海角大神

In December 1994, Miami and the Clinton administration hosted the first Summit of the Americas, an event that drew the leaders of every country from Canada to Chile but Cuba. It was perhaps the zenith of the quest to cast the Western Hemisphere in Washington鈥檚 image, with a vast, Arctic-to-Tierra-del-Fuego free-trade area among market economies that banished populism and ostracized Cuba as the lone vestige of a bygone socialism.

Enter Hugo Ch谩vez, a red-bereted, self-described Bolivarean revolutionary 鈥� after the George Washington of South America, Sim贸n Bol铆var 鈥� preaching a very different vision to a struggling but oil-rich Venezuela. Mr. Ch谩vez鈥檚 model of socialist populism struck a chord that reverberated well beyond Venezuela 鈥� and that sounded the death knell of the thinking, more than a century old, that Latin America had no option but to follow Washington鈥檚 lead.

Ch谩vez died Tuesday after a long illness that, in recent months, silenced the usually vituperative, blustery, even outrageous leader. He聽leaves a Latin America much changed from the one he encountered when he first took office as Venezuela's president in 1999.

The change is not so much because Latin America adopted the model Ch谩vez espoused, but rather because Ch谩vez made it his project to persuade others 鈥� in part by handing out vast amounts of his country's oil revenues 鈥� that alternatives to Washington鈥檚 economic and political vision were possible.

鈥淚 don鈥檛 think it can be overstated how he fundamentally changed relations not just between the US and Venezuela, but how he did the same with US-Latin America relations,鈥� says Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas and the Americas Society in Washington. 鈥淐h谩vez put meat on the bones of the basic message he spread, which was that there is an alternative for development, [and] you don鈥檛 have to follow the example and dictates of the United States.鈥�

News of Ch谩vez鈥檚 death came the same day the Venezuelan government, increasingly agitated by the president鈥檚 worsening condition, accused 鈥渋mperialist鈥� enemies 鈥� specifically the United States 鈥� of having infected the president with cancer.聽The man Chavez designated to succeed him, Vice President Nicolas Maduro, claimed on national television that officials at the US Embassy in Caracas had been involved in conspiracies with Venezuelan military officials to undermine the government and had been expelled.

The US quickly rejected the allegations against US officials, saying such 鈥渇allacious鈥� accusations would make improved relations between the two countries more difficult.

鈥淎n assertion that the United States was somehow involved in causing President Ch谩vez鈥檚 illness is absurd, and we definitively reject it,鈥� said State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell, in a statement. 鈥淲e completely reject the Venezuelan government鈥檚 claim that the United States is involved in any type of conspiracy to destabilize the Venezuelan government.鈥�

During his years at the helm of Venezuela, Ch谩vez made the pursuit of alternatives to Washington鈥檚 vision possible in two key ways, argues Mr. Farnsworth.

First, 鈥渉e put his money where his mouth was,鈥� he says, noting that Ch谩vez used Venezuela's oil largess to rescue the communist regime of his mentor, Fidel Castro, and to allow other small Latin American countries to discount Washington and its wishes. Ch谩vez, Farnsworth says, 鈥渕ade the fashionable feasible.鈥�

Latin leftists certainly predated Ch谩vez, but the economic limitations of their policies eventually clipped their wings: Mr. Castro is the poster boy for that retrenchment from regional dreams. But Ch谩vez, sitting atop what are now considered to be the world鈥檚 largest oil reserves, used oil revenues in the service of his vision 鈥� even as the Venezuelan economy and the nation's living conditions suffered.

鈥淧revious to Ch谩vez, what would a country like Ecuador do, or Nicaragua?鈥� Farnsworth says. Ch谩vez鈥檚 petroleum diplomacy 鈥渁llowed them to chart a different course.鈥�

Second, Farnsworth says, Chavez鈥檚 鈥渙utrageousness鈥� 鈥� taking the United Nations stage to label President George W. Bush 鈥渢he devil,鈥� or striking up a strategic partnership with Iran 鈥� gave other Latin countries the 鈥減olitical cover鈥� to do things that were 鈥渘ot nearly as outrageous鈥� but that nevertheless charted new, non-US-centric directions. Examples include developing strong trade ties with countries other than the US 鈥� Japan or China, for example 鈥� and opposing Washington on the war in Iraq.

Venezuela鈥檚 oil sales to China have soared, and Ch谩vez signed a $40 billion loan agreement with Beijing that cements China鈥檚 access to Venezuelan oil. More worrying still to Washington was how Ch谩vez offered Iran a portal into the hemisphere 鈥� and the opening that could provide to a Tehran already embroiled in a covert war with the US.

Ch谩vez's ties with other anti-Western leaders who balked at dominance by the world's big powers 鈥� Iran鈥檚 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Syria鈥檚 Bashar al-Assad, even Libya鈥檚 Muammar Qaddafi 鈥� certainly rubbed Washington the wrong way. But what set Ch谩vez apart was his determination to undermine US influence throughout Latin America and to enlist others to create a united front to that end.

鈥淭he rise of Hugo Ch谩vez recast the search for regional integration,鈥� says Miguel Tinker Salas, a professor of Latin American studies and a Venezuela specialist at Pomona College in Claremont, Calif. With Ch谩vez rocking the boat, the Miami Summit of the Americas' vision of a hemispheric free-trade area faltered, and regional attempts at unity, with no US presence, arose.

鈥淐oncentrating the new efforts at economic union and political unity on Latin America diminishes the power of the US in the region, and diminishes the relevance of [Washington-based] institutions like the OAS [Organization of American States],鈥� Professor Tinker Salas says. New collective organizations such as Mercosur, UNASUR, and even ALBA, Ch谩vez鈥檚 鈥淏olivarian Alliance for the Americas,鈥� sprang up. Ch谩vez was "a central figure in that,鈥� he says.

But it鈥檚 also true that he reached the peak of his influence a few years ago, experts say 鈥� probably when George W. Bush was still president. Since then, Ch谩vez鈥檚 model of political and economic development for Venezuela has lost much luster.

Moreover, despite his vision of regional unity, Ch谩vez was a divisive figure in his own neighborhood, never overcoming testy relations with next-door neighbor Colombia, whose FARC guerrilla fighters he championed.

To illustrate how Ch谩vez鈥檚 image had tarnished in recent years, some Latin American analysts cite the case of Peru鈥檚 president, Ollanta Humala. When Mr. Humala first ran for the job in 2006, he touted his kinship with Ch谩vez 鈥� both leftist former army officers 鈥� at every turn. He presented himself as the anti-capitalist who would emulate the populism of Ch谩vez and other Latin leftists. He lost that race, but ran again and won in 2011, this time eschewing any admiration for the Ch谩vez model.

Since Humala鈥檚 election, Peru has enjoyed accelerated economic growth and has moved to join Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and others in combining growth with social improvements without resorting to Ch谩vez鈥檚 populism or to his antidemocratic concentration of power.

鈥淲hat the Latin America of the past few years demonstrates is that you don鈥檛 have to be a militant populist who is anti-American to accomplish social change and govern with a social conscience,鈥� Farnsworth says.

With Ch谩vez鈥檚 death, the question for Venezuela and Latin America becomes, 鈥淲ill there be Chavismo without Ch谩vez?鈥� says Tinker Salas.

For Venezuela, the short-term answer appears to be yes. In elections for state governors in December, Chavista candidates 鈥� several of them leftist former military officers like Ch谩vez 鈥� trounced the opposition.

Latin America, on the other hand, has already largely moved on from Ch谩vez, though a few leftist populist states still depend on Ch谩vez largess. Even so, strains of Ch谩vez鈥檚 anti-imperialist, region-centric doctrine and his socialist rhetoric are heard in the region's new responses to global and economic challenges, some experts say.

Ch谩vez sits with Fidel Castro and 鈥渢he sainted Che Guevara鈥� in touching 鈥渁 chord in Latin America that is there,鈥� says Charles Shapiro, a former US ambassador to Venezuela who is now director of the Institute of the Americas in San Diego.

But these days, Mr. Shapiro adds, a stronger chord than Ch谩vez鈥檚 is being struck by Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico and other countries that are not just talking about poverty, but reducing it.