Vaccine diplomacy: Will free shipments pay off for India?
| New Delhi
India, home to nearly 1.4 billion people, is in the midst of a massive, countrywide COVID-19 vaccine drive. But no sooner had New Delhi begun to administer vaccines to its own citizens, back in January, than it began sending millions of free doses around the world.
The neighboring Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan was the 聽Vaccine Maitri (Vaccine Friendship) shipments of AstraZeneca vaccines, followed by Nepal, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar 鈥� and Dominica, where the Caribbean island鈥檚 prime minister himself at the airport.
As of mid-February, just 10 countries had administered 75% of all vaccines, according to the United Nations, securing large supplies for themselves in what has been termed vaccine nationalism. One hundred and thirty countries, meanwhile, had not yet a single dose 鈥� a trajectory the U.N. secretary-general called 鈥渨ildly uneven and unfair.鈥�
Why We Wrote This
Home to a massive vaccine industry, India sees an opportunity to expand its leadership among countries feeling left behind, as others stockpile for themselves. It may be generous, but it鈥檚 also a boost for New Delhi鈥檚 goals.
One, a global nonprofit that combats extreme poverty and preventable disease, has estimated that the United States is likely to have a surplus of 453 million doses even if it vaccinates 100% of its population.
Experts say India sees the power vacuum around vaccines as an opportunity for diplomacy and soft power, in line with Prime Minister Narendra Modi鈥檚 bid to raise India鈥檚 international profile. Next door, Beijing has also pushed vaccine diplomacy, but India鈥檚 industry strength, which is producing vaccines faster than they are currently being distributed at home, may give it an edge.
鈥淔rom the very beginning of the pandemic, the Indian government seemed to be projecting itself as a responsible global stakeholder ... as an important part of global governance and the global health scenario,鈥� an image supported by India鈥檚 strength in the sector, says Harsh Pant, professor of international relations at King鈥檚 College, London.
As of late February, India had exported doses of vaccine across the world, about 20% of them as grant assistance. Meanwhile, it has launched the second wave of its domestic campaign, aiming to vaccinate 300 million of its 1.3 billion people by mid-summer.
Two giants
Even before the pandemic, India was a major pharmaceutical hub, and manufactured about half of all vaccines sold globally. Now, the privately-owned Serum Institute of India (SII), the world鈥檚 biggest vaccine manufacturer, has been producing 2.4 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine a , more than it can distribute domestically.
SII vaccines make up a large contribution of the World Health Organization鈥檚 COVAX initiative, which aims to make vaccines accessible for lower- and middle-income countries. The first shipment under the initiative was sent from India to Ghana late last month.
India鈥檚 vaccine diplomacy isn鈥檛 surprising. It is in line with the Modi government鈥檚 of soft power to aid diplomacy and foreign policy. Since his election in 2014, Mr. Modi has successfully proposed an 鈥淚nternational Day of Yoga鈥� to the United Nations, visited 58 countries, and reached out to the Indian diaspora, especially in the United States.
But India is not alone in dominating vaccine diplomacy. There鈥檚 also China, which long聽聽several southeast Asian and African countries its homegrown vaccines and has been sending its own shipments across the world. For years now, China has made large investments in countries in India鈥檚 neighborhood, like Nepal, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka, that India has been聽. At the same time, India鈥檚 ties with Nepal 鈥� bordered by both India and China聽鈥� have seen a聽setback, and disputes continue over India and China鈥檚 ill-defined borders along the Himalayan regions.
鈥淐ompetition between China and India is now a permanent feature of international politics,鈥� says Jabin Jacob, an associate professor of international relations at Shiv Nadar University outside New Delhi. 鈥淭here is certainly an element of competition between the two countries to show themselves as leaders in Asia.鈥�
鈥淏oth countries see themselves as offering models of political and economic development distinct from the West, the Chinese more so than the Indians,鈥� Professor Jacob says. But India sees itself as an alternative to both 鈥淲estern democracy and Chinese authoritarianism,鈥� he adds.
This time, India seems to have an advantage. The lack of transparency and efficacy data regarding China鈥檚 vaccines has made many abroad wary. Some countries,聽like Sri Lanka,聽have rejected the Chinese vaccine made by Sinopharm and purchased vaccines from India instead.
Professor Pant says he鈥檚 鈥渟keptical鈥� whether vaccine diplomacy can be a 鈥済ame changer鈥� for India鈥檚 relations in the region. 鈥淪maller states in India鈥檚 neighborhood will always try to balance India against China over the long term, and that鈥檚 to their advantage,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut I think in the short term it certainly changes the perception of India being a bully.鈥�
Risks at home
聽vaccine diplomacy is a luxury that New Delhi is undertaking at the cost of its own citizens鈥� well-being. India has the second-highest number of COVID-19 cases globally, preceded only by the United States, and pandemic restrictions caused the economy to fall into a聽recession聽for the first time in nearly a quarter century. Meanwhile, India鈥檚 own vaccine drive has .
New Delhi is taking 鈥渃onsiderable political risk domestically鈥� by sending so many vaccines abroad, says Oommen聽Kurian, head of public health initiatives at the Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation. But he argues that, as a large country with an underfunded health system, India鈥檚 rollout at home needed to be slow, and could not match the pace of production, at least initially.
India鈥檚 vaccine outreach coincides with months of negative press abroad, amid a聽丑颈蝉迟辞谤颈肠听farmer听辫谤辞迟别蝉迟聽against three hastily enacted agricultural laws. One critic was Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who last December聽expressed concern聽over the use of force on protesters. His comments聽drew sharp reactions聽from India, where the Foreign Ministry called his remarks 鈥渋ll-informed鈥� and lodged a formal protest.
But in February, as Canada faced shortages in supplies from Pfizer and Moderna, it reached out to India to request vaccines manufactured by SII. Mr. Modi tweeted about receiving a call from 鈥渕y friend鈥� Mr. Trudeau and assuring him that India would do its best to facilitate vaccines. Afterward, an Indian ministry spokesperson聽聽that the Canadian prime minister had 鈥渃ommended鈥� India鈥檚 efforts to 鈥渃hoose the path of dialogue鈥� with protesters. About 500,000 doses of the vaccine arrived in Canada last week.
In the big picture, though, 鈥渋t鈥檚 important not to overplay the long-term effects of vaccine diplomacy,鈥� Professor Jacob says. 鈥淥nce the pandemic is past, more traditional factors of power are likely to return to center stage, which means India will still have a lot of catching up to do with the West and China.鈥�
