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President Obama says the historic nuclear deal reached with Iran verifiably cuts off every pathway for the country to acquire a nuclear weapon 鈥� and that as a result, the world is safer and more secure.

But for former Sen. Jim DeMint, who is now president of the conservative Heritage Foundation, the deal reached in Vienna Tuesday 鈥渃ompletely fails to cut off Iran鈥檚 path to nuclear weaponry鈥� 鈥� and thus leaves the world 鈥渁 much more dangerous place.鈥�

Iran鈥檚 path to the bomb is cut off, or left wide open; the world is safer, or much less secure 鈥� which is it?

The answer appears to be somewhere in between, according to some former administration officials and nuclear experts who have begun poring over the 100-plus pages that make up the most technical and detailed accord ever reached for limiting a country鈥檚 nuclear development.

The deal will very likely prohibit Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon for the next decade or more 鈥� but for critics who wanted to see Iran stripped of all nuclear capability, that is hardly a win for the world. The deal does not grant Iran the sanctions relief it craves until it begins complying with the agreement鈥檚 obligations 鈥� but for critics, that will still leave Iran with a windfall to do its regional mischief.

While many experts see both strengths and weaknesses in the accord, most agree that the real test will be in the years of implementation 鈥� and that, as difficult as the nearly two years of negotiating may have been, the hard part is still to come.

鈥淚鈥檓 pleasantly surprised by the amount of detail in the deal鈥� that 鈥渃onfirms the positive elements in the Lausanne framework鈥� agreement that was reached in April, says Robert Einhorn, a former State Department adviser on nuclear issues. The deal 鈥渟trengthens in a number of ways鈥� the measures agreed to in the framework, he says.

The deal meets the five key 鈥渞equirements鈥� that a group of former Obama administration officials and other experts laid out last month for supporting a comprehensive agreement, says Mr. Einhorn, who is a senior fellow in the Brookings Institution鈥檚 Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative in Washington.

Einhorn was part of the bipartisan group that in late June sent a letter to Mr. Obama expressing concern that the United States, in the interest of getting a deal, was weakening its demands on issues ranging from inspections of Iran鈥檚 military sites to the timing of sanctions relief.

However, measures that Iran has committed to will extend its 鈥渂reakout鈥� time for acquiring a nuclear weapon from two to three months currently to at least a year for a decade or more, Einhorn says.

Experts are less pleased that the breakout time would start to shrink after a decade of the accord. After about Year 13, the breakout time would return to about where it is today 鈥� about three to four months.

Not everyone agrees that the US managed to maintain and even reinforce the broad principles reached in negotiations earlier this year.

鈥淭he deal has only gotten worse from the standpoint of those who seek to end Iran鈥檚 march toward a nuclear weapon,鈥� says Danielle Pletka, senior vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.

The 鈥渂road strokes鈥� of the deal have been known since March, she says, adding that she feels little confidence that the details nailed down since then 鈥� on reimposing sanctions if Iran violates the terms of the deal, for example 鈥� will work in practice.

Ms. Pletka says the 鈥渕ost troubling鈥� aspect of the deal is that it 鈥渃odifies Iran鈥檚 march toward a sophisticated nuclear weapons capability.鈥�

That鈥檚 because the deal reduces but does not eliminate Iran鈥檚 nuclear infrastructure, and limits but does not forbid all nuclear research and development. Under the deal, Iran is to dispose of 98 percent of its nuclear fuel stockpile and is to reduce its centrifuges 鈥� the machines that produce enriched uranium 鈥� by two-thirds.

So while Obama emphasizes that the deal effectively prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon 鈥� at least for a decade 鈥� critics like Pletka underscore that the deal leaves Iran a nuclear 鈥渢hreshold鈥� state, with the capability to build a nuclear weapon at some point down the road if it chooses.

Others are willing to see the Iran deal as a reflection of how most internationally negotiated agreements end up 鈥� with both positive and less appealing points.

The deal鈥檚 ban on Iran鈥檚 use of plutonium processing (the second path, after uranium enrichment, to developing the fuel for a nuclear weapon) is an important limitation, says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, which is based in Arlington, Va. The additional restrictions the deal places on Iran鈥檚 enrichment activities are also a plus, he says.

But Mr. Sokolski says he doesn鈥檛 have to dig too deep to find 鈥渂ad things鈥� about the deal. He lists three: that the most fundamental limits on Iran鈥檚 nuclear activities lapse in 10 to 15 years, after which the country will be treated like 鈥淛apan, Brazil, Germany, and the Netherlands,鈥� which also have nuclear programs; that the deal appears to be 鈥渟ilent鈥� on Bushehr, Iran鈥檚 plutonium-producing power reactor; and that the deal is more than 100 pages long.

鈥淚t is an illusion to think that a highly detailed agreement is a stronger one,鈥� he says.

The pages of detail may or may not make the deal stronger, but they may reflect the level of specificity and attention to loophole elimination that Obama needed to get the deal through a skeptical Congress. Lawmakers have 60 days to review the deal and act on it.

Indeed, the Iran deal reflects the priorities of each of the two principal sides in the negotiations.

For the US, the specifics on extending the breakout time, the detailed inspections and verification procedures, and, most recently, the rejection of a proposal to immediately drop all United Nations arms embargoes on Iran were pursued not just as administration demands, but with an eye toward getting a deal past Congress.

Iran鈥檚 top priorities for a deal appeared to be quite different. In the end, the deal in Iran鈥檚 eyes was about getting out from under punishing international sanctions while preserving what its leaders claim is a right to a nuclear program.

For Iran, it was about national dignity 鈥� which is one reason Iran insisted on keeping all its nuclear facilities, even as it accepted that those facilities would have very limited functions and be monitored.

In that sense, both sides in the negotiations may have gotten what they most wanted. But that may be the aspect of the deal that its critics like least.