海角大神

In Iran war, 鈥榯he enemy of my enemy鈥� isn鈥檛 moving Gulf Arabs closer to Israel

With a tentative ceasefire between the United States and Iran mostly holding despite the failure of talks this past weekend in Pakistan, the Iran war so far has left Gulf Arab states with stronger ties with regional partners 鈥� but not with Israel.

While the conflict has not led Gulf states to abandon their security partnership with America, the constant barrage of Iranian missiles and drones has driven them to strengthen alliances elsewhere to boost their domestic military industry and air defenses.

The war has forced Gulf states to put aside differences and band together 鈥� Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for example 鈥� as they have tightened ties with Pakistan, Turkey, and Ukraine.

Yet, coming under fire from shared adversary Iran has not driven the Gulf states to turn to Israel.

Instead, the conflict has sown deeper distrust and exasperation in Gulf capitals toward an Israel they see as expanding its military reach and placing their own countries and economies at risk, Gulf officials and observers say.

Gulf states now view Israel as a source of instability, driven by a far-right government whose military operations subject Arab states to crossfire, making them less safe.

Yet the distrust extends further: In many Gulf capitals, the war has cemented a view of Israel as a would-be hegemon, another non-Arab state looking to extend its control and influence over Arab lands, not too dissimilar from Iran.

鈥淏oth Israel and Iran are not acting in a way that supports a region of cooperation, stability, and shared prosperity,鈥� a senior Saudi official, who asked to remain unnamed, tells The Monitor. 鈥淲e are ready to extend the hand of regional integration and cooperation, but Israel does not seem ready to take it. Instead, it is offering only instability.鈥�

Reasons for mistrust

Early hopes in the U.S. and Israel that a broader anti-Iran coalition would emerge, with some Gulf states joining them in the war, did not materialize.

Articles in the Israeli press that Arab states suspect were planted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu鈥檚 office 鈥� claiming falsely that states such as the UAE or Saudi Arabia had joined the conflict 鈥� only angered Gulf states, who saw Israel trying to force them to war.

That added to Gulf states鈥� bitterness over the perception that Israel, despite their warnings over regional and global consequences, incited the conflict, persuading U.S. President Donald Trump to launch a nearly six-week war that has only strengthened Iran鈥檚 position.

There is a sense in many Gulf capitals that 鈥淚srael is the main culprit; they got us to where we are today,鈥� says Bader al-Saif, an analyst and assistant professor of history at Kuwait University. 鈥淵es, the decision to go to war was an American decision, but it has been through the prodding of Netanyahu at the same time.鈥�

This resentment was reportedly hardened by the way in which Israel conducted its war on Iran: striking Iranian infrastructure and prompting Iran to strike Gulf Arab infrastructure in response.

In one exchange, Israeli forces struck Iran鈥檚 gas fields, leading Iran to launch a devastating attack on Qatar鈥檚 gas fields, taking off-line 18% of Qatar鈥檚 gas production, potentially for the next five years.

鈥淚srael has been gambling with Arab lives, prosperity, and infrastructure. In that scenario, Israel feels like it has nothing to lose,鈥� says a second Gulf official, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media. 鈥淲e have no say or control over Israel鈥檚 wars, but we pay the price.鈥�

Distrust had already built up over Israel鈥檚 war in Gaza and the actions of the far-right Israeli coalition, which has egged on an expansion of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank.

The ongoing Israeli occupation in southern Syria, and a refusal by Mr. Netanyahu to reach an agreement with the new Syrian government, despite intensive Gulf mediation, added to prewar frustration.

Now, this distrust has evolved into what some Gulf officials see as a threat to their national security.

鈥淵ou cannot bulldoze your way into international relations, if they want to build relations with countries in the region, they can鈥檛 do it by doing what they are doing,鈥� notes Mr. al-Saif.

Rival or partner?

A deeper fear remains among some Gulf officials that Israel, like Iran, aspires to regional dominance.

Stoking these fears are comments from Israeli officials, including former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, a Netanyahu rival, stating that after Iran, Israel should seek to weaken Turkey.

Mr. Bennett even labeled Turkey 鈥渢he new Iran鈥� 鈥� a sentiment shared by other Israeli politicians and pundits 鈥� claiming that Turkey and Qatar represent a 鈥渉ostile Sunni axis鈥� threatening to encircle Israel.

Mr. Netanyahu released a video statement on Saturday, sharply critical of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an.

鈥淚srael under my leadership will continue to fight Iran鈥檚 terror regime and its proxies, unlike Erdo臒an, who accommodates them and massacred his own Kurdish citizens,鈥� the prime minister said.

鈥淎fter Iran and Turkey, there is only a matter of time before Israel turns its sights on Arab Gulf states,鈥� says a Saudi insider close to decision-makers. Gulf governments sense a 鈥渞ivalry鈥� and 鈥渞esentment鈥� from Israeli officials over the influence and good ties Gulf Arab states enjoy with the Trump administration, the insider says.

Israel and multiple U.S. administrations had long sought to encourage normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the Gulf region鈥檚 largest and most powerful country.

Yet, instead, through the conflict, Saudi Arabia deepened its defense pact with Pakistan. Riyadh is finalizing a security pact with Turkey, under which Saudi Arabia will take advantage of Turkish military technology and know-how to boost its own domestic defense industry and drone production.

There are diverse opinions in the region over how to engage Israel.

The UAE retains security ties with Israel, though the extent of current cooperation is unclear. Bahrain, too, retains relations with Israel.

At a Council on Foreign Relations event in March, Anwar Gargash, an adviser to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, predicted that 鈥淚ran鈥檚 full-throttle attack on the Gulf states will actually strengthen the Israeli role in the Gulf鈥� and not diminish it, saying he expected more channels of dialogue to open.

Yet additional channels with Israel have not materialized during the war, multiple official Gulf sources say.

Given the 鈥渄isastrous end鈥� to the conflict, normalizing ties with Israel is increasingly seen in the Gulf as a 鈥渓iability, not an asset,鈥� the second Gulf official said.

Regional ambitions

Gulf citizens, too, say they are wary of Israel鈥檚 regional ambitions.

鈥淭his war has been between two expansionist powers: Israel and Iran,鈥� says Khalid Mohamed, a Riyadh driver. 鈥淚srael wants to expand its territory, and Iran wants to extend its influence and power over the Arab world. And here in Saudi we are stuck in the middle.鈥�

鈥淭he Israelis plan ahead 鈥� years in advance 鈥� [and] they want dominance, and don鈥檛 want a single rival in the region. Today, they want to get rid of Iran. Tomorrow, their sights are already set on Turkey. After that, we are afraid it is us.鈥�

鈥淥nce we are finished with Iran in the region, we need to focus on Israel,鈥� says Ibrahim, a Saudi university student, saying Gulf states should act as a bulwark against expanding Israeli military reach.

The senior Saudi official stressed that despite the distrust, Gulf states seek a 鈥渞egional integration that includes Israel. But this can only happen with a Palestinian state and Palestinian integration as well,鈥� which Mr. Netanyahu and the majority of Israeli political parties oppose.

With talks between Iran and the U.S. still possible,聽Gulf states wish for the region to emerge from the conflict with neither Iran nor Israel ascendant.

鈥淔or the Gulf,鈥� notes Mr. al-Saif, the Kuwaiti analyst, 鈥渉aving a tense balance of power in which Israel and Iran are watching and testing one another gives us [the chance] to get to a place where we can vie for a leadership role.鈥