The real story behind a charred Iraqi shrine: Resentment of Iran
| NAJAF, IRAQ
Outside the charred walls of a shrine complex here is ample evidence of the ferocity of a dayslong battle mounted by Iraqi protesters, convinced they were targeting a symbol of Iranian power in Iraq.
Molotov cocktails that failed to explode 鈥撎齮heir blackened fuses stuffed into bottles of gasoline or spirits 鈥� lie scattered amid a carpet of stones, bricks, and broken glass.
They were thrown by men who first stormed and torched the nearby Iranian consulate Nov. 27, chanting 鈥淚ran out of Iraq鈥� 鈥撎齮he first of three attacks on that building in a week.
Why We Wrote This
Is Iran鈥檚 power waning in Iraq? Measured by its perceived influence over Iraqi politics, perhaps not yet. But popular resentment toward Iranian overreach is growing, as the violence at a Najaf shrine showed.
Then they moved to the shrine, their anger fueled by rumors of an Iranian intelligence presence at this vast mausoleum, built to deify Ayatollah Mohammad Bakr al-Hakkim, leader of an Iraqi opposition group created by Iran in the 1980s.
鈥淚ran takes all our resources, our funding, our freedom,鈥� charges one protester, explaining why he and others fought at the complex. Beside him, a student, Zain, holds three pieces of metal shot extracted from his bandaged forehead.
鈥淔or sure, the protests will help lower this negative Iranian influence,鈥� says Hamed, another young participant.
The protests that have shaken Iraq are first about removing a corrupt, entrenched sectarian system of rule that has failed to provide jobs, services, or hope since the U.S. military removed Saddam Hussein in 2003.
But Iran鈥檚 outsize influence has also been a growing target of Iraqis resentful toward what they regard as Iranian arrogance. Tehran鈥檚 overt meddling in Iraqi politics is seen as enabling a weak government as well as the rise of dozens of Shiite militias and their parties, which analysts say are corruptly engaged in every aspect of Iraq鈥檚 economy.
As a result goodwill toward Iran has been falling from its high of 2014, when Iran鈥檚 immediate military assistance and advisers 鈥� orchestrated by Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard鈥檚 elite Qods Force 鈥� were instrumental in stopping the advance by Islamic State (ISIS) militants.
Portraits of Iran鈥檚 supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have been defaced and torched. Across southern Iraq, offices of Shiite militias most closely associated with Iran have also been attacked.
Analysts say Iranian听overreach has undermined Tehran鈥檚 influence, ambitions, and the popularity of its proxy forces in Iraq. The erosion coincides with another taking place in Lebanon, where veteran fighters of the Shiite organization Hezbollah are questioning their role fighting Iran鈥檚 wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
鈥淚f I were in Ayatollah Khamenei鈥檚 position, I would put Soleimani in jail,鈥� says Hisham al-Hashemi, a听Baghdad-based听security analyst with the European Institute of Peace who advises the Iraqi government.
鈥淗e failed in the mission. Iraq should be the last front line [of defense] for the Iranians,鈥� says Mr. Hashemi. Iran鈥檚 influence in elections last year and General Soleimani brokering the government that resigned in late November under pressure, he says, means that 鈥淚ran achieved lots of things in 2018. But all that it won it has lost in 2019.鈥�
The conversion of the Shiite militias, collectively known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, from fighting ISIS to waging political war as parties last year, meant the PMF 鈥渄idn鈥檛 realize it had become part of the corruption.鈥� But ordinary Iraqis saw it.
鈥淭hey became like the gods of the temple, and see themselves as sacred people,鈥� Mr. Hashemi says of the PMF. 鈥淲ithout Iran, they wouldn鈥檛 be so much in control. The problem is not with Iran, but with the proxies. People are attacking Iran because their proxies mistreated them.鈥�
The Trump administration a week ago issued sanctions on three senior Iraqi militia chiefs, saying they acted under Iranian orders when cracking down violently on Iraqi protests.
Iran鈥檚 declining numbers
Even by 2018, Iraqis鈥� attitudes toward Iran were shifting, with polls indicating that those holding favorable views had declined from nearly 90% in 2015 to fewer than 50%. Those who view Iran as a threat to Iraqi sovereignty shot up from 25% in 2016 to 58% in 2018.
Those views have been magnified by the publishing last month of 700 Iranian intelligence reports by The Intercept and The New York Times, detailing Iran鈥檚 systematic and successful efforts to co-opt Iraqi leaders, cultivate former CIA informants, and infiltrate every aspect of Iraqi life.
Part of the backlash has played itself out in the attacks on Iranian consulates of Najaf and Karbala 鈥� cities with close ties to the Islamic Republic that welcome millions of Shiite pilgrims each year, many from Iran, to visit the shrines of Shiite Islam鈥檚 two most important seventh-century saints.
鈥淔or sure Iran had a positive stance against ISIS, but it came at a cost,鈥� says Ali Hussein Aboud al-Dhuwayhir, a local activist and head of the Al-Rafidaein Society for Human Rights in Najaf.
He cites Iranian officials speaking as if Iraq were an asset of Iran. Among them, in a speech last April, Hassan Abbasi, a strategist and former Revolutionary Guard officer, said that for every dollar Iran had spent in Iraq and Syria fighting ISIS, 鈥渋t is now returning $1,000鈥� in contracts.
鈥淚n the current government we see the influence of Iran, and Soleimani comes and gives orders like we have no sovereignty,鈥� says Mr. Dhuwayhir.
鈥淟et me ask this question: Can we put any picture of Iraqi politicians or religious figures in Iran, or hold the flag of Iraq in Imam Reza鈥檚 shrine [in Mashhad, Iran]? No,鈥� he says, referring to the ubiquitous Iranian flags and portraits of Iranian clerics across Shiite areas of Iraq.
鈥淲e can see and are sure that Iraq is about to become a suburb of Iran,鈥� says Mr. Dhuwayhir. 鈥淎ll these things have created hatred against Iran and anyone affiliated with them. ... Because of the bloodshed, there is no way back.鈥�
Video of one nighttime battle at the shrine and prayer complex dedicated to Ayatollah Hakkim, head of the Iran-backed Badr Brigade militia, shows the shrine鈥檚 defenders firing heavily amid flames, as the protester recording the scene shouts: 鈥淭hey [the gunmen] are coming from the grave of al-Hakkim, the Iranian!鈥�
Another online video shows one man shouting during the battle: 鈥淭hese people killed our sons! We want revenge.鈥�
鈥淭alking and gossip鈥�
Fueling the bloodshed in Najaf were rumors about Iranian use of the sprawling Hakkim complex, which includes the vaulted shrine chamber itself, a mammoth marble mosque, and extensive seminary grounds still under construction.
One rumor was that the complex hosted a secret center for Iranian intelligence. Another was that Mr. Soleimani himself was inside.听Or, at the very least, protesters say, captured demonstrators had been imprisoned in the basement.
Hassan al-Hakkim, vice president of the Shahid Al-Mihrab Foundation, which runs the complex, dismissed the rumors as 鈥渢alking and gossip.鈥�
On a tour of the complex a week after the fight, only one assault rifle is evident, the smell of burning still hanging in the air.
Like many political families in Iraq, the Hakkims maintain their own militia. Dozens of young Iraqi men wearing black balaclavas, to mask their identity during a rare visit by a foreigner, sit anxiously on mattresses laid all around the gilt, ornate cage that encloses the ayatollah鈥檚 coffin.
There were no Iranians inside during the battles, they say, adding that they were waiting for a new attack by those bent on turning the legitimate grievances of Iraqi protests into an anti-Iran wave.
Mr. Hakkim, speaking by phone from northern Iraq, says the rumors were meant to tarnish the reputation of the center, which is 鈥渏ust a school鈥� that does charity work and feeds 20,000 鈥減eople in need.鈥� But local anger has been developing over the project鈥檚 scale saying it appears to portray the late ayatollah as on par with the 12 recognized Shiite imams.
鈥淭hey managed to create this constant irritation for locals, even locals who are close to them,鈥� says one Najaf native in Baghdad whose grandfather鈥檚 house is 100 yards from the Najaf complex. 鈥淚t was an irritation that was created by the Hakkims out of arrogance.鈥�
Noticing corruption
He also notes a shift among Iraqis away from sectarianism, such that by 2014 Iraqi Shiites were asking why Shiite-dominated governments had done so little for them.
After ISIS鈥檚 defeat, people found corruption and lack of services, and the emergence of a 鈥渘ew class of nouveau riche鈥� that was 鈥渉eavily associated鈥� with the PMF, says the Najaf man.
鈥淪o people are beginning to realize how much corruption is around,鈥� he adds. 鈥淭his is where the anti-Iranian sentiment mainly comes from.鈥�
Is that a blow to Iran?
鈥淎t the politician level, if you drank the Iranian Kool-Aid, then it really doesn鈥檛 matter,鈥� says one Iraqi official in Baghdad, who asked not to be named. 鈥淏ut if you鈥檝e got Iraqi nationalism in your blood, and you鈥檙e looking to better this country, then, yeah, you would see this as Iranian overreach.鈥�
