海角大神

This article was originally published at聽.

George Washington鈥檚 is usually remembered for its admonition to 鈥渟teer clear of permanent alliances". But Washington鈥檚 famous words contained a second warning too, one that is especially apt today: Factionalism at home invites trouble abroad.

Washington wrote at a time when international events threatened to destroy the young American republic. The titanic struggle between France and Britain forced Americans to choose sides: Jeffersonian Republicans aligned with Paris; Hamiltonian Federalists sided with London. The resulting factional infighting, Washington feared, would leave the country vulnerable to foreign coercion and intrigue.

Factionalism is once again rife in the US. The Republican-led shutdown of the federal government last week is but the latest in a series of politically orchestrated crises designed to erode President Obama鈥檚 domestic legitimacy. Whatever success Republicans achieve domestically, holding the federal government hostage to an extremist minority at home is not cost-free internationally.

Today, there is little danger of foreign coercion. Eighteenth century America was an international weakling, which is why George Washington worried about getting caught in France or Britain鈥檚 crosshairs. Yet even 21st century superpowers must worry about the kind of hyper-factionalism currently on display in the US. It sends a confusing, self-defeating message to foreign audiences. Nowhere is this clearer, or the risks to American interests greater, than in Asia.

Worries about America鈥檚 commitment to Asia are not new. Indeed, they have dogged Mr. Obama since he took office in 2009. Many Asian capitals viewed his efforts to scale back America鈥檚 presence in Iraq and Afghanistan as a harbinger of a broader strategic retrenchment. At a time when China鈥檚 regional ambitions seemed to be expanding, Obama鈥檚 preoccupation with domestic matters, however well intentioned, only fueled fears in Japan and South Korea that China would take advantage of the opportunity to extend its geopolitical reach.

Obama鈥檚 tour of Asia in 2010 was described with much fanfare as a 鈥溾�� in US foreign policy. The trip was meant to reassure Japan, South Korea, and others in the region that whatever the US did in the Middle East, Europe, or elsewhere, it remained committed to maintaining the region鈥檚 geopolitical status quo and to the security of its longstanding allies. But the pivot (or what the White House now calls 鈥溾��) has not inspired the depth of support among allies and friends in the region the administration hoped for.

One reason of course is that China has not sat idly by. Beijing has used its economic clout to parry Washington鈥檚 plans for a Trans-Pacific Partnership by offering its neighbors generous lines of credit. Just this week Chinese leader Xi Jinping to create a regional development bank to invest in infrastructure in Southeast Asia and pledged funding from China.

Partisanship in Washington has also taken its toll on the success of the pivot in Asia. America鈥檚 inability to govern at home, as Secretary of State John Kerry聽聽over the weekend, raises doubts about America鈥檚 ability to deliver and encourages others to make 鈥渕ischief". 鈥淚 believe that those standing in the way [of a resolution]鈥�,聽, 鈥渘eed to think long and hard about the message that we send to the world when we can鈥檛 get our own act together.鈥�

What matters most to Asian leaders are not token troop deployments, joint military exercises, or regional port visits. It is whether their own domestic public deems America鈥檚 gestures credible.

This is why Obama鈥檚 to cancel an appearance at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bali this week has caused so much consternation in the region. It reinforces the view that Obama cannot deliver internationally 鈥� that the gap between what the president is promising in the way of focused US leadership and what a highly partisan Congress is willing to deliver has grown too wide.

Forced to choose between appearing indifferent to American voters and looking feckless to his Asian partners, Obama chose the latter. And therein lies the rub: Domestic politics forced the president to trim his international sails.

To be sure, the fallout from the APEC meetings is containable. This is not the diplomatic fiasco some of Obama鈥檚 critics are . But if the governance gap in Washington continues to worsen 鈥� a very real prospect with the October 17 looming 鈥� it will become harder politically for Asian leaders to consider the United States a strategic bulwark against China or a patron that can reliably outbid the Chinese in buying regional access and influence. Some Asian leaders may begin to look for ways to accommodate Beijing, rather than balance against it.

George Washington wrote that partisanship is America鈥檚 鈥渨orst enemy鈥�. He exaggerated. Strong, competitive parties are vital to a functioning democracy and to making rational and far-sighted foreign policy. But the kind of political dysfunction that is currently on display in Washington threatens its ability to lead abroad as well as its capacity to govern at home. America鈥檚 first president must be turning in his grave.

聽is a professor of international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of 鈥淧olitics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft鈥� (Princeton University Press, 2011) and 鈥淒efining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy鈥� (University of Chicago Press, 1998). Mr. Trubowitz聽does not work for, consult to, own shares in, or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.