Beijing is challenging global 鈥榬ules.鈥� But some are pushing back.
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Ann Scott Tyson Staff writer
| Pingtung County, Taiwan
Liu Taiguang often walks along Taiwan鈥檚 windswept southernmost cape to the gleaming white Eluanbi Lighthouse, its beacon flashing from a fortified, cast-iron tower across the turquoise waters of the Bashi Channel.聽
A fourth-generation Taiwan native, Mr. Liu is as steadfast as this lighthouse near his home in supporting Taiwan鈥檚 independence. He is defiant in the face of Beijing鈥檚 insistence on uniting it with the mainland 鈥� by force if necessary. And he is jubilant that Taiwanese voters delivered a landslide reelection to pro-independence President Tsai Ing-wen in January, despite Beijing鈥檚 interference.
鈥淟ook at this election!鈥� the wiry taxi driver says with a laugh. 鈥淭aiwan people won鈥檛 do whatever the mainland says.鈥�
Why We Wrote This
When we say that the post-war order is in flux, what are we really talking about? Sometimes, it boils down to one word: China. But the questions Beijing鈥檚 rise has posed for people from Taipei to Washington are far more complex. Second in our global series 鈥淣avigating Uncertainty.鈥�
Only 80 miles from the mainland, Taiwan has long been on the front lines of Chinese intimidation. Today, Taipei鈥檚 alarm 鈥� and readiness to push back 鈥撀爄s shared in Washington and many other capitals, as China increasingly asserts itself as an autocratic economic, technological and military power following its own rules.
When China unleashed market reforms in 1979, Western leaders believed political liberalization would follow, bringing China into the fold of the international order that had held since World War II. But those expectations have unraveled since Chinese leader Xi Jinping took power in 2012, tightening the ruling Communist Party鈥檚 control and launching an ambitious program of 鈥渘ational rejuvenation鈥� to achieve the 鈥淐hinese dream.鈥澛�
Mr. Xi envisions China strengthening its sovereignty at home, projecting influence across Asia and beyond, advancing an authoritarian alternative to liberal democracy, and regaining a central place on the world stage 鈥� at a time when faith in democratic norms in many parts of the world. Beijing鈥檚 spending on foreign aid and development projects has soared, transforming the country into one of the world鈥檚 top lenders.
China is 鈥渇ully confident in offering a China solution to humanity鈥檚 search for better social systems,鈥� Mr. Xi proclaimed in 2016. In 2018, he said one of China鈥檚 priorities is 鈥渓eading the reform of the global governance system,鈥� which Beijing argues enshrines U.S. hegemonism and unfair trade and financial arrangements.聽
鈥淲hat the Chinese government wants is to survive 鈥� to make a world safe for autocracy,鈥� says Jessica Chen Weiss, an associate professor of government at Cornell University. 鈥淚t鈥檚 in areas where the Chinese government has felt the most threatened by global norms, such as on human rights, that it has been the most determined to rewrite the rules to favor its interests.鈥�
And Beijing is in a stronger position to do so at a time when the traditional institutions of global governance have atrophied, says William C. McCahill Jr., senior resident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research in Seattle. China is 鈥渨orking the [existing international] system for what it鈥檚 worth to them, and at the same time slowly building this kind of parallel universe,鈥� he says.
Beijing stresses 鈥渨in-win鈥� diplomacy. But many governments are concerned that China often wields its wealth and power 鈥� including the world鈥檚 third strongest military 鈥� in zero-sum fashion, or out of sync with international norms.
The United States now casts China as a strategic rival, and President Donald Trump鈥檚 administration 鈥渉as been enormously influential in shaping how the rest of the world now views China,鈥� says Elizabeth Economy, Asia director at the Council on Foreign Relations.聽
In Asia, China is encountering resistance to its sweeping claims in the South China Sea. And some countries are reevaluating Mr. Xi鈥檚 signature foreign policy, a massive infrastructure plan called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Closer to home, 鈥渆very element of Xi Jinping鈥檚 reunification narrative is being challenged, and that is at the heart of his 鈥楥hinese dream鈥�,鈥� says Dr. Economy. 鈥淐hina has come under enormous criticism for its human rights abuses in Xinjiang. In Hong Kong, there is really massive societal unrest 鈥� a rejection of the Chinese political model, and in Taiwan you had the reelection of Tsai Ing-wen.鈥�
Taiwan鈥檚 defiance is extraordinary given the intense pressure Beijing exerts on the de facto independent island of 23 million people. Since President Tsai was first elected in 2016, China has cut off official dialogue, imposed economic sanctions, stepped up military actions, and bombarded the island with disinformation aimed at manipulating elections. Taiwan endures about 30 million cyberattacks a month, mainly from China.
