Winter is coming. Is the EU ready to stop buying Russian energy?
Almost four years after Russia鈥檚 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union is working to fully end its dependence on Russian energy. But with winter coming once again, and Russia pressing its military advantage on the battlefield, Europe鈥檚 ongoing purchases of Russian fuel are an evermore pressing issue.
EU leaders have pledged to complete the project by the end of 2027. But every euro spent on Russian commodities helps finance Moscow鈥檚 war, and leaves the bloc exposed to a geopolitical rival all too willing to use energy as geopolitical leverage 鈥� and a weapon 鈥� against neighbors it views as threats.
How much does the EU rely on Russian energy?
Why We Wrote This
Ending its dependency on Russian gas has been a goal for Europe since Moscow first launched its mass invasion of Ukraine. While progress has been made, the bloc is still impeded by both energy needs and foot-dragging member states.
At the outset of the war in February 2022, Russia supplied about 27% of the EU鈥檚 crude oil, about 40% of its natural gas, and nearly half of its coal. Imports of coal were halted that August.
The EU has also phased out oil purchases with relative speed and success. Russian crude and refined petroleum products now make up less than 3% of EU imports.
But gas imports, needed for the heating of 1 in 3 households in the EU, have been harder to eliminate. Despite sanctions and steep volume cuts, Russia still earned an estimated 鈧�215 billion (about $248 billion) from gas sales to Europe during the war. Imports of Russian gas rose by about 18% from 2023 to 2024, driven by higher purchases in Italy, the Czech Republic, and France, though overall gas consumption in the EU held steady.
Russia still supplies about 13% of the EU鈥檚 gas, including around 16% of its liquefied natural gas, or LNG. The EU spent about 鈧�4.5 billion on Russian LNG in the first half of 2025, with a full ban planned for January 2028.
Russia also remains a major source of nuclear fuel to countries with Russian-designed reactors, such as Finland. It supplied 573 of the EU鈥檚 707 tons of uranium imports in 2023, up from 314 tons in 2022, according to Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank. The EU has yet to set a phaseout date.
What are the EU鈥檚 alternatives?
The European Union is accelerating efforts to secure new energy sources and supporting infrastructure.
Norway has become the bloc鈥檚 largest gas supplier via pipeline, providing about 30% of all such imports. Liquefied natural gas now plays a far larger role, with the United States establishing as the key supplier to the EU. Qatar, Algeria and Nigeria have also expanded deliveries to Europe.
The shift away from Russian gas sped up after the transit contract between Ukraine鈥檚 Naftogaz and Russia鈥檚 Gazprom expired on Jan 1. That put a stop to pipeline flows through Ukraine, prompting European states to expand their capacity to receive LNG shipments instead. Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands added new floating storage regasification units 鈥� tankers that effectively function as offshore transportation and storage for LNG 鈥� while other nations upgraded their existing terminals to handle larger volumes.
Reinforced cross-border energy interconnectors 鈥� interfaces that allow national energy grids to transfer energy to one another 鈥� have also helped strengthened the bloc鈥檚 resilience, particularly between Spain and France, Poland and Slovakia, and across the Baltic states.
At the same time, a structural shift away from gas is underway. Solar capacity has surged since 2022. Combined with growing wind power, nuclear reactor restarts in some countries, and efficiency gains in homes (such as better insulation and replacing gas boilers with heat pumps) and in industry (such as recovering waste heat and switching to electric alternatives), this clean-energy expansion is steadily reducing gas demand.
How are politics and national interests shaping the pace of change?
Domestic politics and national interests are driving very different speeds of change across the EU.
Poland pivoted the fastest, treating Russian energy dependence as a security threat. Once reliant on Russian crude, it halted all imports in early 2023. Poland also refused Moscow鈥檚 demand to be paid in rubles in April 2022 鈥� prompting Gazprom to cut supplies 鈥� and let its long-term gas contract expire later that year. By then, the newly opened 鈥淏altic Pipe鈥� to Norway provided an alternative supply.
Germany, Europe鈥檚 largest economy, has taken a different path. After losing Nord Stream supplies in 2022, it rapidly built floating LNG terminals to facilitate additional new imports.
Hungary and Slovakia remain among Europe鈥檚 biggest buyers of Russian oil, importing 鈧�166 million and 鈧�145 million, respectively, in September 2025, mostly via the Druzhba pipeline. Both are also still heavily reliant on Russian gas. Hungary is one of the largest EU buyers of Russian pipeline flows. And Slovakia is even weighing legal action against the EU鈥檚 plan to end Russian supplies by 2028, arguing that the phaseout threatens its energy security and economy.
France and Belgium are the top importers of Russian LNG, accounting for about 41% and 28% of the EU鈥檚 purchases in 2025, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. Regardless, both countries are still on board with EU plans to phase out Russian LNG usage.
