海角大神

Episode transcript

Matthew Bell: 鈥溾�奀onstructive strategic stability.鈥� The phrase may not roll off the tongue super smoothly, but that鈥檚 how China鈥檚 leader, Xi Jinping, talked about a new era for the US-China relationship. Mr. Xi treated President Donald Trump to a second full-blown two-day state visit to Beijing in mid-May. It included appearances at the Great Hall of the People, the Temple of Heaven, and the garden at Zhongnanhai. That鈥檚 the heavily guarded official residence of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

For his part, President Trump was deferential. He was more disciplined than usual about staying on script, and he talked about Mr. Xi as a friend. The Chinese president did not reciprocate with that sort of rhetorical warmth. He did say, however, that the US-China relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, and that 鈥溾�妛e must make it work and never mess it up.鈥�

Xi Jinping: 鈥淏oth China and the United States stand to gain from cooperation, and lose from confrontation.鈥�

Bell: The summit did not produce any major new deals between Beijing and Washington, but it did come off without any big meltdowns or gaffes and perhaps kept the world鈥檚 two largest economies on track to not mess things up.

The Monitor鈥檚 Beijing bureau chief, Ann Scott Tyson, covered the summit in Beijing. Ann is a Mandarin speaker who鈥檚 been assigned to the Beijing bureau since 2019. She recently reported a cover story for our weekly magazine that looked at China鈥檚 long-game approach and how Beijing鈥檚 strategic patience has helped deliver some big wins for the People鈥檚 Republic.

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Bell: This is 鈥淲hy We Wrote This.鈥� I鈥檓 Matthew Bell, international desk editor at The Monitor, based in Boston. And welcome to you, Ann, from Beijing. Thanks for joining the podcast again.

Ann Scott Tyson: Thanks, Matt. It鈥檚 great to be here.

Bell: So let鈥檚 start, Ann, with how this summit was portrayed in China. Here in the United States, this was definitely the biggest news story for several consecutive days. But what were the headlines, the framing of the event there in China?

Tyson: Well, here it was also very big news. They had the live broadcast of the welcoming ceremony for him and so forth. So it was big on the TV. I think in terms of headlines, listeners really need to know that in China, the front and center headline day in and day out is always Xi Jinping. So if you turn on the [nightly] news here broadcast in Beijing, as I often do, you can basically set your watch by how many seconds it takes before they say Xi Jinping. Also the front pages of all the major newspapers are usually very similar, like copies of each other, and every headline starts with Xi Jinping. I kid you not.

So it was no different the day after the main summit meeting happened. The top item as you highlighted, was constructive strategic stability. This is a framework that China has put forth for the relationship that is Beijing鈥檚 priority, and it fits into its long-game strategy. You know, at the same time, the news also included some more 鈥渇eature-ish鈥� material. All very flowery, all very complimentary to Xi Jinping. There was a feature in the Communist Party mouthpiece, People鈥檚 Daily, and it was depicting Xi as this wise leader who was strolling amid ancient trees, extolling the virtues of Chinese civilization to Trump, and sort of guiding Trump towards a more harmonious existence in this Chinese-centric world. The article says: 鈥淐hina, rooted in the fertile soil of civilization, is lighting up the lamp of thought for building a world of harmonious coexistence and shared destiny on this one planet, and is providing Chinese solutions to answer the questions of the times.鈥� So you get the idea. That is what we鈥檙e...

Bell: That鈥檚 poetry.

Tyson: That鈥檚 what we鈥檙e reading in Chinese media.

Bell: It鈥檚 interesting. Ann, you mentioned Xi Jinping being in the center of all the news coverage there. Did you get a sense that the Chinese audience was learning anything new about President Trump during this visit?

Tyson: Well, it was definitely learning that President Trump was saying complimentary things about China. When China summarizes things that foreign leaders say, they summarize what they want them to be saying, and Trump did say many flattering things. He talked about the enthusiasm of the US business community for China, his own feeling of a personal friendship with Xi Jinping.

I should say, also, that despite the fact that there is a very tightly controlled propaganda environment here that limits people鈥檚 access to Western media outlets, urban educated people tend to have VPNs [virtual private networks that ensure privacy, partly by cloaking location]. They tend to be able to get outside of China to access some news from abroad.

Bell: And sort of have a bit more of freewheeling discussion about current events.

Tyson: Yeah.

Bell: These events, of course, are meticulously choreographed, and that鈥檚 true not just in China, but anywhere. Tell us, Ann, a little bit about what your strategy was as a journalist covering the summit, because, for example, the two leaders didn鈥檛 do the kind of traditional joint news conference appearance and take questions from journalists.

Tyson: Well that鈥檚 another thing that, I think, people do need to understand. In China, they don鈥檛 really hold press conferences as we understand them. So a 鈥減ress conference鈥� here means that journalists are essentially assembled, and then Xi will come out, make a statement, and leave. And that鈥檚 what they call a press conference. And Trump, you know, might under some circumstances take questions from reporters even in those short opportunities at the opening of meetings, but he didn鈥檛 even do that here. It was clear that that was a prearranged agreement.

So in terms of the official events, you know, you can pretty much watch what is on television. I have the Chinese broadcast, and I have the CNN broadcast. And there鈥檚 another sort of funny thing about it with foreign broadcasts, which is the censorship. Because if there鈥檚 some commentary that the Chinese censors don鈥檛 like, they will essentially just make the screen go blank, and it will say, 鈥淣o signal.鈥�

Bell: Sort of real time censorship.

Tyson: Real time censorship. Which is funny in and of itself because it gives you a little insight into what they consider sensitive. I鈥檒l give you one specific example from this: CNN was reporting how there were a lot of mocking and critical comments of Trump on the Chinese internet through just like Chinese netizens. And at the moment that they were talking about that, that was one time when they just cut the screen off.

Bell: Interesting. Maybe they didn鈥檛 want negative comments about the guest, the honored guest.

Tyson: Yes, I think that鈥檚 true, but it鈥檚 also interesting because they censor their own internet so harshly, that they could have not even let those comments come out on their own internet. So it鈥檚 a little bit tricky to know what they were or were not trying to do.

Bell: Is there some sort of consensus in China right now about the United States? Because in the U.S. in recent years, both parties here are very critical of China. They see China as the biggest rival of the United States. Is there something similar going on with the way people in China understand the relationship and understand the United States?

Tyson: I think from the leadership standpoint, since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he has drastically concentrated power. He has surrounded himself with loyalists, and there isn鈥檛 a divergent opinion, really, from the guidelines and the statements that he makes and sets out. I mean, there might be slight differences of views that scholars might express, but that鈥檚 not government policy. The sense is that, for a great deal of time, the West and the US have been trying to contain China, to prevent its rightful rise, and a sense that, nevertheless, China鈥檚 rise is inevitable, and that China is at the brink of overtaking the United States. So despite the fact that they talk about, you know, win-win cooperation, there really is a very intense rivalry going on. And that comes out in the way that the United States is often portrayed in the official media: very negatively, consistently.

Bell: And does that feel like sort of a widely accepted consensus among the public in China as well?

Tyson: No, I wouldn鈥檛 say that at all. When I meet Chinese people, they will usually ask where I鈥檓 from at some point. And one funny aside is that in recent years, they almost always ask if I鈥檓 Russian. And I think that that indicates just the large number of Russians who are here now, and the close relationships with Russia, and the paucity of Americans here. But when they hear that I鈥檓 American, they will very quickly say, 鈥淥h, well, our two countries may have problems or difficulties, but that doesn鈥檛 concern us.鈥� They鈥檒l just brush it aside.

Bell: Interesting.

Tyson: They鈥檙e very warm. They鈥檙e very gracious. 鈥淲e want peace.鈥� That鈥檚 what they say.

Bell: As simple as that.

Tyson: Yep.

Bell: And I鈥檝e done some reporting in China. I haven鈥檛 been there in about 10 years or so, but I do remember approaching people on the street and sort of getting, you know, person-on-the-street interviews. Often people would talk with me, but it wasn鈥檛 uncommon for folks to say, you know, in a really polite way, 鈥淚鈥檓 sorry, I don鈥檛 want any trouble.鈥� The thing I thought about was that it was risky for them to talk to a foreign reporter. I was a radio reporter at the time and was walking around with a microphone, so maybe that鈥檚 different than people鈥檚 thoughts appearing in print.

Tyson: Yeah, I mean, sure, there are some people who aren鈥檛 gonna wanna talk, but for the most part, I haven鈥檛 had difficulty with that. I can鈥檛 really explain that. I mean, I鈥檓 not using an interpreter. It鈥檚 just me going up to people. I guess I鈥檓 not really a very threatening looking person. All I have is like my notebook and I do have a tape recorder, and I will go up to people very directly. I tell them I鈥檓 a reporter, and I ask them if I can record our conversation so that I can listen to the Chinese over again if I want to. And lots of times people will talk to me.