Digital Minister Audrey Tang says Taiwan鈥檚 鈥渨hite hat hackers don鈥檛 have to do 鈥� drills, because they are facing real battles every day.鈥� 鈥淥ur democracy,鈥� she says, 鈥渋s battle-tested.鈥澛�
Near the lighthouse, shops have lost business since China restricted mainland tourism to Taiwan. Mr. Wu, purveyor of fresh coconut milk, sells only half what he used to. 鈥淭aiwan is too small. We shouldn鈥檛 fight with the mainland,鈥� he argues.
Overall, though, Beijing鈥檚 bullying seems to have backfired. Only one in ten Taiwanese today backs unification with China, and support for independence since 1995.聽
鈥淐hina鈥檚 economy is huge and can allow us to make a lot of money, but democracy is more valuable,鈥� says Mr. Liu, voicing a widespread sentiment. 鈥淵ou make so much money but you are not free? It鈥檚 very agonizing.鈥�
As Mr. Liu visits the lighthouse one late January day, Chinese military jets conducting a drill roar over the Bashi Channel in a show of force designed to intimidate Taiwan. Mr. Liu is unfazed. 鈥淲e are a free and democratic country,鈥� he says. 鈥淲e can鈥檛 tolerate a聽one party-rule, dictatorial country.鈥�
Coercion at sea
Taiwan and many Asian states are feeling the heat from China鈥檚 burgeoning military, fueled by larger than those of Japan, India, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations combined.
Chinese fishing boats, coast guard vessels, and maritime militia are pushing ever deeper into the resource-rich and strategic waters of the South China Sea, regularly encroaching on the legal economic zones of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Beijing鈥檚 claim to virtually the entire sea was dismissed by an independent international tribunal in 2016.
In January, a telling standoff near the Natuna Islands, which belong to Indonesia, highlighted how China鈥檚 seaward expansion is galvanizing a nationalist backlash.
A Chinese fishing fleet 1,000 miles from home, escorted by coast guard vessels, sailed into Indonesia鈥檚 Exclusive Economic Zone and fished for days without permission, ignoring a formal protest by Jakarta. The provocative move underscored China鈥檚 ability to conduct longer missions by resupplying vessels at bases it has constructed on artificial islands in the South China Sea 鈥撀� in violation of Mr. Xi鈥檚 2015 pledge that China would not militarize the area.
But Indonesia鈥檚 President Joko Widodo pushed back. He dispatched fighter jets and warships to the Natunas, deployed hundreds of troops, and then landed there himself, saying Indonesia鈥檚 鈥渟overeign rights鈥� must be enforced.聽
The bold move worked. Soon afterward, the Chinese flotilla departed.
鈥淐hina鈥檚 ultimate aim in the South China Sea is to have a veto over any activity,鈥� so Indonesia鈥檚 rebuff was significant, says Brian Harding, deputy director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).聽 聽 聽
BBC, United Nations
As Indonesia, Vietnam, and other countries resist China鈥檚 encroachment, the United States is stepping up support with its 鈥渇ree and open鈥� Indo-Pacific strategy. The U.S. Navy, still the most powerful in the region, staged a record number of 鈥渇reedom-of-navigation patrols鈥� in 2019 鈥� aimed at keeping vital sea lanes open 鈥� defying Chinese navy warnings to stay out of waters it claims.聽
In a key step, the U.S. assured the Philippines last year that any armed attacks on its forces in the South China Sea would trigger their mutual defense treaty, although a bilateral spat is now threatening the alliance. A multiyear U.S. maritime security initiative is also underway to help Southeast Asian countries and Taiwan boost law enforcement and intelligence capabilities.聽
鈥淚t鈥檚 not just about keeping waters safe for navies to sail through. [South China Sea] resources are incredibly important to these countries,鈥� says Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at CSIS. 鈥淲e have to incur more risk.鈥�
鈥淐hina continues to flout international law鈥� by laying claim to territories that do not belong to it, she adds. 鈥淚f the U.S. does not stand up for the rights of smaller countries, then those countries will probably over time increasingly accommodate China ... because China is the big elephant right near them and the United States is far away.鈥� But if the U.S., Japan, Australia, and other powers actively oppose China鈥檚 infractions, she says, smaller nations can strike a better balance.
