海角大神

US-China: Are Americans ready for a (costly) breakup?

The Commerce Department announces tighter standards for the export of some sensitive technology to China.

Members of Congress send a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo encouraging him to investigate the role of the Chinese Communist Party in what they say was a cover-up of the coronavirus鈥� origins and a disinformation campaign about the outbreak.

And President Donald Trump declares at a press conference that the United States will seek to require China to 鈥減ay big鈥� for a pandemic that originated in China but spread globally to sicken millions, kill hundreds of thousands, and plunge the world into recession.

That鈥檚 just part of the evidence that the already testy relations between the world鈥檚 two superpowers have taken a sharp turn for the worse as a result of the outbreak.

Editor鈥檚 note: As a public service,聽all our coronavirus coverage聽is free. No paywall.

That shift appears to be taking hold not only in Washington but in the American heartland 鈥� the state of Missouri has filed a lawsuit against Beijing seeking reparations for the heavy costs of addressing the epidemic 鈥� and in a public with an increasingly negative view of China.

With six months to go until the U.S. presidential election, could a rising tide of anti-China public sentiment become a factor?

For many experts in U.S.-China relations, the bilateral tensions spawned by the pandemic have so far been limited to tougher and certainly more public versions of positions that were already percolating. Congress already had its China bashers; the Trump administration was already debating a tougher stance versus deeper cooperation with China 鈥� especially on trade.

But some longtime advocates of a 鈥渄ecoupling鈥� from China say the pandemic offers the best opportunity since the 1970s for a robust national debate on the merits of a significant and policy-driven separation. Such a debate would span issues from technology transfer and U.S. economic sectors鈥� dependence on China trade to sharpening criticism of China鈥檚 violations of human rights.

鈥淭hree months ago I would have said there was no chance of a serious decoupling from China, but the political environment has changed,鈥� says Derek Scissors, an expert in U.S.-China economic relations at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.

鈥淲e鈥檙e still not near the serious 鈥� and what would be costly 鈥� steps necessary to separate [from them] and reduce our participation in the success of China鈥檚 economic model,鈥� he adds. 鈥淏ut all the outrage over the tremendous suffering and economic impact of [the pandemic] has opened a door to a reassessment of our relationship.鈥�

More likely than a new China strategy that sets out to reduce ties, say others, is an acceleration and intensification of actions that were already being pursued or promoted by some in Congress and some China analysts.

鈥淲hat this [rise in tensions] is really doing is exacerbating the geopolitical trends we鈥檝e already been seeing in recent years,鈥� says Michael Auslin, a distinguished research fellow in contemporary Asia at Stanford University鈥檚 Hoover Institution in Stanford, California. 鈥淭he tensions were already growing.鈥�

Thus there is likely to be rising pressure for action on topics that have raged for years, from stemming the theft of intellectual property and repatriating supply chains critical to U.S. national security, to confronting China鈥檚 expansionist activities in the South China Sea.

鈥淎n asterisk next to China鈥�

A change that the U.S. and other Western countries should capitalize on in the post-pandemic period, some experts say, is that China is now going to be marked by many countries as an untrustworthy partner. That is not just because of how China handled the initial outbreak of the coronavirus, they say, but because its heavy-handed actions in its pandemic-related foreign assistance has left a bad taste from Europe to Africa.

鈥淭he world has put an asterisk next to China,鈥� says Mr. Auslin, who notes for example that the White House now puts an asterisk next to coronavirus statistics out of China. And the theme running through much of the European press last week, he says, was 鈥淭he Week China Lost Europe.鈥�

Efforts to punish China that were building primarily among Republican senators have recently gained the avid interest of President Trump.

鈥淲e are not happy with China,鈥� the president said last week, before separately leveling the accusation that the coronavirus originated in a Wuhan virology laboratory. Most scientists and the U.S. intelligence community have concluded that, based on available information, the virus spread after a wild-animal-to-human transmission.

