oil and has agreed to a raft of other sweeteners 鈥� including a $300 billion investment fund for Iran鈥檚 reconstruction.

Mr. Trump鈥檚 turnabout on his war goals has drawn barbs from across the political spectrum. While Democrats have derided the waste of U.S. blood and treasure, some Republicans have balked at concessions to Tehran and the sidelining of Israel, which jointly waged war against Iran. But Mr. Trump might face an easier path than Mr. Obama did in advancing a rapprochement, because of both his own political coalition and a changed geopolitical climate, in part of his own making, even as the path to negotiating a successor to the JCPOA remains perilous.

Politically, a nuclear deal 鈥渃ould be more tenable now than ever before because the majority of the American public 鈥� including among President Trump鈥檚 own coalition 鈥� would want an end to the decades of U.S.-Iran hostility,鈥� argues Arta Moeini, the research director at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, a foreign-policy think tank with offices in Washington and Toronto. Crucially, Mr. Trump might be able to secure congressional approval for any peace treaty, given his grip on the GOP, Dr. Moeini says.

Just as President Richard Nixon鈥檚 d茅tente with China in the 1970s was feasible because he was a staunch anti-communist, so Mr. Trump could point to decades of hostility toward the Islamic Republic to justify a 180-degree turn to his base. But that analogy only goes so far, says Rina Shah, a GOP strategist and former congressional aide. 鈥淣ixon went to China with a real, clear strategic goal, and he delivered results that reshaped the Cold War,鈥� she says.

Skepticism about Iran is bipartisan, and any nuclear deal will be closely scrutinized, Ms. Shah says. 鈥淭rump鈥檚 base might give him more leeway initially, but if a deal fails to contain Iran鈥檚 nuclear ambitions or their proxy threats long term, then even he faces backlash.鈥�

So far, the public appears far from convinced by Mr. Trump鈥檚 claims about Iran. Few believe that Tehran鈥檚 nuclear program is no longer a threat, though most want the war to end regardless, . Among Republicans, though, 4 in 10 support continuing to use military force against Iran to overthrow the regime.

The war鈥檚 inflationary pressures have been a drag on GOP hopes of holding on to Congress after November鈥檚 midterms. The administration鈥檚 shifting reasons for going to war could complicate Mr. Trump鈥檚 ability to sell any deal to voters, says Dave Wilson, a Republican strategist based in South Carolina. 鈥淭here has not been enough of a firm wall of definition that Trump has put out there to the public to explain to them why they are financially suffering, why there are lives that are being lost to do what we鈥檙e doing in Iran,鈥� he says.

Mr. Obama鈥檚 outreach to Iran faced fierce opposition from Israel, whose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rallied opposition among Republicans in Congress. The JCPOA also faced resistance from Saudi Arabia and other U.S. allies who saw Iran as an implacable enemy. While Mr. Trump鈥檚 peace process with Iran has gone over poorly in Israel, Gulf states have pledged billions of dollars to the proposed reconstruction fund for Iran.

Analysts say Gulf states have been rattled by Iran鈥檚 retaliatory attacks and the disruption from the closing of the Strait of Hormuz. 鈥淭hey鈥檙e incentivized now to play nice with Iran,鈥� says Max Abrahms, an international relations professor at Northeastern University who is critical of the Trump administration鈥檚 diplomacy. Gulf leaders have also begun to question the United States鈥� commitment to protect the region after the conflict is over, he says.

During the fighting, which began as a joint operation with Israel on Feb. 28, the U.S. military inflicted damage from both the air and sea, but was unwilling to send in ground troops to accomplish the White House鈥檚 goals 鈥� including regime change and the removal of Iran鈥檚 enriched uranium stockpiles.

鈥淔or coercion to work, there must be a credible threat,鈥� he says. 鈥淭his war, ironically, has undercut the credibility of the U.S. military threat against Iran.鈥�

The Trump administration insists that it is in a strong position to extract concessions from Iran after decimating much of its military and industrial base. Mr. Vance has argued that this economic pain is conducive to making diplomatic progress and that the two countries can now turn a page. that 鈥減eople within the Iranian system 鈥� senior leadership, even IRGC officials 鈥� say, 鈥榊ou know what? We may have some animosity, we may have some mistrust. But we recognize the way that we鈥檝e done business with the United States for 47 years is a mistake. Let鈥檚 try something else.鈥欌��

Aaron David Miller, who worked on Middle East policy and peace negotiations for the State Department under Republican and Democratic administrations, says this rhetoric is misleading. 鈥淭his regime still prides ideology over prosperity,鈥� he says. Iranian officials would welcome economic growth that means less popular discontent, he adds, but their idea of prosperity is about 鈥渆nriching the regime and building its military and proxy assets.鈥�

鈥淭he notion that somehow you鈥檙e going to change the nature of the regime [with economic investments] ... is just crazy,鈥� says Mr. Miller, now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Mr. Obama had also suggested that the deal he made could lead to regime change, but wasn鈥檛 dependent on that happening. He it was signed: 鈥淚t is possible that if we sign this nuclear deal, we strengthen the hand of those more moderate forces inside of Iran.鈥�

On sanctions, Mr. Trump has put far more on the table than the JCPOA ever did, says Robert Einhorn, a special adviser on nonproliferation and arms control during the Obama administration, and who was involved in the negotiations. The JCPOA eased nuclear-related sanctions in return for compliance with limits on uranium enrichment and international inspections. But it didn鈥檛 lift the sanctions that prevent U.S. companies and individuals from doing business in Iran.

鈥淭he Iranians were very upset [in 2015] that they didn鈥檛 realize the benefits from sanctions easing that they expected. I think this time around, they basically said that the Trump administration has to get rid of them all,鈥� says Mr. Einhorn, now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

The JCPOA was also a multilateral agreement joined by China and Russia. As part of the deal, Iran agreed to send enriched uranium to Russia. So there was greater international cooperation. 鈥淲e operated as one team. It was Iran against all the rest. The Russians and the Chinese were very helpful in getting a deal,鈥� Mr. Einhorn says.

He is also skeptical that the Trump administration can negotiate a watertight deal to limit Iran鈥檚 nuclear program in 60 days, as the memorandum of understanding envisions. But he expects Iran to stay at the negotiating table for as long as it takes. 鈥淚t鈥檚 clear from the way the Iranians are negotiating [that] they believe they are in the driver鈥檚 seat,鈥� he says.

Staff writer Sophie Hills contributed reporting.