Afghanistan mystery: Why was Al Qaeda鈥檚 leader in Kabul?
Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden (left) and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, an architect of the 9/11 attacks, sit for an interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir (not pictured), in an image supplied by Dawn newspaper, Nov. 10, 2001. Mr. Zawahri was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan, July 31, 2022.
Hamid Mir/Editor/Ausaf Newspaper for Daily Dawn/Reuters/File
LONDON
Announcing the death of Ayman al-Zawahri 鈥� killed by a CIA drone strike on the balcony of a villa in downtown Kabul early Sunday 鈥� President Joe Biden said it demonstrated a U.S. capability to fight terrorism in Afghanistan today, even without thousands of soldiers on the ground.
Yet a year after the jihadist Taliban swept back to power in Kabul, the brazen presence in the capital of the Egyptian-born Al Qaeda leader 鈥� a key architect of the 9/11 attacks and earlier high-profile strikes on American targets 鈥� appears on its face to have brought Afghanistan full circle: back to the incendiary circumstances that led to 9/11.
Indeed, U.S. officials say that by harboring Al Qaeda leaders, the Taliban have breached the Doha agreement negotiated by then-President Donald Trump in 2020 and accepted by Mr. Biden. The U.S.-Taliban deal included a Taliban commitment to prevent Afghan soil from being used to plan attacks on the United States, in exchange for a troop withdrawal ending America鈥檚 20-year military involvement in the country.
Why We Wrote This
Stripped bare, the drone strike that killed Al Qaeda鈥檚 leader in Afghanistan鈥檚 capital exposes a lack of trust between the U.S. and Taliban. But was their agreement broken, or were there just differing views on how to keep it?
But, say analysts, the Taliban have never condemned Al Qaeda nor cut ties, and the presence and killing of Mr. Zawahri in Kabul 鈥� just a 15-minute stroll from the presidential palace 鈥� expose a collision of differing expectations between the U.S. and Taliban that is likely to worsen.
And there is plenty of interpretation over what Mr. Zawahri鈥檚 presence in Kabul meant. Was it a flouting of Doha? Or evidence the Taliban were trying to keep tabs on Al Qaeda?
The U.S. attack reveals the scale of the challenge for the Taliban, who need to balance a desire to maintain their ultraconservative, jihadist bona fides while pushing for recognition as a legitimate government, worthy of open Western embassies and billions of dollars in humanitarian aid.
Their 鈥渙verwhelming victory鈥� gave 鈥渢he Taliban a sense that they are unstoppable, that they don鈥檛 need to obey anything other than what they believe is right, whether that鈥檚 Al Qaeda, whether that鈥檚 girls鈥� education, whether that鈥檚 human rights,鈥� says Rahmatullah Amiri, a Kabul-based independent analyst and expert on the Taliban.
The drone strike 鈥渋s a wake-up call for them, and this will shake them up a bit, that the golden days are almost over,鈥� says Mr. Amiri, contacted in Europe. The Taliban, he says, do not think twice about hosting fellow Muslim militants; they don鈥檛 ask questions, as long as those militants don鈥檛 challenge the Taliban; and they don鈥檛 believe that in 2001 Al Qaeda actually carried out the 9/11 attacks.
鈥淏ack then it was not discussed. Now it is not discussed,鈥� says Mr. Amiri. To the Taliban, hosting the Al Qaeda leader 鈥渋s not such a strange thing. It鈥檚 totally fine.鈥�
A powerful precedent, 鈥渧ery difficult for other Taliban to reject,鈥� was set by Mullah Omar, Mr. Amiri adds. The shadowy first leader of the Taliban chose to let the American military destroy the Taliban鈥檚 self-declared Islamic Emirate in 2001 rather than hand Osama bin Laden over to the Americans. Al Qaeda鈥檚 charismatic founder was killed by a U.S. SEAL team in Pakistan in 2011.
Differing approaches
Yet even more is at stake for the Taliban today, as both sides navigate their differing approaches.
鈥淭his Doha agreement can鈥檛 be done if there is no good-faith relationship,鈥� says Mr. Amiri. 鈥淭he Taliban can successfully control Al Qaeda; it鈥檚 probably the only group that can. But why would the Taliban agree to do that for the U.S., which they fought for 20 years?
鈥淭he U.S. is trying to make an ally out of the Taliban against Al Qaeda, which is very difficult,鈥� he adds. 鈥淏ut now that they took this guy out, the chance of friendship on such issues is becoming more and more unlikely.鈥�
The Taliban have a mixed record regarding fellow jihadis. In the past year, they have continued to fight brutal battles to crush the Islamic State franchise in Afghanistan, which accuses the Taliban of selling out to the West.