Mr. Trump and senior administration officials kept the anti-China fire roaring over the weekend, with the president promising a 鈥渧ery strong report鈥� soon that would lay out China鈥檚 initial mishandling of the outbreak and then a cover-up.

Mr. Pompeo said on ABC鈥檚 鈥淭his Week鈥� Sunday that the聽Chinese Communist Party聽had engaged in a 鈥渃lassic communist disinformation effort鈥� that made sure 鈥渢he world didn鈥檛 learn in a timely fashion about what was taking place.鈥�

In response, a party newspaper, The Global Times, said Mr. Trump was making accusations without presenting evidence, 鈥渢o fool the American public鈥� about his administration鈥檚 poor response to the pandemic.

White House officials confirm that Mr. Trump鈥檚 comments reflect his growing interest in finding ways to 鈥減unish鈥� China over the pandemic. That interest has focused on the idea of stripping China of its sovereign immunity so that it might be successfully sued for damages by states 鈥� such as Missouri 鈥� and individuals demonstrating losses from the epidemic.

Options for punishing China

Yet while demanding greater transparency may be the international community鈥檚 right, many experts say the chances of forcing China to pay for the pandemic are remote.

鈥淚t is totally appropriate for the U.S. and other countries around the world 鈥� to be deeply upset and concerned about the initial development of the virus 鈥� and to demand greater information and changes in Chinese policies,鈥� says Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser in Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

On the other hand, the chances of successfully suing for reparations are extremely low, he adds. 鈥淚n the case of the Missouri lawsuit, they will almost assuredly not be able to overcome issues of sovereign immunity.鈥�

Mr. Scissors of AEI says that even if White House officials are discussing a range of options for punishing China, he assumes that what the president would settle on, if anything, would be a new round of tariffs.

鈥淭he president probably means tariffs鈥� when he talks about making China pay 鈥渂ecause he always means tariffs, it鈥檚 his go-to response,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut tariffs are about getting the Chinese to buy more American products,鈥� he adds, 鈥渁nd that鈥檚 definitely not decoupling.鈥�

Mr. Trump acknowledged last week that a new round of tariffs he is considering might jeopardize his trade deal with China, but he said addressing the pandemic crisis is now more important.

Mr. Scissors says the U.S. faces a 鈥渂asic choice鈥� in its relationship with China, which he sums up as 鈥渨eighing money earned by American technology companies against the harms of supporting the Chinese Communist Party.鈥� Any meaningful steps to disentangle the U.S. and China would be costly, he adds, and 鈥減oliticians don鈥檛 like costly.鈥�

A 2020 election issue?

But he says he sees signs the American public could demand a different relationship with China 鈥� and says he would not rule out that demand becoming a key theme of the 2020 election.

A Pew Research Center poll from last month backs up the notion that the American public is souring on China. The survey found that the percentage of Americans holding an unfavorable view of China rose to 66% 鈥� up from 47% last year and the highest negative opinion of China since Pew began asking the question 15 years ago.

鈥淭his election will decide the course of U.S.-China relations,鈥� Mr. Scissors says, while acknowledging that, at this early point in the presidential race, there is little evidence of either major candidate making significant change a pillar of his campaign.

Real change 鈥渋s going to take either President Trump or Vice President Biden moving to action against China that neither of them has ever agreed to in the past,鈥� he says.

Nothing so far suggests either man would proceed to a sea change in U.S.-China relations, Mr. Scissors says, but he cautions that the last election came down to an underlying public sentiment that got short shrift in the campaign.

鈥淚n 2016 it was unhappiness with globalization, and as part of that, unhappiness with China. That was the story of the election,鈥� he says. 鈥淚n 2020, it could be a deepening of that unhappiness with China, and a signal from the American people that they don鈥檛 want the relationship to continue as it has, that could lead to real change concerning China beginning in 2021.鈥澛犅犅犅犅�

Editor鈥檚 note: As a public service,聽all our coronavirus coverage聽is free. No paywall.