The 鈥楻oad鈥� to win-win?聽 聽 聽 聽 聽 聽 聽 聽 聽 聽 聽 聽 聽 聽 聽聽
If China鈥檚 military muscle-flexing is unnerving the rest of Asia, its major economic overture, the Belt and Road Initiative, has met with cautious welcome.聽
The initiative involves building an infrastructure network of roads, railways, pipelines and ports worth 聽to link China more closely to the rest of Asia and Europe. Its goals are to increase China鈥檚 access to energy and natural resources, open markets for Chinese goods, and secure China鈥檚 future growth.
But China鈥檚 failure to follow international norms in BRI projects has led to problems: Some borrowers 鈥� such as Sri Lanka 鈥� have found themselves with crippling debt burdens; BRI鈥檚 lax environmental standards threaten hundreds of species, activists warn; and opaque loan terms and project bidding procedures have fostered corruption. This has led some recipient countries to reevaluate their deals.聽
鈥淏elt and Road has moved from being something that was overwhelmingly welcomed by the international community, to something that is still of interest but equally of concern, based on the way China is doing business,鈥� says Dr. Economy.
In 2018, Malaysia鈥檚 then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad suspended a multibillion-dollar, 400-mile BRI railroad project, citing exorbitant costs and unfair terms. Mr. Mahathir then renegotiated the project, lowering the cost by $5 billion to $11 billion, securing a guarantee of 40% local participation, and reducing environmental harm.
鈥淐hina may seem powerful 鈥� it鈥檚 got all the finances, the technology, the corrupt networks 鈥� but in the end the small countries in Southeast Asia have significant leverage over the Chinese,鈥� says David Lampton, a China expert at Stanford University. 鈥淭his idea that China is an unstoppable juggernaut, to which everybody else has to genuflect, is a mistake.鈥�
Reuters
The U.S., Japan, and India are stepping up funding, including through the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, launched in January with authority to lend $60 billion.聽
But if China dominates development lending to Southeast Asian nations, Beijing will easily enjoy undisputed influence, says Dr. Lampton, co-author of the forthcoming book 鈥淩ivers of Iron: Railways and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia.鈥澛�
As China鈥檚 building spree races ahead, it will 鈥渃hange the face of Southeast Asia,鈥� Dr. Lampton says. 鈥淭he train has left the station. The question is, will we be on it?鈥�
Today鈥檚 test case
In the heart of Hong Kong鈥檚 Central District, in a high-rise office suite lined with law books, Cambridge-trained Senior Counsel Alan Leong reflects on the pro-democracy protests that saw more than a million people flood the streets of the Asian financial center last summer.
鈥淭here has never been such an awakening of the Hong Kong people ... to the breaches of the Chinese Communist Party of Hong Kong law,鈥� he says. The massive protests were sparked by a proposed extradition bill, later withdrawn, that would have allowed suspected criminals in Hong Kong to be sent to mainland China for trial in courts controlled by the Communist Party.
鈥淥ur personal safety was at stake,鈥� Mr. Leong says. 鈥淲e could feel for the first time the betrayal of trust. We had believed the Communist Party would honor the Basic Law,鈥� he says, referring to the miniconstitution established to guarantee Hong Kong鈥檚 way of life and independent judiciary after the former British colony reverted to China鈥檚 sovereignty in 1997.
Hong Kong鈥檚 uncertain fate holds unique lessons for the democratic world, he says.
鈥淲e are a Chinese society on Chinese soil, flying the five-star red flag, but in every sense of the word, we are free,鈥� says the bespectacled Mr. Leong, a former legislator and chairman of Hong Kong鈥檚 Civic Party. But Hong Kongers will have to go on fighting to preserve that, he adds.
Mr. Leong pauses, his look somber. 鈥淲hat I have been sharing with friends is: Today鈥檚 Hong Kong may be your tomorrow, and you have only yourselves to blame.鈥�
Nearly 20 years ago the West made a mistake, he argues, by supporting China鈥檚 accession to the World Trade Organization, by believing China would adopt international legal norms, and by failing to police China鈥檚 compliance with those norms as it emerged as an economic giant.聽
Now, he says, democracies must uphold the rules-based international order against China鈥檚 challenges, just as people in Hong Kong are standing up for their core values.
鈥淵ou are not just helping Hong Kong,鈥� he says. 鈥淵ou are helping yourselves.鈥�
You can find other stories in the Navigating Uncertainty series here.
