Iran attacked: Is Revolutionary Guard looking the wrong way?
| LONDON
A veteran of 5,000 hours behind bars, accumulated during repeated bouts in prison and months in solitary confinement, Iranian Mohammad Reza Jalaeipour is very familiar with the intelligence arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 鈥� and with its obsessions.
So when the political activist was summoned for questioning in March 鈥撀爅ust days after being warned by the IRGC to stop helping reformists find a consensus candidate for June 18 presidential elections, or face jail 鈥撀爃e expected arrest. He quickly posted a video on social media.
Describing himself as an 鈥渦nimportant and low-impact citizen, whose activities are not even worth mentioning,鈥� Mr. Jalaeipour said, addressing his interrogator: 鈥淚鈥檓 surprised at your tyranny; at least do it in an effective way!鈥�
Why We Wrote This
In Iran, the vanguard security force seems more focused on internal dissent than on external threats. Is that a failure of imagination, or is the Guard overwhelmed by taking on too much?
He added, 鈥淵ou put me in solitary confinement many times, and you realized every time that it does not work.鈥�
At a moment when Israeli agents and its allied operatives appear to regularly penetrate Iran and freely target its nuclear program, the episode highlights the fixation of the IRGC鈥檚 intelligence branch instead on domestic activists and dual citizens it accuses of espionage, providing a window into its threat priorities.
The latest alleged Israeli attack, an explosion at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant April 11 that destroyed thousands of centrifuges 鈥� the second devastating strike on Natanz in less than a year 鈥� comes after Iran鈥檚 well-protected top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in broad daylight last December.
The disconnect between the attacks and the IRGC鈥檚 focus is raising questions 鈥� even among staunch loyalists of the Islamic Republic 鈥� about how an authoritarian regime obsessed with 鈥渋nfiltrators鈥� has become so vulnerable to external threats.
For Iran, one root issue appears to be the cost of an ideological military force that sees itself as much more. The often hubristic self-image of the IRGC, created to 鈥減rotect鈥� the 1979 Islamic Revolution, has outstripped its capabilities.
鈥淟ooking for an easy win鈥�
Analysts say the IRGC is overburdened, having assumed more and more functions of the state. As the IRGC fails repeatedly to prevent sabotage widely attributed to the Mossad, they say, it seeks to compensate by hitting domestic targets.
鈥淭he IRGC at times loses sight of its main mission, due to its ever-expanding portfolios,鈥� says Ali Alfoneh, an analyst at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.
鈥淚ncapable of preventing Mossad operations in Iran, the IRGC creates the illusion of intelligence superiority by hitting soft targets such as Iranian dual nationals,鈥� says Mr. Alfoneh, the author of two books on the IRGC鈥檚 rise.
鈥淭hey are distracted, and also I think myopic. They are looking for an easy win,鈥� says Afshon Ostovar, an Iran expert at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. 鈥淭hey go after small-potato dissidents, or just invent them to begin with, because it鈥檚 something they can show the regime [and] everybody else.
鈥淏ut what they have not developed is a real unity of effort, and a real articulation of what the danger is,鈥� says Dr. Ostovar, author of 鈥淰anguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran鈥檚 Revolutionary Guards.鈥�
Other inherent security vulnerabilities, say experts, are created by widespread economic discontent and inefficiencies in overlapping and redundant state institutions.
Iran鈥檚 economic hardship and corruption, says Mr. Alfoneh, 鈥渆ases recruitment of the citizenry by foreign powers.鈥�
It鈥檚 鈥渘ot just them looking in the wrong places [for threats], but 鈥� really discounting how much discontent there is within Iran 鈥� within the ranks of the government, the armed forces, the civil servants,鈥� says Dr. Ostovar. 鈥淭his isn鈥檛 all political discontent, but it leaves people more susceptible to inducements that foreign intelligence services can offer them.鈥�
Even Mossad derived a benefit from Iran鈥檚 many intelligence distractions, according to the London-based Jewish Chronicle. In a detailed account of the Fakhrizadeh killing published in February, citing intelligence sources, it said a team of more than 20 spies 鈥� both Israeli and local Iranian agents 鈥� spent eight months getting close to their target and smuggling parts of a remote-controlled gun.
鈥淭he audacious operation 鈥� succeeded partly because Iranian security services were too busy watching suspected political dissenters,鈥� the Chronicle reported.
Survival tactics
Those dots have been connected in Tehran, too, raising questions like never before about IRGC priorities.
鈥淎nother fire at the Natanz nuclear facility鈥� isn鈥檛 it a sign of how serious the issue of infiltration is?鈥� asked former commander of the IRGC, Mohsen Rezaei, in a tweet. 鈥淭he country鈥檚 security apparatus is in need of cleansing.鈥�
Former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad went further, asking about Iran鈥檚 $1.2 billion-per-year security apparatus: 鈥淗ow is it that, instead of fighting off the enemy, you are standing against the people? How is it that the people have turned into the threat?鈥�
The political rationale might be simple.
鈥淭he regime leadership is aware of the substandard performance of its institutions in the intelligence wars against foreign powers,鈥� says Mr. Alfoneh. 鈥淏ut I also suspect they are content as long as those same institutions display full competence suppressing the domestic opposition, which has hitherto secured the regime鈥檚 survival.鈥�
The IRGC鈥檚 broadening remit includes a major role in the sanctions-strapped economy; supporting regional proxy forces from Lebanon and Syria to Iraq and Yemen; building an expanding ballistic missile and drone program; and fighting a shadow war against the United States and Israel.
Yet it has also found time for lethal crackdowns on protests that left hundreds of Iranian citizens dead; made spectacles of arresting dual nationals and successfully luring dissidents within kidnapping range; and stepped into Iran鈥檚 vicious political fray.
Political drama
The IRGC even produced an expensive TV series called 鈥淕ando,鈥� a spy thriller that portrays it as invincible, while insinuating that the centrist President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif are sellouts to archenemies America and Israel.
Mr. Zarif dismissed 鈥淕ando鈥� as a 鈥渓ie,鈥� but sparked controversy in an interview leaked in late April when he said Iranian diplomacy was 鈥渟acrificed鈥� to IRGC military interests. In the interview, for a government oral history project, he said the Guard鈥檚 much-revered Qods Force commander, Gen. Qassem Soleimani, killed in an American drone strike in January 2020, sought to scupper the 2015 nuclear deal.
Days after the leak, IRGC intelligence agents reportedly raided the offices of President Rouhani and of Mr. Zarif, and carried away documents.
The political firestorm is the latest example of how Iran鈥檚 鈥渄eep state of security and intelligence forces,鈥� which report to Iran鈥檚 supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, continue to 鈥渉ave power without accountability鈥� and dominate the 鈥渨eak state,鈥� writes Karim Sadjadpour, Iran analyst of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
鈥淲hile the Guards鈥� use of fear and coercion might be able to indefinitely sustain the Islamic Republic鈥檚 internal contradictions, this should not be mistaken for popular legitimacy,鈥� Mr. Sadjadpour wrote in The Atlantic in March. During four decades, the Islamic Republic 鈥減roved adept at surviving but, like many revolutionary regimes, incapable of reforming.鈥�
And that creates a systemwide lack of unity that can lead to vulnerability.
鈥淭he regime itself is a compromise, between the ruling institutions and the supreme leader who sits on top of it,鈥� says Dr. Ostovar. Mr. Khamenei 鈥渉as not found a way to become a dictator and just impose a king-like efficiency to the system, and there鈥檚 also an indigenous looseness to the system that 鈥� allows these cracks and these fissures that can be exploited by Israel and whomever else.鈥�
IRGC efforts are complicated, too, by the scale of 鈥渢aking on the world, or at least a significant part of it, as an enemy,鈥� says Dr. Ostovar. 鈥淚t鈥檚 difficult for them to keep up. It鈥檚 got to be exhausting, because their foot is on the pedal all the time.鈥�
