海角大神

Two presidents, Barack Obama and George W. Bush, weighed the option of taking out one of Iran鈥檚 most prominent and revered military leaders, Qassem Soleimani, commanding general of the Qods Force, a powerful branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

In the end both presidents held back, worried that potential consequences 鈥� including a further destabilized Middle East, deeper U.S. military involvement in the region, and even all-out war with Iran 鈥� outweighed the satisfaction of removing a figure with American soldiers鈥� blood on his hands.

Now President Donald Trump has taken the very step Mr. Obama and Mr. Bush thought better of, with the early Friday drone strike that killed General Soleimani at Baghdad International Airport in Iraq.

Mr. Trump took to Twitter Friday morning to laud what amounts to the most significant and potentially consequential military action of his presidency.

For much of his time in office, Mr. Trump has been known for attacking his adversaries on Twitter, but not necessarily following through militarily or being inclined to drag the U.S. into longer conflicts. And when he has acted 鈥� as when he launched punitive airstrikes in Syria in April 2018, over Bashar al-Assad鈥檚 chemical weapons attacks 鈥� it ended up a one-and-done that did not alter Mr. Trump鈥檚 overall disengagement from the region.

Now, one strike may have changed that dynamic at a pivotal moment in his presidency 鈥� with impeachment hanging over his head, and with some critics faulting his administration鈥檚 foreign policy for disarray and lack of strategic thinking, everywhere from Iran聽and Iraq to聽North Korea and China.

Some analysts worry the strike could further intensify a conflict with Iran that has maintained a slow burn since Mr. Trump withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 and began imposing tough economic sanctions on Tehran. America鈥檚 friends and adversaries alike may see General Soleimani鈥檚 assassination as further evidence of a shoot-from-the-hip U.S. president who remains as unpredictable as ever. Was the strike an alarming one-off move, leaders may wonder, or an indication of new resolve in the Middle East?

No matter which assessment ends up closer to reality, America鈥檚 adversaries in particular 鈥� first among them Iran 鈥� are likely to remain true to form and ultimately take the longer view in responding to the Soleimani killing.

Iran, Russia, and Syria will all condemn the action. But they are also likely to recall that the earlier military action ordered by Mr. Trump in response to Mr. Assad鈥檚 use of chemical weapons ultimately did little to change the trajectory of an American withdrawal from the region that has benefitted all three U.S. adversaries.

Mr. Assad 鈥� the Syrian president whom the U.S. for a time said 鈥渉as to go鈥� 鈥� is on the verge of reasserting control over almost all of Syrian territory after a devastating civil war. Iran now basically has use of Syria as a corridor for funneling arms to proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere. And Russia鈥檚 foothold in the Middle East is broader and more secure than in decades.

Still, what makes some call this action a 鈥済ame changer鈥� in Middle East relations is how the killing of General聽Soleimani 鈥� in a third country to boot 鈥� is being widely interpreted as an act of war.

鈥淲e have moved from a shadow war and an economic war to a direct act of war by the Trump administration,鈥� says Suzanne Maloney, a senior fellow in the Brookings Institution鈥檚 Center for Middle East Policy in Washington.

In an attempt to calm widespread jitters, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was on the phone early Friday with his Chinese and European counterparts, reassuring them that 鈥渢he United States remains committed to de-escalation鈥� with Iran, the State Department said.

But as Secretary Pompeo argues to America鈥檚 friends that the assassination was a 鈥渄efensive action鈥� in response to 鈥渋mminent threats to American lives,鈥� others in the region know from long experience that Iran will not leave General聽Soleimani鈥檚 death unanswered 鈥� and that the region is almost certain to bear the brunt of Iran鈥檚 ire.

Indeed the Pentagon appeared to be acknowledging that retaliation in some form is likely, announcing Friday that it will deploy an additional 3,500 troops to the region in response to Iran鈥檚 vow to seek 鈥渟evere revenge鈥� for General聽Soleimani鈥檚 death.

That does not mean Iran is likely to seek all-out warfare with a militarily superior U.S. Instead, expect Iran to redouble its efforts that have broadly paid off 鈥� strengthening proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and elsewhere; debilitating America鈥檚 Sunni Arab regional allies; and pressing internationally with Russia, China, and even the Europeans that America鈥檚 unilateralism poses a global threat.

鈥淚ran has no interest in fighting the United States militarily,鈥� says Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. 鈥淚nstead, it will wage its battles economically and politically, seeking to persuade target populations that the costs of fighting Iran exceed the benefits. The Iranians will cast rising global tensions as a consequence of U.S. aggression,鈥� he adds.

Mr. Alterman says to expect 鈥渓ow-level actions鈥� such as attacks against Persian Gulf shipping, fomenting low-scale violence in Gulf Cooperation Council countries, greater pressure on Lebanon, and perhaps above all, amplifying the political turmoil in Iraq that led to the U.S. drone strike on General Soleimani.

Iran is likely to push U.S. forces out of Iraq this year, Mr. Alterman says. Indeed the Iraqi parliament is expected to move to force a U.S. departure, with Mr. Trump suggesting the U.S. could very well leave if Iraq pulls in the welcome mat.

The killing of General聽Soleimani has had what some analysts are calling a 鈥渨hiplash鈥� effect among U.S. Gulf allies that had resigned themselves to a U.S. disengagement from the region 鈥� but which in a matter of 24 hours have switched to wondering if open conflict with Iran could be in the offing.

After Mr. Trump reversed his decision to retaliate over last year鈥檚 downing by Iran of an American drone, and then failed to respond after the drone attacks on Saudi ARAMCO oil fields, Gulf countries had decided Mr. Trump could not be pushed toward confrontation with Iran no matter the provocation.

But now U.S. allies in the region are preparing for a worst-case scenario: that their close association with Washington and their hosting of U.S. military, diplomatic, and commercial hubs make them targets for an Iranian response.

Noting that Tehran鈥檚 core interest is 鈥渞egime survival,鈥� Ms. Maloney of the Brookings Institution says any response to the Soleimani killing will be calibrated with that long-term objective in mind.

The Iranians 鈥渁re very good at biding their time,鈥� Ms. Maloney says, but 鈥渙ver time [they] have a way of making their feelings known.鈥澛�

Taylor Luck contributed reporting from Amman, Jordan.