Why Iran and Israel are crossing each other鈥檚 red lines
| LONDON
Just hours after Israel said it had launched airstrikes in Syria to stop an Iranian 鈥渒iller drone鈥� attack, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu toured the occupied Golan Heights 颅鈥� the supposed target of the foiled Iranian barrage.
The premier鈥檚 visit last weekend came amid a two-day whirlwind of strikes that were either claimed by Israel or were attributed to it and were aimed at Iranian forces or their allies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip.
As Israel and Iran surge past each other鈥檚 red lines, analysts are raising questions about how far such fresh escalations can go, short of all-out war. The region is already buckling under an array of proxy conflicts, the U.S.-Iran standoff in the Persian Gulf, and Washington鈥檚 鈥渕aximum pressure鈥� campaign against Iran.
Why We Wrote This
Unintended consequences? Outside pressure from a major power can upset the equilibrium of a local conflict. That could explain why Israel and Iran are ratcheting up the pressure on each other.
Mr. Netanyahu explained why Israel is now striking further afield than ever before, to thwart Iran:
鈥淚f someone comes to kill you, rise up and kill him first,鈥� he said, invoking a line from the Talmud long embraced by Israel鈥檚 security services. 鈥淎ny country that allows its territory to be used for attacks against Israel will bear the consequences.鈥�
Until now a strategic balance between Israel and Iran has prevailed 鈥� despite more than 200 Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Iran-linked targets in Syria in recent years, most with modest or no Iranian response.
But as U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on Iran has intensified, so too has Iran deepened its ties to and reliance on its allied militias. Its goal: to increase its own strategic depth and its deterrence against Israeli and U.S. military action.
Iran鈥檚 moves have given it enhanced freedom of action on Israel鈥檚 doorstep 鈥撀燿espite Russian assurances聽that it would keep Iranian forces back from the border in southern Syria 鈥撀燼nd an improved capacity to upgrade the missile arsenal of Hezbollah, its ally in Lebanon.
But if Iran鈥檚 threat perception encompasses both Israel and its superpower ally the U.S., Israel鈥檚 gaze is focused on regional hegemon Iran and its lesser proxies.
Israeli strikes in Iraq
Its cross-regional strikes 鈥� starting with a July 19 bombing of an Iran-backed Shiite militia base near Baghdad, which reportedly struck guided missiles bound for Syria 鈥撀燼re designed to limit Iran鈥檚 influence, raise the cost of foreign adventures for Tehran, and prevent the growth of what Israeli officials call Iran鈥檚 鈥渨ar machine鈥� in Syria.
Besides four strikes in Iraq this summer 鈥撀爐he first Israeli attacks in聽Iraq since聽its聽1981聽destruction of a nuclear reactor 鈥撀營srael was behind a drone attack in Beirut last Sunday, which is reported to have destroyed key Iranian-made equipment for upgrading Hezbollah missile guidance systems.
鈥淭he game is relatively clear for both parties,鈥� says Nasser Hadian, a political scientist at Tehran University.
鈥淚ran is trying to build an effective deterrence against Israelis, in Lebanon and Syria 鈥撀爐his is the main part 鈥撀燼nd to a much lesser extent in Iraq,鈥� says Mr. Hadian. 鈥淭hat puts Iran in an advantageous position regarding Israel, because Iranian forces and proxies 鈥� if you want to use the term 鈥撀燼re close to Israel鈥檚 border, but the Israelis are far away from Iranian borders.
鈥淪o naturally, it鈥檚 very clear that what Israel wants is to prevent that,鈥� he says.
Indeed, from the Israeli perspective it is military pressure against Iran鈥檚 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria that has prompted Tehran to shift operations inside the country northward and to increasingly use Lebanese and Iraqi territory.
鈥淚srael has been quite successful in delaying or acting against Iranian attempts to come up with a strategic military infrastructure inside Syria,鈥� says Raz Zimmt, an Iran expert with the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), a think tank at Tel Aviv University.
鈥淭he Iranians are trying to adapt their strategy to the constraints in Syria and moving more activity to Lebanon and Iraq, [which] makes Israel realize that is has to expand its activity as well to [those] other fronts,鈥� he says.
鈥淚ran is not ready to give up Syria. It has spent too much money, and given too many Iranian soldiers until now, and it鈥檚 not ready to give up this opportunity,鈥� Mr. Zimmt says. 鈥淚ran considers Syria its strategic depth, vis-a-vis Israel.鈥�
Threats, but no interest in war
The result of Israel鈥檚 expansion of strikes has been outrage in parts of the Arab world. Both Iraq and Lebanon, as well as the Iran-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, called Israel鈥檚 actions a 鈥渄eclaration of war.鈥�
Pointing to one possible constraint on Israeli action in Iraq, the Pentagon on Aug. 26 issued a statement denying any role in the attacks there and said it was 鈥渇ully cooperating鈥� with an Iraqi investigation.
A Twitter account believed to belong to IRGC Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani said Israel鈥檚 鈥渋nsane operations are the last desperate moves鈥� by Israel. A top Iranian official tweeted that Iran鈥檚 response would be 鈥渟hocking and crippling.鈥�
And Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah said retribution for Israel鈥檚 strike in Beirut would come.
Such threats are a 鈥渞hetorical鈥� part of the game, but no side wants war, says Mr. Hadian in Tehran.
鈥淣o doubt Israel thinks that Iran is building an effective force,鈥� he says, ticking off the names of pro-Iranian militias, most of them Shiite Muslims, from Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan, and even Pakistan.
Both the benefits to Israel of demonstrating its prowess, and the risks of Iran moving away from its past modest responses to a determined counter-escalation, are laid out in an analysis this week from the Israeli INSS.
鈥淔or the long term, Israel displays boldness, initiative, and proof of effectiveness of its long arm,鈥� the INSS said. But it added: 鈥淭he Iranian attempt to carry out weaponized drone attacks against northern Israel is testimony to Iran鈥檚 arrival at a critical point, forcing it to change the nature of its response to Israeli actions.鈥�
Further improvement of Hezbollah weapons, the analysis noted, 鈥渁nd a crossing of the escalation threshold by Israel, will push Iran to react differently than it has done so far.鈥�
Thwarted drone attack
The Israeli strike to prevent Iran鈥檚 alleged drone attack last weekend has received particular attention in the Israeli media, after military and intelligence officials released details that included video footage that, they said, showed a Hezbollah team led by Iranians preparing to launch drones against Israeli targets.
Israel said it had tracked some of the would-be bombers for weeks, and that the operation had been ordered specifically by Maj. Gen. Soleimani.
That attempted drone attack was 鈥渃ertainly a reaction鈥� to Israel鈥檚 purported actions in Iraq, says Mr. Zimmt in Tel Aviv.
Israel鈥檚 thwarting of the attack 鈥渁gain shows that, at least in the last two years, whenever there was a confrontation, Israel has clearly shown that it has both the intelligence and operational superiority, and it is certainly ready to use it,鈥� says Mr. Zimmt.
Yet Iran may have time on its side, he adds.
鈥淚f I were Soleimani, despite all the failures, I would say: 鈥極K, even if Israel manages to hit 50%, 60% or 70% of what I鈥檝e been trying to do鈥� 鈥撀燼nd I have to be quite skeptical about those percentages 鈥� 鈥榮o it won鈥檛 take me one year to make it, it will take me three or four years to make it. But eventually we鈥檒l get there,鈥欌�� says Mr. Zimmt.
鈥淚t鈥檚 not like Iran and Israel are right now on the verge of a confrontation, so they have the time, and they have the patience,鈥� he says.