The United Nations special representative for Afghanistan, Deborah Lyons, told the Security Council in January that the Taliban had worked to prevent 鈥渕ajor鈥� attacks by the Islamic State, but that the 鈥渄esire of the de facto authorities鈥� to take on the threat from 鈥渘umerous terrorist groups ... remains to be convincingly demonstrated.鈥�
Graeme Smith, a senior Afghanistan analyst for the International Crisis Group, says Mr. Zawahri鈥檚 presence in Kabul 鈥渉ighlights the difficult balancing act the Taliban have been trying to do politically.鈥�
鈥淭here is a saying in Pashto that you can鈥檛 hold two watermelons in one hand,鈥� he says. 鈥淚n this case the watermelons are the jihadi supporters of the Taliban on one side, and the international community on the other.鈥�
Talks with Germany
Current Taliban discussions with the German government about restoring an embassy presence and investing in economic development starkly illustrate the dilemma.
Aside from the fact that the original German Embassy was destroyed by a 2017 suicide truck bomb that killed 150 people 鈥� the blast was attributed to the Haqqani network, whose leader Sirajuddin Haqqani is now acting interior minister 鈥� the building is located a two-minute walk from where Mr. Zawahri was killed, in a villa reportedly owned by a senior aide to Mr. Haqqani.
鈥淭hink about the hosting the Taliban were trying to do there,鈥� says Mr. Smith. 鈥淭hey were trying to have nice European embassies quite literally a stone鈥檚 throw from people who want to murder foreigners. ... They were trying to work some strategic ambiguity, and this [CIA strike] lifted the veil on that.鈥�
The result, he says, is that the Taliban are now subject to suspicion from both sides. The international community fears the Taliban are back in the business of harboring terrorists. And, he adds, there will be 鈥渧ast suspicion from jihadis,鈥� too, who will want to connect the dots between a high-level Taliban meeting with U.S. officials last week in Tashkent, Uzbekistan 鈥� where the urgent humanitarian situation and release of Afghan central bank reserves made up the agenda 鈥� and then, soon after, the death of the Al Qaeda chief.
But there may be more to the Taliban鈥檚 variable relationship with Islamist militants, and, in fact, with the Americans, including the possibility the Taliban are making real efforts, in their own manner, to curb attacks.
Mr. Smith notes a history of de-confliction that dates back to 2018 at least, when the Taliban and U.S. forces stayed out of each other鈥檚 way, as they separately hunted down Islamic State militants.
More recently, the Taliban have been cantoning Taliban-aligned foreign fighters, including, reportedly,聽Uyghur militants, in areas away from their borders.
鈥淲hat does that behavior indicate? To me it looks like they were trying to keep these guys under control,鈥� says the聽International Crisis Group analyst. 鈥淧ublicly, they don鈥檛 admit these guys are on the ground,鈥� he adds. 鈥淧rivately, they鈥檒l say, 鈥業n the Doha deal we promised to keep an eye on these guys, and we鈥檙e holding them close.鈥欌��
What did Taliban promise?
Indeed, according to Andrew Watkins, an expert on Afghanistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Taliban negotiators told U.S. diplomats in Doha as early as 2019 that they only intended to keep tabs on Al Qaeda, but no more.
The careful language of the U.S.-Taliban agreement reflects that, and only commits the Taliban to preventing attacks from Afghan soil 鈥� not cutting ties with Al Qaeda or other militants.
鈥淲e do have some evidence that the Taliban are very highly aware of the consequences of allowing Al Qaeda to move about the country, or to operate unrestrained and unfettered,鈥� says Mr. Watkins. He notes reports from early 2021 of a formal order issued by the Taliban leadership to junior commanders across the country to not harbor foreign fighters or take them under their wing.
鈥淥bviously, that鈥檚 a case we now see of, 鈥楧o as we say, not as we do,鈥欌�� says Mr. Watkins. 鈥淏ut it can also be read as evidence that the Taliban 鈥� in their own way 鈥撀爑nderstood the importance of managing their relationship with Al Qaeda.鈥�
That awareness will have only been heightened by the CIA drone strike, which killed a 鈥済uest鈥� of the Taliban who presumably thought he was protected in the anonymous folds of Taliban territory.
鈥淲hatever else, we know that today鈥檚 Taliban leadership does take the threat of American intervention seriously,鈥� says Mr. Watkins. 鈥淧erhaps not full-scale, boots on the ground, but the fact that we haven鈥檛 seen the Taliban鈥檚 emir emerge in public, and the degree of paranoia in senior Taliban figures being filmed, photographed, or appearing in public at all, is one little testament to how seriously the Taliban take the continued threat from the Americans.鈥