I was actually just at the Temple of Heaven yesterday, talking to people about how they felt about the US and China, who was, you know, who is rising, who is falling. Actually, nobody refused, come to think of it. That is very encouraging, given that the government and institutions tend to be quite closed off and hard to get access to. If I couldn鈥檛 engage easily with ordinary people, it would make reporting here almost impossible.

Bell: Right.

Tyson: It鈥檚 interesting. Actually, the Monitor is known in China, especially in some circles 鈥� maybe not younger people. But the Monitor, The New York Times, [The] Washington Post, those are translated. Articles that I鈥檝e written since I鈥檝e been here have been translated into Chinese and published. They don鈥檛 ask us for permission or anything. But they translate them, and they publish them in something called 鈥淐ankao Xiaoxi鈥� or 鈥淩eference News,鈥� and that has, like, millions of subscribers. It used to be sort of semi-classified, but it鈥檚 a way that the Chinese can get access to some things published about China in the Western and outside press.

One thing to note is that the number of foreign journalists in China has shrunk quite significantly. There are just really declining ranks of American reporters here, partly because a number were kicked out, during the first Trump administration. There was sort of a journalist visa war, which makes me feel a really, really strong sense of obligation to continue this work, despite the hardship that exists. And I hope that in the future this will change, and that similarly, restrictions will be lifted on Chinese journalists in the US, and that we can have this very critical work going on. Because it鈥檚 the only way that we can truly understand one another.

Bell: So many important stories to report. Ann, tell us a little bit about some of your reporting that you did leading into this big news week of the summit. One place you went to was Hainan, an island province off the southern coast of China. Why did you choose to go there?

Tyson: I went there because I thought that that would be a good illustration of the different approach that China was taking, and in some ways how it was trying to leverage the Trump administration and its policies to portray China in a positive light, in the eyes of the world. And this is part of that long game strategy that I wrote about. We have a system where each president will come in and sort of define an approach, oftentimes veering quite drastically from the prior administration. But in China 鈥� where it鈥檚 very top-down 鈥� the Communist Party system can on one hand lack agility, and be slow to course correct, but it does have this great advantage of continuity. And the party鈥檚 overarching goal has been to rebuild China鈥檚 power, displace the US, and reshape the world order to better serve China鈥檚 interests. And all of that has grown bolder under Xi Jinping.

When Trump hit China with these prohibitively high tariffs, Xi Jinping was really ready for that because they had experienced a trade war the first Trump administration, and had a lot of tools at his disposal, escalated tariffs against Trump鈥檚 tariffs step by step, and just leveraged things like China鈥檚 dominance over rare earths, and through doing that, he forced the Trump administration to a stalemate. The impact of the tariffs themselves: they reduced Chinese exports to the US. But what did China do? It said, 鈥淲ell, we鈥檙e gonna just open up new markets and more markets in every place else in the world.鈥� And they did that.

Bell: Which they鈥檝e done spectacularly.

Tyson: Yeah, very spectacularly. They racked up a $1.2 trillion trade surplus in 2025. That really was a huge moment, and it gave China the confidence that it had sort of matched the US. And part of this new definition for the relationship, this constructive strategic partnership, it stresses that the US and China are now sort of on an equal footing.

So back to Hainan, and going to Hainan. I just talked about the hard-power impact, but in terms of its soft power, Beijing has used the opportunity to criticize US protectionism and cast itself as this new world champion of free trade. And Hainan was on the verge of becoming the biggest free trade port in the world. It is a large island, almost the size of Taiwan. And China was making plans to essentially make that its own custom zone, so that many categories of goods can freely enter and exit. And that was why I decided to go there.

Bell: And this is a vital trading hub, and not just for the region, but for global trade in general. Another place you went to is Taiwan, not that far away from Hainan. But of course, Taiwan is a different story. And this came up at the summit between Xi and Trump. What did you learn in Taiwan about what鈥檚 at stake for people there, as they look at this developing relationship between the US and China?

Tyson: Yes, I went there beforehand, because I really wanted to get my sort of finger on the pulse of how people were feeling in Taiwan you know, based on a number of developments there, both internally 鈥� which had Taiwan see the leader of the main opposition party, a more pro-China party 鈥� go to China. So that was a key event that was happening. But also just the reaction to Trump鈥檚 clear reluctance to be as forthright in saying that the US would defend Taiwan. Compared with President Biden, who did that repeatedly. And Trump has been far less reassuring to Taiwan, and instead has said things like, 鈥淲ell, you know, China is so close to Taiwan,鈥� um, you know, 鈥淲e鈥檙e thousands and thousands of miles away.鈥�

And in Taiwan, people very much just want to maintain the status quo. They like Taiwan鈥檚 autonomy. And even people who would favor Taiwan becoming an independent country know that they can鈥檛 do that, or they would invite, you know, an invasion from China.

But the second thing which was very notable is that there鈥檚 much greater doubt about the US commitment, and that has grown exponentially under the Trump administration. I think that now a majority of people on Taiwan, do not believe that the US will really back Taiwan up in the case of an attack by China. And this is quite important because in polls that have been done over the years, there鈥檚 been a connection between people鈥檚 confidence in US support and their willingness to stand up and fight should they face a military attack.

And people were also worried that during the summit, Trump might say something to walk back longstanding American commitments on Taiwan. And he didn鈥檛 do that exactly, but he did some things such as discuss US arms sales to Taiwan with Xi Jinping, which goes against longstanding US practice. Beijing may feel that they鈥檝e made sort of small and incremental gains on Taiwan through this summit.

Bell: There were no big major deals announced when President Trump was in China, but in subsequent days, we saw some headlines about commitments apparently the White House says China has made for buying American agricultural products. That will be taken as a win for the Trump administration. What are you watching for next, Ann, as you report on this complicated relationship and this constructive strategic stability, as Xi Jinping calls it?

Tyson: I think each country is very likely to interpret that differently. China scholars I鈥檝e spoken to believe that China has tried to frame it that way because they want to use that framing to constrain the US from doing things that they will say, 鈥淥h, this is against the strategic stability agreement.鈥�

Bell: 鈥淭hat鈥檚 not constructive.鈥�

Tyson: So based on that, it will be very important to see what Trump does decide to do on this large American arms package for Taiwan. It鈥檚 a reportedly $14 billion arms package that was delayed prior to his visit to China. Before he left, he said he was going to discuss it with Xi, which was quite unusual. And then on his way back, he said he would decide soon what he was going to do with that. He would make a determination.

So, for example, does that go forward? Is it further delayed? Is it scaled back or even canceled? All of those would send different signals to Taiwan and other US allies such as Japan and South Korea that depend upon US backing.

Trump and Xi Jinping could potentially meet as many as three more times this year, which is quite a lot for this high-level engagement. Xi Jinping was invited to the US, and is now scheduled to come to Washington in September. They could also meet at the APEC gathering in China in November, and maybe even at the G20 in the US in December. So all of those encounters will be something to watch very closely.

Bell: And in terms of another high-level contact, Russian leader Vladimir Putin is on his way to China, for a visit on May 19 and 20 [just before this episode was recorded]. I read that this is his 25th meeting with Xi Jinping. How big of a story is that, Ann, where you鈥檙e sitting in Beijing?

Tyson: Well, it is a big story. The Chinese media is playing it up. I think that Chinese people do have a fairly warm feeling towards Russia. When Russia invaded Ukraine, there was a clear warning to the Chinese media that nothing negative was to be reported about Russia鈥檚 invasion.

I think that Putin is the foreign leader who Xi Jinping has met with more than any other. They have a relationship where each side is sort of basically seen as protecting the other鈥檚 back. If both countries are going to be either expanding or engaging in conflicts with outside countries, they want to make sure that their very long common border is secure. This is why they have this partnership and it has grown deeper.

What鈥檚 been really notable since Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine is to what extent Russia has grown more economically dependent upon China, which has provided, really, a lifeline with its purchases of Russian oil and its provision of dual use equipment for Russia in fighting the war in Ukraine. So that dependency of Russia has intensified, and Russia is quite the junior partner in the relationship at this point. And Russian experts think that this is a bet by Russia that China is going to surpass the United States, and that, you know, given their shared animosity toward the US or the West, that this is the way to go.

Bell: New world order. Ann Scott Tyson is the Monitor鈥檚 Beijing bureau chief. Ann, thanks so much for joining us on the podcast.

Tyson: It鈥檚 my pleasure, Matt.

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Bell: Thanks for having me. And thanks to our listeners. You can find links to the stories we have discussed and more of Ann鈥檚 China coverage in our show episode notes at CSMonitor.com/WhyWeWroteThis. This episode was hosted by me, Matthew Bell, [and] produced by Jingnan Peng. Mackenzie Farkus is also a producer on the show. Our sound engineers are Morgan Anderson and Alyssa Britton. Original music is by Noel Flatt. Produced by 海角大神. Copyright 2026.