Jan. 6 was a security failure. Have the problems been fixed?
| Washington
It was a long road from killing bugs to battling protesters on the front lines of Jan. 6, 2021.
As a young husband, Dennis Kelly was working as an exterminator to pay the bills when he decided to try to become a cop. He鈥檇 be good at it, he thought, and it sounded cool. His wife鈥檚 view was less rosy; her dad had been a chaplain for a police department, and police officers would come to their home to get counseling. She saw what they went through, what they grappled with afterward. But she supported her husband鈥檚 decision.听
Mr. Kelly took the New Jersey civil service exam and tried finding a job with local police departments, but some officer鈥檚 relative always seemed to get hired instead. So he got his start in a new federal detention center in Philadelphia. A year later, 9/11 hit. Law enforcement officers were in demand. He saw a 鈥渉ot jobs鈥� icon on a government website and clicked. It was a Capitol Police position.听
Why We Wrote This
Capitol Police has implemented dozens of recommendations since the 2021 attack caught its force off guard. But some say a deeper cultural shift is needed to protect the Capitol and those who work there, including officers.
鈥淚 thought, 鈥極h, Capitol Hill 鈥� I鈥檒l never get hired, but what the heck, I鈥檒l apply for it,鈥欌�� he recalls. Now a retired lieutenant, he still remembers the awe he felt when he first entered an area of the 200-year-old building closed to the public. And he recalls the sense of honor he felt in upholding fellow citizens鈥� First Amendment rights, no matter how tired his feet got on the 12-hour shifts.
鈥淧rotesting is part of the American fabric, and I was always proud that I had a small part in making sure people had a right to say what they wanted to say,鈥� says Lieutenant Kelly. That鈥檚 part of what hurt so much on Jan. 6, when protesters attacked him and his platoon on the West Front of the Capitol with flag poles, baseball bats, bear spray, bolts 鈥� anything they could get their hands on. 鈥淚 felt like, 鈥業鈥檓 helping you to protest and redress your government.鈥欌��
Like so many others, he was blindsided by the assault, carried out by some of the same kinds of people who usually waved 鈥淏ack the Blue鈥� flags and professed their love for police.听
Two years on from that unprecedented attack, the United States Capitol Police is striving to implement the lessons learned from Jan. 6 and become a more robust force. That includes improving intelligence capabilities and operational planning; distributing better equipment; boosting morale through pay raises and听mental health and other wellness initiatives; and adding more officers to the roster.听
But there is concern听that the Capitol remains vulnerable. Critics say political considerations have prevented a full examination听and fixing听of the systemic weaknesses that left the institution unprepared that day. Moreover, some say a deeper cultural shift is needed to protect the citadel of American democracy amid rising political violence and threats to lawmakers.听听
鈥淚 think [Jan. 6] was a failure of imagination, clearly,鈥澨齭ays Steven Rotkoff, who听runs his own company helping organizations in their security planning and served on the听听recommending post-Jan. 6 improvements to Congress. 鈥淚 think we still have this failure of imagination.鈥�
Warnings unheeded
Shortly before noon on Jan. 6, Lieutenant听Kelly and his Civil Disturbance Unit platoon arrived at the U.S. Botanic Garden, right near the West Front of the Capitol that looks down the Mall where Trump supporters had amassed a mile and a half away to hear the president speak. The platoon was about to don their riot gear when protesters started streaming over the bike-rack barricades on the West Front. Lieutenant听Kelly and his officers rushed to defend the Capitol.听There was no time to gear up.听
How a ragtag band of protesters was able to storm one of the most iconic government buildings in one of the most heavily policed cities in America is still a matter of debate. Many blame an intelligence failure, but others say it didn鈥檛 require a special clearance to read then-President Donald Trump鈥檚 Dec. 19 tweet calling his supporters to Washington on the day Congress would be tallying the electoral votes: 鈥淏e there, will be wild!鈥� he wrote.听
Mr. Trump鈥檚 claims of massive fraud had not stood up in court, and his pressure campaign on state legislators and election officials had failed to overturn Joe Biden鈥檚 victory. Supporters saw it as a 1776 moment.
Rep. Mary Gay Scanlon, a Pennsylvania Democrat on the House Administration Committee that oversees Capitol security, recalls sharing with the Capitol Police social media posts that seemed to suggest impending violence. 鈥淲e got a lot of, 鈥楧on鈥檛 worry about it, everything is under control,鈥� 鈥� she says.听
It wasn鈥檛 just her.听
On Dec. 24, the Secret Service got an emailed document titled 鈥淎rmed and Ready, Mr. President,鈥� detailing online responses to the president鈥檚 tweet. Many Trump supporters interpreted it as a call for armed revolt, according to the Jan. 6 select committee鈥檚听听released late last month. 鈥淭here is not enough cops in DC to stop what is coming,鈥� said one.听听
Jack Donohue, the head of Capitol Police intelligence, got the same document several days later 鈥� not from the Secret Service, but from a former colleague on the New York Police Department.听A civilian tip warned the department, 鈥淚鈥檝e also seen tweets from people organizing to 鈥榮torm the Capitol鈥� on January 6th .鈥�
On Jan. 4, Mr. Donohue鈥檚 assistant director, Julie Farnam, warned some Capitol Police leaders, 鈥淚t鈥檚 potentially a very dangerous situation.鈥澨�
The next day, the head of security for the Architect of the Capitol forwarded an alert to Capitol Police that an individual online was vowing that 鈥渨e will storm the government buildings, kill cops, kill security guards, kill federal employees and agents.鈥澨�
鈥淲e get our President or we die,鈥� read another post spotted by the FBI, which included perimeter maps of the Capitol.
None of this made it to听the police听on the front lines like Lieutenant听Kelly and his platoon, who were left dramatically outnumbered.听The morning of听Jan. 6, only 50% of the Capitol Police force was on duty; by 2 p.m., shortly after the district鈥檚 Metropolitan Police Department had declared a riot, it rose to two-thirds. It still wasn鈥檛 enough; 12 minutes later, protesters breached the Capitol, interrupting the electoral vote count and causing police to hurriedly evacuate all lawmakers.听
鈥淭he National Guard should have been in place at 7 a.m.,鈥� says Gus Papathanasiou,听a Capitol Police officer who chairs听the department鈥檚 labor union. 鈥淵ou don鈥檛 wait to bring in a relief pitcher in the ninth inning after you鈥檝e been shelled with 20 runs in the first inning.鈥�
Then-Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund did seek National Guard support several days before Jan. 6. But, he later told the Jan. 6 committee, the House sergeant-at-arms said it would be bad optics to have the military surrounding the Capitol as Congress counted electoral votes 鈥撎齛 concern shared by Defense officials and Democratic staff.听Chief Sund conceded he didn鈥檛 have the intelligence to听back up his听demand. In his book released this week, 鈥淐ourage Under Fire,鈥� the former chief said he never heard about the warnings that the FBI or even his own intelligence division had received.听
Donell Harvin, who headed the district鈥檚 Fusion Intelligence Center听at the time, acknowledges that the lack of coordination among various intelligence agencies left gaps. But there were still enough signs that bad things were coming. His own daughter asked him if it would be safe for her to go into work that day.听
鈥淪hame on the people who organized, incited, pushed it, did it 鈥� but also, shame on the people who allowed it to happen,鈥� says听Dr.听Harvin, now a professor at Georgetown University, who blames 鈥渃ognitive bias鈥� for the failure of law enforcement officers to see white conservative men as threats. 鈥淐an you imagine a bank heist being pulled, when the bank knew the robbers were coming weeks in advance?鈥�
鈥淒oes anyone have a plan?鈥�
As the riot erupted on Capitol Hill,听Lieutenant Kelly鈥檚 wife, Katherine, got a text: 鈥淚鈥檓 praying for your husband.鈥� She started watching TV and searching social media, hoping for a glimpse of her husband. A sign he was OK.听
Amid the melee, Lieutenant Kelly remembers the immense relief he felt when the Metropolitan Police Department showed up with reinforcements. An MPD commander told Capitol Police officers to lock their riot shields together. A later detailed how little, if any, practice many of them had in using such equipment and weapons.听
Together, over hours of intense fighting and tear gas attacks, the听police听defended a key door on the lower level, preventing a second breach of the Capitol.听Lieutenant Kelly calls it 鈥渁 miracle.鈥�
The Jan. 6 committee鈥檚 first hearing, in July 2021, focused on听the heroism of law enforcement officers听who held the line that day, bringing two Capitol Police officers and two MPD officers in to testify. Several had been defending the same door as Lieutenant听Kelly. One, MPD Officer Michael Fanone,听testified that as he was dragged into the crowd, he heard people yelling, 鈥淜ill him with his own gun,鈥� and saw a rioter repeatedly lunging for it听until others intervened.听
But after the committee played visceral clips of the violence, none of the nine members asked any questions about whether听police听had received adequate training in riot tactics, or how they could be better prepared going forward.听Its 845-page report primarily blames Mr. Trump, relegating law enforcement and intelligence failures to two appendices.听
The committee听and its听defenders say they didn鈥檛 want to come across as blaming the rank and file for what happened. That would be like听blaming 9/11 on airport security officials, says Democratic Rep. Tom Malinowski of New Jersey. 鈥淲e didn鈥檛 say, 鈥楴o, don鈥檛 look at Al Qaeda 鈥� look at the people who should have checked the hijackers鈥� bags.鈥欌��
Still, Mr. Papathanasiou, the chair of the Capitol Police union, says for many officers it felt like a "slap in the face" that the Jan. 6 committee听hand-picked certain officers to tout as heroes. He also expresses frustration that the committee used them to support their narrative without looking at the bigger picture. 鈥淲hen you start using officers as political pawns, I think it鈥檚 wrong,鈥� he says.听
He had been warning for years about lack of training, equipment issues, and low morale, and felt like no one cared. His biggest fear was something like Jan. 6 鈥� or worse. He says he asked the chiefs over the years many times about contingency plans.听And indeed, on Jan. 6, an officer asked, 鈥淒oes anyone have a plan?鈥�
Weeks later, the union organized a听听against Capitol Police leaders. Some 92% voted against Yogananda Pittman, who oversaw the intelligence division, and 96% against Sean Gallagher, who oversaw the department鈥檚 Protective Services Bureau.听
Officers felt like, 鈥淭hey hung us out to dry,鈥� says Mr. Papathanasiou, who also blames congressional leadership. 鈥淚鈥檓 just upset that there hasn鈥檛 been any accountability at the top.鈥�
Chief Sund and both the House and Senate sergeants-at-arms resigned after Jan. 6. But Ms. Pittman was promoted to acting chief of Capitol Police for six months. She and Assistant Chief Gallagher, who oversaw the evacuation of lawmakers, remain in leadership, despite a scathing听听asserting that their 鈥渓eadership/intelligence failures鈥� endangered officers鈥� lives and accused Congress of masking those failures.听
A Capitol Police spokesperson said that when the new chief, J. Thomas Manger, came on in July 2021, he decided to retain Ms. Pittman 鈥渢o keep her experience and knowledge of the department鈥� and 鈥渆xpand upon the improvements that were made immediately after January 6.鈥� The spokesperson credited Deputy Chief Gallagher with implementing some of the most significant recommendations from Congress.听
Even with two years of improvements, however, some say the Capitol remains a relatively soft target. Among them is GOP Rep. Dan Crenshaw of Texas, a former Navy SEAL.
鈥淚f I were assigned to attack this place and harm people, it would be extremely easy,鈥� he says.听
Mr. Rotkoff argues that Jan. 6 should prompt a reevaluation of the long-standing tradition of Congress being open to the American people. Just as the White House 鈥� where the public could once traipse through 鈥� now has a fence and more security protocols, Congress also needs to adapt to a new reality. Attackers learn from their failures, he notes, worrying that Jan. 6 could be akin to the 1993 truck bombing of the World Trade Center that came eight years before 9/11.
A new threat landscape
In 2021, Capitol Police investigated 9,000 threats 鈥� more than double the number just four years prior. The hammer attack against听then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi鈥檚 husband in their San Francisco home, and the attempted assault against New York congressman-turned-gubernatorial candidate Lee Zeldin, are 鈥渟ad reminders of how our social fabric is frayed,鈥� testified Chief Manger last month before the Senate Rules Committee,听which co-led a 2021听听on Jan. 6 security failures.听
Providing additional security to lawmakers 鈥撎齛nd their families 鈥� will take more resources, he said. Though the budget has expanded from less than $100 million in the late 1990s to $708 million for fiscal year 2023, Capitol Police duties have expanded significantly to respond to the threat landscape.
But Daniel Schuman,听policy director听with the progressive organization Demand Progress,听who has testified before Congress about the Capitol Police Board, says the problem is more structural than financial.听
The board is made up of the House and Senate sergeants-at-arms, both political appointees, and the Architect of the Capitol, a presidential appointee with a 10-year term.听The inspector general for the Capitol Police is appointed by the board, but doesn鈥檛 have the authority to investigate it, and inspector general reports on the police force are not made publicly available.听Moreover, neither chamber has听traditionally held hearings听with the full three-member board, but a recent change听explicitly authorizes听the House Administration and Senate Rules committees to jointly do so.
Mr. Schuman contends that the lack of transparency, independence, and accountability creates structural disincentives for reform.
The biggest problem is that there is no one entity or individual that has 鈥渦niform responsibility鈥� for thinking ahead about how best to protect the complex, adds Mr. Schuman, who says he dealt with post-traumatic stress disorder from being there听on 9/11 and is so concerned about security vulnerabilities that he has only been there a handful of times since Jan. 6.
鈥淣obody is in charge听of the Capitol,鈥� he says.
In a December 2021 hearing, Capitol Police Inspector General Michael Bolton floated the idea of听听to more closely resemble a protective agency like the Secret Service, with one individual in charge of overall Capitol security and a chief overseeing day-to-day police operations.听
Rep. Rodney Davis of Illinois, for years the top Republican on the House Administration Committee that oversees Capitol security, told the Monitor last month that Chief Manger has put forward good solutions to manpower issues. Hundreds have left since Jan. 6, but the department met its goal of hiring 280 new recruits in fiscal year 2022, and is on track to meet that goal again in FY23.听
But Representative Davis said he was still disappointed in the Capitol Police Board鈥檚 lack of accountability and the structure that allows whichever party is in the majority to exert significant influence.
鈥淣o matter what the majority publicly says, they鈥檙e engaged in every detail of the security apparatus in and around the Capitol Complex every single day,鈥� said Mr. Davis,听who was originally nominated to be the top Republican on the Jan. 6 committee along with four GOP colleagues. But after Mrs. Pelosi vetoed two of them, all five boycotted the committee.
They released a听 last month alongside the committee鈥檚 report, in which they assessed that the House sergeant-at-arms had 鈥渟uccumbed to political pressures鈥� from then-Speaker Pelosi鈥檚 office and House Democratic leadership while largely sidelining GOP involvement in security decision-making. They also found that听the efforts of Ms. Farnam,听who was new to the department and had little previous intelligence experience, to reorganize the Capitol Police intelligence unit left it 鈥渋neffective during a critical period.鈥� In addition, the report听asserted that the Capitol Police had still not implemented important recommendations from oversight bodies.听
Representative Scanlon of the House Administration Committee is one of numerous lawmakers interviewed who cited improved intelligence sharing as the most significant change since Jan. 6. The Capitol Police spokesperson said other key issues, including equipment and operational planning, have been addressed. The inspector general鈥檚 roughly three dozen remaining recommendations, including building a new training facility and expanding protection for lawmakers, will require more time and resources.
Support for police
By 9:30 p.m. on Jan. 6, Lieutenant Kelly and his colleagues finally got a break. They hadn鈥檛 eaten all day. Pizza was on the way, someone said. He remembers waiting around for it to be delivered when he saw Officer Brian Sicknick collapse. The next day, Officer Sicknick died. Four other officers, one from MPD, would die by suicide in the coming days and months. More than 100 Capitol Police officers were injured.听
On the second anniversary of the attack, President Biden posthumously awarded Officer Sicknick, along with six other members of the Capitol and Metropolitan Police, the Presidential Citizens Medal, one of the nation鈥檚 highest civilian honors. This week, Officer Sicknick鈥檚 family sued former President Trump and two rioters for at least $10 million in damages.听听
At first,听Lieutenant Kelly thought he was fine. In the intense days following the assault, his department put him up in an area hotel. His wife was staying with him there, worried about her husband.听
鈥淢y wife kept telling me 鈥� 鈥榊ou鈥檙e not OK, you need help,鈥欌�� he says. The wake-up call came when he was in the car going to dinner with his family and wanted to suggest going to Japan Express but found he suddenly couldn鈥檛 talk.听
鈥淚 knew I had to go to any lengths to get myself better,鈥� says听Lieutenant Kelly.
He went to therapy at least weekly for eight months, but it wasn鈥檛 enough. That led him to enroll in a Texas treatment program on his own dime, which helped him 鈥� and, he hopes, can be made more widely available to other federal employees.听
He credits the Capitol Police with doing a lot to address trauma and boost morale at a time when it鈥檚 not popular to be a police officer. The department has made a multitude of wellness and mental health resources available, including a new program that provides confidential counseling to officers and their families. There are also peer support programs and two dogs, Lila and Leo, who make the rounds to relieve Capitol Police employees鈥� stress. And the department is working with the offices of the House and Senate chaplains to develop new resources for achieving 鈥渟piritual wellness.鈥澨�
Lieutenant听Kelly is no longer walking those halls, though he still speaks fondly of them. He retired in April 2022 after nearly two decades with the department, the last nine of which he spent in a commuter marriage. This past summer, he and his wife went to a marriage retreat in Alaska for law enforcement officers and their spouses. It was life-changing, he says, sharing a photo of himself grinning with a freshly caught pike and pristine mountain forests in the background.听
鈥淚鈥檓 so grateful I鈥檝e gotten a second chance,鈥� he says.听
He鈥檚 disappointed though, that the department has not provided retirees like him replicas of the Congressional Gold Medal awarded to Capitol Police for their heroism on Jan. 6. He wrote a letter to Chief Manger a month ago, but has yet to hear back. He would pay for a replica medal himself, he says, but the Mint has run out.听
When asked whether he feels like Capitol Police leadership did right by him that day, there is a long pause.听
鈥淵eah, I do,鈥� he says finally. 鈥淭hey really tried.鈥�
Editor鈥檚 note:听After publication, a Capitol Police spokesman said that current employees were informed through a Jan. 4 bulletin that replicas of the Congressional Gold Medal would be distributed to anyone serving on Jan. 6, 2021. He confirmed that this included retirees, and said he believed the department was in the process of reaching out to them. As of Jan. 9, Lieutenant Kelly had not yet heard from them.
