In Iraq鈥檚 protests, a popular cry to reform a broken political system
| London
The overwhelming display of anger in Iraq over the past week 鈥撀燼nd the unprecedented violence with which it was met 鈥撀爃as shocked many Iraqis, even though its sources are familiar: unemployment, poverty, corruption.
And as Iraqi security forces end their high alert today and the nation begins to take stock, questions are being raised about whether the country has the leadership, willpower, and democratic institutions to translate this powerful expression of citizen anger into meaningful action.
The short answer is 鈥渘ot yet,鈥� analysts say, even though Baghdad itself has experienced relative calm and a renewed sense of security and normalcy since the Islamic State (ISIS) militants were聽declared defeated in聽2017.
Why We Wrote This
On the surface, Iraq鈥檚 antigovernment protests are about unemployment and corruption. But they expose a much deeper challenge: the dearth of democratic institutions to translate that anger into meaningful reform.
But deep underlying problems have sparked the biggest challenge to Iraq鈥檚 political elite since then, with street violence leaving some 165 Iraqis dead, by one count, and more than 6,000 wounded.
Widespread anger at a persistent lack of hope in Iraq 鈥� fueled by weak government and years of failed, top-down reform 鈥� boiled over in Baghdad and Shiite heartland cities of southern Iraq.
The popular outrage was met with lethal live fire and tear gas, as Iraqis on the street,聽many of them young men who said they had 鈥渘othing to lose,鈥� called for fundamental political change.
鈥淧eople are shocked at what they are seeing and what they are hearing,鈥� says an Iraqi analyst in Baghdad who asked not to be named for security reasons.聽
Internet blackout
Until an internet blackout, imposed to prevent further organizing and the spread of news and images of the protests, began to be lifted in recent days, 鈥渋t was very difficult to tell what was going on unless you went there,鈥� he says. 鈥淎nd if you went there, there was obviously a chance you wouldn鈥檛 come back. ... But now the images are starting to come out, videos are starting to come out, the numbers, quotes from hospital officials, and people are shocked.鈥�
Roiling the protesters is not only disillusion with the ballot box, but anger at a political elite that still rules through powerful, ethnosectarian parties and militias 鈥撀爏ome of them backed by Iran 鈥撀爀ven as they use state funds to satisfy patronage networks.
Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi said there were 鈥渘o magic solutions鈥� when he offered protesters a 17-point proposal, including handouts for the poor, in his first public statement since the unrest began on Oct. 1. But it is the weakness of Mr. Abdul-Mahdi鈥檚 year-old government of technocrats, and its inability to grapple with Iraq鈥檚 entrenched issues, that has failed to narrow the gap between the people and the state.
More than 16 years after an American invasion toppled the dictator Saddam Hussein, Iraq is blessed with revenues from an underground ocean of oil. But it has also been bludgeoned by the U.S. occupation, an Al Qaeda-led insurgency, and finally an invasion by ISIS in 2014, all of which crippled institution-building that might have boosted faith in government and even job prospects.
鈥淣othing has changed,鈥� says the Baghdad analyst. 鈥淚t鈥檚 still the same kleptocracy that we鈥檙e in. The frontline services that people experience every day are still as bad as they were several years ago, in some places they鈥檝e got worse.鈥�
He blames inefficiency, corruption, a lack of will, and fiercely competing interests, such that coalition governments are 鈥渕ade up of rivals and enemies ... just empires and fiefdoms, and they鈥檙e constantly at each other鈥檚 necks, because they are trying to maximize their benefits,鈥� he says. 鈥淪o, nobody is thinking, 鈥榃ell, how do we do something for the benefit of citizens and of the country?鈥欌��
Protesters, most of them drawn from Iraq鈥檚 majority Shiite population, have called for the collapse of the regime, which is Shiite dominated. Yet instrumental in protecting the system have been Shiite militias, a collection of mostly Shiite paramilitary units, known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), that grew to some 150,000 strong and consolidated their role during the anti-ISIS fight. They have now been largely absorbed into Iraq鈥檚 security and political structure.
Straining to be heard
Iraqi security forces apologized for the excessive use of force, and said commanders never ordered lethal tactics, and don鈥檛 know the identity of snipers who have played a key role in raising the death toll.聽
鈥淚 spoke to a doctor, and, on the snipers, these are precision shots, aimed precisely at hearts and heads,鈥� says Renad Mansour, an Iraq expert at the Chatham House think tank in London, referring to the cramped and deprived Shiite enclave where one-third of Baghdad鈥檚 estimated 8 million residents live.
The prime minister and his aides have no control over security forces, and 鈥渘o idea which armed groups are behind this, who is doing the killing,鈥� says Mr. Mansour, who was in Baghdad until the eve of the protests.
He notes that elections last year saw the lowest turnout of any vote in Iraq since 2003. And despite the fact that two-thirds of the seats in parliament changed hands, and that a party of the populist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr made impressive gains, initial hopes of significant change have gone.
Iraqis 鈥渉ave given up faith in elections, in parliament, in technocrats, and this [protest] is the only way 鈥� they think 鈥撀爐hat they can have a voice,鈥� says Mr. Mansour.
鈥淎nd you can see how important this is, by the way that elites are reacting,鈥� he adds. 鈥淭hey learned from Basra [protests] last year that those who want to protect the system, if they kill enough, if they intimidate enough, if they shut off the internet, they could stop the protests. So this equation is now being used, not just in Basra, but in Baghdad and elsewhere.鈥澛�
The PMF chief Falih al-Fayyadh blamed the unrest on infiltrators working for foreign enemies. 鈥淥ur response to those who want ill for the country will be clear and precise by the state and its instruments. ... There will be no chance for a coup or rebellion,鈥� he said on Monday.
Actually engaging with citizens
Even as the street protests wind down, the fact that discontent grew to such an extent means it is already 鈥渢oo late鈥� for a quick fix, and that a new cycle of protest is inevitable without strategic efforts at reform, says Maria Fantappie, an Iraq analyst for the International Crisis Group.
鈥淪top-gap measures will not do much,鈥� Ms. Fantappie told Al Jazeera English. 鈥淭here is a need for the government to actually engage with a section of what I call the 鈥榮ociety of demonstrators.鈥� It is very important to [remember] that not all demonstrators are violent, [many] are well educated, who are usually engaged in civic activism, volunteering.鈥�
She laid out the challenge for Iraq in an analysis published last March, after five months of research in Iraq. Appointing technocrats to ministerial posts, Ms. Fantappie wrote, 鈥渕arked an attempt to trigger a transition from a dysfunctional political system. Yet technocrats remain dependent on the old political figures who have little interest in reforming a system that serves them.
鈥淚n that sense, Iraq is at a crossroads,鈥� she wrote. 鈥淎 sense of hope and a readiness for reform run parallel to a stubborn belief that a broken system will continue to sputter along.鈥�
So many graduates, so few jobs
But how broken is that system in Iraq? A few numbers tell the story of discontent and explain why it is young Iraqi men manning the burning barricades. Each year, an estimated 700,000 Iraqis become employable in a country that, at most, is producing just 50,000 jobs. 聽
鈥淭he majority of those [jobs] are just welfare, repackaged into the form of employment,鈥� says the Baghdad analyst. 鈥淵ou have a factory that needs 200 people to run it, and you have 3,000 people on the payroll. You have security forces numbering 1.25 million, yet you still have a problem when you fight ISIS, because the vast majority of them are not showing up or are assigned desk jobs.鈥�
鈥淭here is no denying that a significant proportion of the population is benefiting from the people in power,鈥� says the analyst, referring to patronage networks. But institution-building has been hobbled, he says, first by Iraqi leaders coming from abroad, post-2003, installed by the U.S. and enriching themselves, then by Iraqis themselves: 鈥淒ue to ignorance, [and] there are lots of tribal and religious hatreds.聽
鈥淲e have had Al Qaeda and ISIS, all of these elements, and it means we haven鈥檛 had any breathing space to say, 鈥楬ow can we improve our governance, and deal with our issues?鈥� without constantly looking at the geopolitics of it all,鈥欌�� says the analyst.
