As Iran and Iraq simmer, giants of Shiite world vie for influence
| NAJAF, Iraq; and LONDON
United briefly in their mourning over the assassination of Iran鈥檚 most powerful military commander, Qassem Soleimani, two rival titans of the Shiite Muslim world both paid their respects.
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the reclusive top religious authority in Iraq, sent his son to greet the funeral procession as it filled the shrine city of Najaf with mourners.
And he sent his condolences to Iran鈥檚 supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, his longtime rival for influence over the Shiite world.
Why We Wrote This
The separation of religion and state is deeply dividing the Shiite world. On one side is the supreme leader of Iran, a theocracy. On the other, a grand ayatollah in Iraq. The tensions echo events on the ground.
But when Ayatollah Khamenei called for 鈥渟evere revenge鈥� against the United States, Grand Ayatollah Sistani called on all parties 鈥渢o behave with self-restraint.鈥�
The divergent responses encapsulate one facet of a broader theological contest 鈥� newly rejuvenated by months of anti-government protests in Iraq 鈥� between the religious rulers of Iraq and Iran,聽and their two very different worldviews about the role that Shiite clerics should play in politics and daily life.
At stake, analysts note, is leadership of the world鈥檚 200 million-plus Shiites. And as Iraq鈥檚 protests have unfolded since Oct. 1, the pressure points between these two tectonic plates of Shiite politics are being exposed and redefined like never before.
Ayatollah Sistani articulates a more liberal interpretation that respects a secular state in Iraq. That stands in contrast to the system of absolute clerical rule in Iran, called velayat-e faqih, which is led by Ayatollah Khamenei and has dominated Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
鈥淗e supports our desires,鈥� says Ali, a young Iraqi in Najaf, where Ayatollah Sistani leads a powerful Islamic seminary. The majority of Iraqis, says Ali, sitting in a protest tent hung with three posters of Ayatollah Sistani that outline his views, 鈥渁re waiting for [his] call.鈥�
To be sure, Ayatollah Sistani still wields great political influence. His authority has been on display during months of Friday prayer sermons, where his words have removed a prime minister, eased a violent crackdown that has taken some 460 lives 鈥� the worst of the violence reportedly the result of hard-line guidance from Iran 鈥� and warned against any foreign intervention in Iraq.
A liberal political Shiism
In the recent sermons 鈥渨e have seen more liberal, political Shiism being spelled out than in the hundred years before,鈥� says an Iraqi government analyst, a native of Najaf who asked not to be further identified.
鈥淚f we are to mention a single factor that prevented a totally bloody crackdown against the protests, it would be [Ayatollah Sistani鈥檚] Friday sermons,鈥� says the analyst. 鈥淎nd by doing so, he has put a limit on the Iranian approach. He stopped Iraqis taking Iranian advice.鈥�
By contrast, in addition to their core demands for political change, Iraqi protesters have burned portraits of聽Ayatollah Khamenei, sacked Iranian consulates, and attacked Iran-backed Shiite parties and militia groups in their anger over Iran鈥檚 extensive influence.
鈥淲e are seeing these two schools 鈥� at least the Iraqi, Sistani one 鈥撀爐aking clearer shape, under pressure of these events,鈥� says the analyst. 鈥淚t seems that [Sistani] is shifting away even farther from velayat-e faqih into a different, yet-to-be-clearly-spelled-out Shi鈥檌 theory of governance, that is definitely more liberal, that does not see instructing people as one of the duties of an ayatollah.鈥�
Yet in the religious-political construct of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei is in charge of the perpetual revolution and has final say in all affairs of state. As the personification of the faqih, Ayatollah Khamenei is meant to be the official representative of the infallible 12th Shiite saint, Imam Mahdi, who disappeared centuries ago.
鈥淚t is well-known 鈥撀爐his is not a secret 鈥撀燬istani is more on the side of tolerance and coexistence,鈥� says Abbas Kadhim, head of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington.
鈥淜hamenei and the velayat-e faqih system is [based] more on the exclusive claim to authority,鈥� says Mr. Kadhim, who is from Najaf. The Iranian system refers to聽Ayatollah Khamenei as the 鈥済uardian鈥� of all Muslims, whether they believe they should follow him or not.
鈥淭he only reason they tolerate other voices outside Iran is because they don鈥檛 have authority over those,鈥� says Mr. Kadhim. 鈥淪o from Sistani鈥檚 perspective, if velayat-e faqih takes control of Iraq, there will be no Sistani, or there will be Sistani under house arrest. ... These guys in Najaf are fighting for their own very existence.鈥�
Secular vs. clerical rule
The style of these towering rivals also could not be more different. Ayatollah Sistani has some 600 representatives across Iraq, and a global network beyond. He earned public reverence with careful, infrequent intervention that 鈥渉elped Iraq a great deal to save the day every time the country was about to fall apart,鈥� says Mr. Kadhim.
