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Iran and six world powers led by the United States have reached a historic agreement, a victory of diplomacy over war that verifiably limits Iran鈥檚 nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.

Hailed by negotiators as striking a 鈥渨in-win鈥� balance, amid significant compromises by both sides, the complex and detailed agreement 鈥� running to 159 pages, with annexes 鈥� caps a 13-year dispute over Iran鈥檚 nuclear program that resulted in more than three years of talks, including the last 20 months of intensive negotiations in Switzerland and Austria.听

The final 鈥� sometimes angry and emotional 鈥� 18-day push in the Austrian capital, Vienna, blew through four self-imposed deadlines before a deal was reached early Tuesday.

American officials say the agreement effectively cuts off four possible pathways to a nuclear weapon for more than a decade by strictly limiting Iran鈥檚 uranium enrichment capacity, stockpiles of nuclear material, and use of facilities, and by adding far more intrusive inspections.听

Iranian officials say the deal will prove that Iran has no desire for nuclear weapons, and that it can pave the way for cooperation on other issues afflicting the Middle East.

鈥淭oday could have been the end of hope on this issue, but now we are starting a new chapter of hope, and let鈥檚 build on that,鈥� said Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. He said the deal was 鈥渘ot perfect for anybody,鈥� but could 鈥渙pen new horizons for dealing with [other] serious problems.鈥�

The deal is a 鈥渘ew chapter鈥� and shows that diplomacy can 鈥渙vercome decades of tensions and confrontations,鈥� said Federica Mogherini, the European foreign policy chief who has led the talks on behalf of the so-called P5+1 group 鈥� the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, Russia, China, Britain, and France) and Germany.

"With courage, political will and mutual respect, we delivered what the world was hoping for," said Ms. Mogherini. "A shared commitment to peace, and to join hands in order to make our world safer."

Which direction for Iran?

The deal, which follows a diplomatic process often overshadowed by the risk of war, is bound to have a profound effect on Iran, and raises the question of how the Islamic Republic鈥檚 regional role might change, if at all.

Will the Islamic Republic be empowered by a $100 billion post-sanctions windfall, as some of its rivals have warned, to exert more influence in the region via proxy armed forces that threaten Israel, Saudi Arabia, or other US allies?

Or will Iran 鈥� which faces regional challenges such as the Islamic State (IS) jihadists, sectarian strife, and the conflicts engulfing Syria, Iraq, and Yemen 鈥� look for areas of overlapping interests with the US and focus instead on its crippled economy?

The short answer, say analysts who know Iran, is the pocketbook: Tehran鈥檚 top priority will be resuscitating the economy as sanctions ease to improve the daily lives of 80 million Iranians and ensure stability at home. That issue helped elect President Hassan Rouhani in 2013.

鈥淭he mood is really for renewal rather than expansion, and to revive the economy and to keep the country going,鈥� says Shahram Chubin, an Iran analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Geneva.

鈥淚 don鈥檛 think [the nuclear deal] will empower them to think that now they can run riot in the region at all,鈥� he says. 鈥淎fter all the neglect that happened these last few years, they really have a lot of catching up to do, for the quality of life for their own people.鈥�

For decades, Iran has opposed the US-dominated regional order and challenged Israel and US allies in the Gulf like Saudi Arabia, notes听Mr. Chubin.

鈥淣ow 鈥� the 鈥榬egional order鈥� has collapsed; nobody鈥檚 in charge of it,鈥� and in some places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the interests of Iran and America overlap for the first time, he says. The result is the nuclear deal isn鈥檛 the end, rather 鈥渋t鈥檚 the beginning of a process.鈥�

Indeed, both President Barack Obama and Iran鈥檚 supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have hinted that a successful nuclear deal could be the basis of future negotiations.

Moreover, resolving the once-intractable nuclear issue is an example of what may be possible, say Iran analysts, with other hard-to-crack problems like Syria, where Iran鈥檚 policies and interventions are diametrically opposed to Western ones.

So what are the key factors likely to shape Iran鈥檚 post-deal actions, at home and abroad?

Domestic expectations in Iran

Despite warnings from some US and Israeli politicians that Iran would use the freed-up revenues from the deal to spread 鈥渞egional mischief,鈥� the talk inside Iran focuses on easing economic pain.

鈥淭hose who say sanctions are not important don鈥檛 know what is happening in people鈥檚 pockets,鈥� Mr. Rouhani said at a provincial rally in late June. He promised that with the deal 鈥渨e will enrich both uranium and the economy.鈥�

Since Iran鈥檚 oil industry 鈥� the country鈥檚 main source of foreign currency 鈥� is still state-owned and revenue flows through the central bank, the Rouhani administration 鈥渨ill get first dibs, and they have [domestic] priorities right now,鈥� says Kevan Harris, of the Center for Iran and Persian Gulf Studies at Princeton University.

Iranians have been stung by soaring inflation in recent years, raising the cost of everything from tomatoes to medicine. So Iranian politicians have been talking up the economic benefit of sanctions removal, from foreign investments to more employment.

In April, lawmaker Ahmad Tavakkoli said Iran鈥檚 human resources, diverse climate, and geopolitical situation 鈥渉ave not been effectively used,鈥� and that 鈥渃oncentrating on foreign issues would waste such opportunities and keep us away from reality.鈥�

Estimates of Iran鈥檚 spending needs are vast, according to data compiled by Bijan Khajehpour, head of the Vienna-based arm of the Iran analytical firm, Atieh International. Rouhani鈥檚 top priority is the 鈥渆mpowerment of domestic industry,鈥� including for export, and creating more value in the energy sector 鈥� all of which make jobs, he said in a presentation June 29.

But the initial pricetag will be $122 billion, with the banking sector alone requiring 听$25 billion to partly settle the previous government鈥檚 debts, estimates Mr. Khajehpour. Construction contracts, with their multiplier effects on jobs and the economy, will require a minimum of $30 billion, and the petroleum industry will need an interim $40 billion 鈥� just over half of the $70 billion necessary to bring oil production levels back to 2012 levels. Another $7 billion will be required for infrastructure projects from the Internet to telecoms.

Lifting sanctions will 鈥渂e surely felt in people鈥檚 lives long-term,鈥� said MP Abouzar Nadimi, deputy chair of parliament鈥檚 Economic Commission, in April. The nuclear deal will lead industry 鈥渢o fulfill its full capacity."

Regional aspirations: Hegemony?

听The nuclear deal was achieved even as the Middle East lurches into its most volatile period in decades.

While some Iranian officials hold fast to the rhetoric of 鈥渞esistance鈥� against US and Israeli influence 鈥� claiming that the ideals of Iran鈥檚 1979 Islamic revolution are spreading 鈥� others recognize that Iran and the US are on the same side when it comes to fighting Sunni militants.

But will this deal enable a more antagonistic Iranian posture? Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 鈥撎齱ho tried to block it 鈥� said in March that Iran was 鈥済obbling up four countries right now,鈥� and would control more if sanctions were lifted.

And Martin Indyk, a former senior US official now at the Brookings Institution, testified to the Senate in early June that a new regional security network must 鈥渃ontain and roll-back Iran鈥檚 nefarious hegemonic ambitions.鈥�

But as painful as they have been for Iran鈥檚 economy, the sanctions have hardly been a deterrent to its military endeavors: Iran has still rearmed Lebanese Hezbollah with tens of thousands of rockets for any future battle with Israel; spent billions of dollars a year backing Syria鈥檚 President Bashar al-Assad in a war that has taken more than 220,000 lives; and resurrected Shiite militias in Iraq to fight IS 鈥撎齣ronically in concert with US airstrikes.

鈥淚 don鈥檛 think the release of funds, which after all is going to be very gradual, is going to change the pace or intensity of any of [Iran鈥檚] significant involvements,鈥� says Richard Dalton, a former British ambassador to Iran now at the Chatham House think tank in London.

鈥淚t鈥檚 all very opaque, so we don鈥檛 know whether there鈥檚 updating of a Hezbollah capability, or they have a wish list from Assad that they鈥檝e been gagging to respond to and haven鈥檛 been able to,鈥� he says. 鈥淭here could be. But ... these will be incremental.鈥�

From Beirut to Kabul, Iran鈥檚 model now is defensive, says Carnegie鈥檚 Chubin. Syria, especially, has been costly in cash and dead Iranian generals, and also has tarnished Hezbollah. 鈥淚ran is not madcap about doing more,鈥� he says.

Seeking to engage Iran

The narrative that Iran will 鈥減low its hard-won sanctions relief into regional adventurism 鈥� is powerful, compelling, and frightening. It is also not true,鈥� wrote Richard Nephew, a former director for Iran at the US National Security Council and former member of the US nuclear negotiating team, in a mid-June column for Reuters.

Such analysis defies history, he argued, because when Iran had $100 billion in restricted oil funds just over two years ago, it 鈥渨as not plowing it all into Assad, the Houthis [in Yemen] or troublemaking along the Gulf.鈥� When Iran was making $88 billion a year from high oil prices in 2012, he wrote, 鈥渘o one alleges that all of that money was going to terrorists.鈥�

With the nuclear deal done, the European Council on Foreign Relations is proposing engagement with Iran. In a report this week, the London-based think tank calls for 鈥渉igh-level and high-intensity鈥� talks similar to the nuclear negotiations, to focus on 鈥渄e-escalation and conflict resolution.鈥�

Princeton鈥檚 Mr. Harris argues for just such an approach.

鈥淭he places where Iran has influence tend to be the places where the region has collapsed,鈥� he says. 鈥淚f one truly believes that Iran is on the march, then the best way to block it is to come up with a regionally-agreed-upon pathway to a more stable Middle East.鈥�

Abiding US-Iran distrust

Despite the nuclear deal triumph and unprecedented face time between top diplomats, US-Iran d茅tente is not around the corner.

The US last month declared that 鈥淚ran鈥檚 state sponsorship of terrorism worldwide remained undiminished鈥� in 2014. And in Iran, hardliners still chant 鈥淒eath to America,鈥� even in parliament.听

Throughout the nuclear talks, Khamenei often described his mistrust of the US, and listed the reasons why. If before the deal that level of suspicion scored 100, now Khamenei鈥檚 鈥渋nherent distrust of the US is going to stay at 85 or 90,鈥� says Dalton of Chatham House.

He expects ad hoc US-Iran consultations on overlapping interests 鈥渢o move things forward incrementally,鈥� but no pro-Iran tilt in Washington that disadvantages either Israel or America鈥檚 Gulf allies. At least both the US and Iran now can 鈥減ick up the phone and know who to talk to.鈥�

鈥淒iplomatic communication is going to be more effective,鈥� says Dalton. 鈥淏ut whether [it] will be more influential? That is a completely different question.鈥澨�听听