海角大神

Reclaiming Mosul: concerns run high about the politics of the 'day after'

As Iraqi forces move to retake the city from ISIS, analysts warn that 鈥� in contrast to military lessons learned 鈥� the Shiite ruling elite is not doing enough to include a disenfranchised Sunni minority, whose anger helped feed the growth of ISIS.

Jihadist attackers of the Islamic State burned two humvees of Lt. Col. Helan Mahmoud Ali鈥檚 unit Friday morning, but did little to dent the Iraqi Army鈥檚 methodical advance on Mosul.

Backed up by US airpower, long-range artillery, Kurdish peshmerga forces and, further back, even Shiite militias, the Iraqi Army will inevitably expel the self-declared Islamic State from its last stronghold in Iraq, says Ali, echoing top Iraqi and American commanders.

Thousands of residents are reported to have been rounded up for use as human shields by IS 鈥撀燼nd some 200 executed for not following IS orders, according to the Associated Press. Jihadi tactics have so far included dozens of suicide car bombs, and booby-trapped towns criss-crossed with underground attack and escape tunnels.

The Iraqi Army has learned the military lessons of successive battles against IS, and is applying them to the Mosul fight 鈥� planning to deploy only federal troops inside the Sunni-majority city, for example, while the Kurdish peshmerga tackle outlying villages, and Shiite militias accused of past anti-Sunni abuses are kept well away.

But analysts warn that 鈥� in sharp contrast 鈥� few political lessons appear to have been absorbed by Iraq鈥檚 Shiite ruling elite about the need to resolve issues for Iraq鈥檚 disenfranchised Sunni minority, such as inclusive governance, that helped feed Sunni anger and the spread of IS in Iraq.

Unless these issues are resolved, analysts say, this disconnect could mean that militarily expelling IS from Mosul may not prevent a new variation of IS from emerging, leeching off continued Sunni bitterness.

鈥淲e鈥檒l see the son of Daesh within months of the liberation of Mosul,鈥� says Toby Dodge, an Iraq expert at the London School of Economics, using the Arabic acronym for IS. 鈥淏ecause if you think about all the things we have gone through, the reasons why the Iraqi state is so weak, so illegitimate, so exclusionary of Sunnis, none of those have changed.鈥�

鈥淭here is a hardening of sectarian attitudes amongst key influence groups," says Dodge, who notes there are no representative Sunnis in Baghdad. "Not [Grand Ayatollah Ali] Sistani, not the senior ayatollahs, but beneath that 鈥� and the sense that once victory has been delivered in Mosul, we can get back to business as usual. There is no plan for reintegration of Sunni politicians. It鈥檚 like discussing [the sport of] cricket in America 鈥� people just don鈥檛 understand, they don鈥檛 care.鈥�

'Our blood was mixed together'

The US-trained Iraqi Army disintegrated and fled in humiliation in the face of the June 2014 IS offensive that swept across the border from Syria and seized Iraq鈥檚 second city, Mosul, along with one-third of the country, and threatened the capital, Baghdad.

Since then the Iraqi Army 鈥� rebuilt and reconfigured to remove senior Shiite officers appointed as political favors by former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, among other weaknesses聽鈥� has sought to better reflect Iraq鈥檚 ethnic and sectarian diversity.

Ali, for example, is a Sunni officer who was in Mosul when it fell in 2014, and witnessed the Army鈥檚 quick collapse. But today, as commander of Iraq鈥檚 3rd Regiment, 16th Division, south of Mosul, he says that the resurrected, Shiite-majority Army embraces a largely non-sectarian ethos, and the string of anti-IS victories has given it a nationalist unity of purpose that has advanced in conjunction with separate Kurdish and Shiite forces.

All of them 鈥渇ight to liberate Iraqi land鈥� and in support of the Iraqi Army, says Ali. 鈥淲e all fought in one trench and gave sacrifices together. Our blood was mixed together.鈥�

He dismisses the fact that some Army units fly the flag of Imam Hussein, the grandson of Islam鈥檚 prophet Muhammad, who is especially revered by Shiites as the 鈥渓ord of the martyrs鈥� 鈥� and whose 7th-century image is sometimes used as a sectarian rallying cry by Shiites.

鈥淚 am Sunni, and Hussein is not for Shiites only 鈥� he is a symbol for all Muslims鈥� that is used on the Mosul battlefield to 鈥減rovoke the [IS] enemy, which used sectarianism to implement its agenda,鈥� says Ali.

No political plan?

But even if anti-IS forces have as much as a 25-to-1 advantage over the militants hunkered down in Mosul, who by some counts number between 4,000 to 8,000 fighters defending a city of more than 1 million, concerns are high about the politics of the day after.

鈥淵ou have another battle in Iraq, where you have a very clearly defined military plan to remove IS, but without a political plan,鈥� says Renad Mansour, an Iraq analyst at the Chatham House think tank in London. 鈥淚f you speak to different communities, they are not sure what is going to happen. This type of uncertainty is troubling.鈥�

Now is the 鈥渂est time鈥� to resolve political issues, 鈥渂ecause Iraqis are actually coming together right now鈥� to fight a common enemy 鈥� presenting a moment on which leaders can capitalize, and which is crucial to defeating IS in the longer-term.

鈥淒aesh sees them coming without a real plan [for post-Mosul governing] and they can tell this isn鈥檛 going to last,鈥� says Mr. Mansour. 鈥淭heir plan is to go underground 鈥� because they are going to lose at the moment 鈥� stage an insurgency, and take a gamble that Iraqi leaders aren鈥檛 going to get their act together and come up with a sufficient plan, and will create some conditions that will re-invite them back.鈥�

鈥淲ithout convincing the locals that an alternative is coming that is going to work, and that people have some representation in central government 鈥� all the things that were missing before 2014 鈥� it might not be Daesh, because Daesh has a tarnished image, but there will be alternative forms continuously re-emerging until a solution is found to the endemic, inherent problem of governance and [Sunni] representation,鈥� he says.

Finding a new way

Iraq鈥檚 Shiite Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has been a voice for unity, and launched the Mosul offensive 12 days ago with a call for all Iraqis to reject the sectarianism that has torn Iraq鈥檚 social fabric since the US invasion of 2003 toppled Saddam Hussein.

The military, too, has adjusted it methods as it has pressed the anti-IS campaign since last year. After April 2015, for example, some Shiite militias took part in anti-Sunni revenge attacks during the recapture of Tikrit. By the Fallujah offensive that ended in June 2016, the Shiite militias were kept out of the Sunni city, but were tasked with capturing some outlying towns and oversaw a controversial vetting process of those Sunnis trying to flee for safety, in a bid to catch escaping IS fighters.聽Around the northern city of Mosul, well-established Kurdish forces are playing a far greater role.

But the proof of sustainability may be in what politics emerges after Mosul falls, and how decentralization plans play out that would place more authority and budgets in the hands of local politicians.

At the very least, that will require recognizing the risk of not easing concerns of the Sunni community.

鈥淚 don't think we will see another version of Daesh soon,鈥� says Sajad Jiyad, managing director of the Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, a think tank in Baghdad. 鈥淚ts brutalization of Iraqis, including its Sunni Arab audience, has been so horrific that the violent extremism it practices has been rejected firmly.鈥�

Mr. Abadi鈥檚 leadership has been less confrontational than that of his predecessor. But, Mr. Jiyad cautions, Iraqi politics post-2003 are often dysfunctional 鈥� and effecting change is complicated by corruption and sectarianism.

鈥淧olitics in Iraq has always been difficult, and it is probably a better option to try hard to get good agreements that take time to hash out, rather than speedy accords that unwind quickly,鈥� says Jiyad, referring to the need for structural adjustments that would return Sunnis to the political process in a meaningful way. 鈥淚 think all sides want to see peace in the country and have had enough of violence. They realize now that zero-sum politics doesn't work and so it is a matter of making acceptable concessions that don't mean any one side is completely isolated.鈥�

Awadh al-Taee contributed reporting from Baghdad.