That respect has been enhanced, he says, by 鈥渘ot micromanaging the daily public life of Iraqis ... because he鈥檚 not like what you see in Iran, or a place like Saudi Arabia ... where there is a religious police mentality.鈥�
In Iran, however, every public and social step is scrutinized and controlled by laws such as mandatory head-covering for women. Every aspect of politics is officially defined by devotion to velayat-e faqih, which was a marginal Shiite concept for centuries until it was put into practice four decades ago by the first leader of Iran鈥檚 revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Under聽Ayatollah Sistani鈥檚 leadership, the Najaf seminary 鈥渉as successfully revived a traditional approach to Shia politics as a rival to velayat-e faqih,鈥� writes Ali Mamouri, a former seminarian, in a September analysis for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
鈥淚n articulating his own version ... Sistani refers explicitly to velayat-e insan (state guardianship by the people), as opposed to velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist),鈥� or clerical rule, writes Mr. Mamouri.
Protests in Iraq
As Iraq鈥檚 protests grew to become the most widespread since the U.S. invasion of 2003 toppled Saddam Hussein, there was an indirect back-and-forth dialogue between the Iranian and Iraqi Shiite schools.
When聽Ayatollah Khamenei instructed 鈥渢hose who love Iraq鈥� to stamp out insecurity, for example, Ayatollah Sistani declared his stance against a violent crackdown. When Ayatollah Khamenei called the Iraqi protests a foreign-backed 鈥渟edition鈥� 鈥撀燼s Iranian officials label any anti-government protests in their own country 鈥撀燗yatollah Sistani backed the protesters鈥� call for change and told the government to 鈥渞ecalculate鈥� its decision not to step down.
And clearly irritated by Iran鈥檚 continuing intrusions,聽Ayatollah Sistani in December called for the new government to be formed 鈥渨ithout foreign interference.鈥�
鈥淲ith Iran gaining influence across the region, Tehran is eager to claim moral leadership over the more than 200 million Shiites around the world,鈥� wrote Mr. Mamouri for the Al-Monitor website in April 2018.
鈥淲ith Sistani pushing 90 and facing persistent rumors of ill health, Khamenei and his allies see a once-in-a-generation opportunity to take over Najaf, the spiritual capital of the Shiite world,鈥� he wrote. 鈥淚ts most immediate impact will be felt on Iraq鈥檚 capacity to continue charting its own path in the shadow of the Islamic theocracy next door.鈥�
Boosting that capacity for Iraq has been an uphill battle for聽Ayatollah Sistani, despite his vast authority.
鈥淟et鈥檚 face it: The style of the Iranian leadership is the style of a state, not a religion or a religious leadership,鈥� says Mr. Kadhim of the Atlantic Council, noting that states have a monopoly over violence, as does the faqih in Iran.
Ayatollah聽Sistani, by contrast, 鈥渄oes not have a claim of monopoly, or even a shared responsibility or right to use violence,鈥� says Mr. Kadhim. 鈥淗e is an absolutely non-violent man. He doesn鈥檛 believe in coercion.鈥�
Restraint and respect
In addition,聽Ayatollah Sistani has refused to meet 鈥渉ard-liners,鈥� such as figures close to聽Ayatollah Khamenei, including the Lebanese Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.
His attempts to integrate Iraq鈥檚 Iran-backed Shiite militias into the state military 鈥撀燼gainst聽Ayatollah Khamenei鈥檚 express wishes 鈥撀犫�渉ave limited Iranian influence,鈥� writes Mr. Mamouri for the Washington Institute.
Mr. Sistani has also demonstrated restraint in another way, by choosing not to turn Iraq into a clerical-run system like Iran.
鈥淪istani could turn Iraq into velayat-e faqih not tomorrow, but this evening, if he wants,鈥� adds Mr. Kadhim. 鈥淵et he doesn鈥檛, and that is an important distinction. Sistani鈥檚 lack of inclination to assume a lot of power ... deserves a lot of respect.鈥�
It鈥檚 respect he also gets from Iran, despite the dispute.
鈥淜hamenei respects Sistani very much. He also respects the fatwas of Sistani, even if they are against him,鈥� says Hisham al-Hashemi, a Baghdad-based security analyst with the European Institute of Peace. 鈥淚 know lots of Khamenei鈥檚 followers. They have very firm instructions not to talk [negatively] about Sistani in any way.鈥�
But for Ayatollah Sistani, limiting Iran鈥檚 influence has not been easy, given the critical role that Tehran played in 2014 to halt the Islamic State鈥檚 lightning advance, and in supporting Iraq鈥檚 Shiite militias.
鈥淟ots of Iraqis believe in Iran, therefore their beliefs oblige them to work for Iran,鈥� says Mr. Hashemi. 鈥淭hey don鈥檛 believe in Iran as a geography or a neighbor, they believe in it as an Islamic Revolution, and the right for this revolution to cross borders everywhere.鈥�
