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How NATO is navigating Syria (and other issues for the evolving Alliance)

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, the NATO secretary general discusses Syria and how 'smart defense' will contribute to cash-strapped Alliance members鈥� security future.

One of the advantages for NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in attending the United Nations General Assembly meeting this week is that it鈥檚 not his show.

That means the former Danish prime minister at the helm of the 28-nation Atlantic Alliance has a little extra unprogrammed time 鈥� for a morning run or two in Central Park or to meet with reporters to extend to the US public his message of NATO鈥檚 transition from a cold-war footing to a 21st-century security alliance.

Mr. Rasmussen, whose five-year term ends next summer, sat down in New York with the Monitor to discuss Syria, Afghanistan, and why 鈥渟mart defense鈥� will be a growing feature of cash-strapped NATO members鈥� security future.

Syria: Steps to protect Turkey from civil war spillover, but no additional role

At Turkey鈥檚 request, NATO deployed batteries of Patriot missiles along the Alliance member鈥檚 border with Syria, and provocative incidents between the two unfriendly countries largely ceased. 鈥淲e do believe [deploying the Patriots] has a deterrent effect, so that potential adversaries don鈥檛 even think about attacking Turkey,鈥� Rasmussen says.

But don鈥檛 look for NATO involvement in implementation of the plan to eliminate Syria鈥檚 chemical weapons. The Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack outside Damascus 鈥渘eeds a firm response from the international community here and now,鈥� he says, before adding: 鈥淚 don鈥檛 foresee any further role for NATO.鈥�

Russia has indicated it could be open to providing a military component to help with security for the chemical weapons inspectors and experts who would be implementing the plan in a war zone. But Russia, which regards NATO as having overstepped its bounds by intervening in Libya in 2011, would almost certainly be skeptical of Alliance participation in Syria.

But Rasmussen says 鈥渋ndividual allies鈥� (NATO members) 鈥渉ave capabilities that would be useful to the weapons-elimination program.鈥� As a result, he envisions that 鈥渋f requested, NATO could play a coordinating role in such [Allied] efforts.鈥�

On Afghanistan: A post-2014 role for NATO, waiting for a 鈥榞o鈥� from Karzai

Rasmussen is upbeat on Afghanistan, noting that Afghan security forces now lead 鈥渁lmost all security operations鈥� and have impressed NATO commanders with how they are performing. 鈥淲e have seen them deal with recent security incidents in quite a capable manner,鈥� he says.

But the Afghan Army鈥檚 officer corps in particular will need additional training in 鈥渃ommand and control鈥� capabilities past the conclusion of NATO鈥檚 Afghanistan mission in December 2014, Rasmussen says. 鈥淲e need to focus on the leadership level,鈥� he adds.

And while he鈥檚 confident Alliance members are prepared to contribute to a post-2014 role, he also cautions that Afghanistan has to take certain steps to make a new NATO mission possible.

鈥淏efore we can do that, we need to know whether we will be invited 鈥� and what will be the legal framework鈥� for a NATO presence, he says. 鈥淚 have on several occasions told President [Hamid] Karzai that it is a prerequisite for our continued presence in Afghanistan that we are invited, and that we have a firm legal framework, a status-of-forces agreement鈥� or SOFA.

Mr. Karzai鈥檚 first priority is to see if he can negotiate an agreement with the United States, which would require its own SOFA 鈥� including immunity from Afghan justice for US military personnel 鈥� before agreeing to a training and counterterrorism presence in post-2014 Afghanistan.

Time is running short 鈥� Afghanistan is to hold pivotal national elections in April 鈥� but Rasmussen predicts the hurdles to a continuing Alliance role will be overcome. Karzai 鈥渦nderstands that we can鈥檛 deploy unless we have a very clear legal framework,鈥� he says. 鈥淚鈥檓 confident we鈥檒l reach an agreement.鈥�

On NATO in the 21st century: A new strategic concept of three 鈥榗ore tasks鈥�

First, 鈥渢erritorial defense.鈥� Deploying Patriot missiles to Turkey is an example.

Second, 鈥渃risis management.鈥� The Libya intervention showcased the 鈥渘ew NATO,鈥� Rasmussen says, with 鈥渁 very short, targeted operation to implement a UN resolution based on the 鈥榬esponsibility to protect,鈥� 鈥� a nascent international humanitarian intervention doctrine.

Third, 鈥渃ooperative security,鈥� a 鈥減artnership concept鈥� that expands the reach and heft of Alliance activity outside the NATO area by bringing in outside participants to NATO missions. 鈥淲e realize that if we are to accomplish our security mission in the modern world we need strong partnerships,鈥� Rasmussen says: 鈥渇or political dialogue, but also for concrete operational contributions.鈥�

In Afghanistan, for example, 22 non-NATO countries are present on the ground alongside the 28 NATO members, creating a partnership of 50 countries.

鈥淚t gives us strength, but it also gives us broad political legitimacy,鈥� he says.

On NATO鈥檚 reform under his tenure: a tauter, smarter Alliance

For weary American taxpayers tempted to dismiss an international institution like NATO as a bloated cold-war relic, Rasmussen has a message: 鈥淲e have cut fat and built up muscles.鈥�

As part of a major streamlining effort, NATO has cut its administrative workforce by a third, and reduced the number of divisional headquarters from 11 to 7 鈥� even as the Alliance has taken on new missions reflecting the challenges of today鈥檚 world.

Noting that 鈥淭oday we can no longer provide adequate security by lining up tanks along our borders,鈥� Rasmussen says NATO has had to expand its concept of what 鈥減roviding security鈥� means to include fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, tackling piracy off the coast of Somalia, and addressing the growing global threat of cyberattacks.

To do more with less, NATO under Rasmussen is shifting to what he likes to call 鈥渟mart defense:鈥� taking the cooperative spirit underpinning the Alliance and extending it to the acquisition and operation of new military capabilities.

By more 鈥減ooling of resources,鈥� he says, increasingly prohibitive hardware, personnel, and training costs can be shared, and 鈥渨e will be able to maintain our ability to work and operate together. That鈥檚 also part of NATO鈥檚 future.鈥