海角大神

Showdown in Mosul: Why it could be transformative for both ISIS and Iraq

If ISIS loses the northern Iraqi city of Mosul in the coming battle, its visions of a caliphate would fade, while the government in Baghdad would have the chance to rewrite Iraq's national narrative.

For the government in Baghdad, there is no bigger prize than recapturing Mosul, Iraq鈥檚 second city, which fell ignominiously as the Iraqi Army crumbled in the face of an onslaught from the so-called Islamic State (IS) in June 2014.

And with the offensive looming in coming weeks, the jihadists are facing what could be the greatest blow to their vision of a caliphate that stretches from across North Africa, through the Middle East, to Pakistan.

Mosul was where that state was first declared, with a call for the Islamic nation to 鈥渨ake from its sleep 鈥� and shake off the dust of humiliation and disgrace.鈥� Muslims were told: 鈥淭riumph looms on the horizon. The signs of victory have appeared.鈥�

鈥淲e鈥檙e not just talking a symbolic victory [over IS in Mosul]; this is going to be the death blow for IS the caliphate,鈥� says Hayder al-Khoei, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in London, who nevertheless cautions that the jihadists will not disappear.

鈥淭hey are still going to be a very powerful, a very relevant terrorist organization,鈥� Mr. Khoei says. 鈥淎nd if anything, the loss of their state will increase the frequency of their attacks, both in the West and certainly in Iraq and Syria. This is simply for them to say, 鈥榃e are still relevant. The loss of our capital in Iraq isn鈥檛 going to make us go away.鈥� 鈥�

The battle for Mosul may be just as pivotal for Iraq. Analysts say that seizure of the last major IS stronghold in the country 鈥撀爁ollowing government recapture of the cities of Tikrit, Ramadi, and, most recently, Fallujah in June 鈥� may also help change the narrative of a weak and helpless centralized state by convincing Iraqi citizens of a resurrected military capability.

Iraqi counter-terrorism units and the Iraqi Army are now marshaling for the battle, the culmination of 2-1/2 years of promises from Baghdad to force IS out of Mosul. Kurdish peshmerga forces are also deployed near the city, which once had an estimated population of 2 million, winnowed down now to perhaps 700,000.

A purpose-built 鈥淣ineveh Liberation Operations Center鈥� is meant to organize the offensive, reportedly with the help of dozens of US and British advisers, who are backed up by American artillery and US air power some 40 miles south of Mosul at Qayyara.

Messaging Mosul

Any anti-IS military operation is fraught with risk, since the jihadists have become adept at booby-trapping entire districts, masking their movements from the eyes of drones and surveillance aircraft with burning oil, and deceptively 鈥� and lethally 鈥� using Humvees and other captured Iraqi military vehicles as car bombs in multiple, back-to-back strikes. But Iraqi officials exude confidence over the end result.

Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi this week made a first broadcast to the residents of Mosul, who have reported an uptick in IS violence in recent weeks against alleged fifth columnists.

鈥淲e will celebrate the big victory of Mosul with you soon,鈥� said Mr. Abadi, promising that the Iraqi flag would fly over them again and ticking off the names of 鈥渓iberated鈥� cities 鈥渨hich have been reunited with our home, Iraq, and our people.鈥�

Iraqi forces dropped leaflets south of the city in late September, which read: 鈥淧rotect yourself, don鈥檛 be human shields for the enemy, leave the town immediately,鈥� CNN reported.

IS has stoutly defended some towns and territory in Iraq, but in the most recent stand-off in Fallujah, outnumbered and outgunned IS fighters appeared in many cases to melt away, leaving Iraqi forces with a relatively cost-free victory that has bolstered confidence among Iraqi commanders that Mosul may present less of a fight, too.

Expectations after the battle

If IS loses its grip on its last large city in Iraq, different players have different expectations.

If you are a native of Mosul, 鈥渋t鈥檚 the end of a nightmare and the start of a new era 鈥� for the first time, Iraqi security forces are coming into the city as liberators, rather than occupiers,鈥� says Michael Knights, an Iraq expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP).

鈥淚f you are the US, you鈥檙e always looking for that Tokyo Harbor moment, so it looks like victory, and allows the president to sort of wipe his hands of this Iraq mess and walk away, as if everything worked out the way he planned,鈥� Mr. Knights says.

鈥淎nd if you are the Iraqi government and the Abadi guys, then this is a major political victory that might strengthen your hand to fight off all these Shiite militias from taking over the country,鈥� he says.

One key variable will be the role of the Shiite militias and their tens of thousands of men, who were mobilized in mid-2014 to defend Baghdad and Shiite shrines from IS. They have played a key role in the anti-IS fight, but have also deepened sectarian divisions with allegations of abuses against Iraq鈥檚 minority Sunnis, who were in wide rebellion against the Shiite-led government in Baghdad in 2014, and in many instances welcomed and even facilitated the IS arrival.

Need for sectarian balance

Atheel al-Nujaifi, the Sunni governor of Nineveh province, with Mosul as its capital, when IS took control, warned this week of the sectarian stakes.

鈥淭he biggest fear is that Iraq will [fracture] if they don鈥檛 control this fight in a wise manner and they don鈥檛 give the Arab Sunnis real authority,鈥� Mr. Nujaifi told Reuters from his base in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Erbil. 鈥淜urds are partners on the ground. We have no problems with them. But in terms of the Shiite militias, they are an alien or strange entity in the governorate.鈥�

Aware of the need to strike that balance to minimize sectarian friction in the post-Mosul era,聽the Shiite militias 鈥渉ave been given very clear commands, 鈥榊ou鈥檙e not going to assault the city. You are going to stay on the perimeter,鈥欌�� says Khoei of ECFR.

That frees up federal troops for the actual battle, he says, where they will find a population subjected to years of hateful, anti-Shiite indoctrination by IS that has been further fed by reports of Shiite abuses of Sunnis elsewhere.

鈥淚t鈥檚 bound to have an effect on the psyche of the people of Mosul, who say, 鈥極h my God, if these people come in, there鈥檚 going to be a bloodbath,鈥� 鈥� says Khoei. 鈥淏ut that didn鈥檛 happen in Fallujah, it didn鈥檛 happen in Tikrit, and I鈥檓 pretty certain it鈥檚 not going to happen in Mosul, despite the fact there might be rogue elements, isolated incidents. Nobody can deny this, some pretty awful stuff has happened.鈥�

Canadian Brig. Gen. Dave Anderson, who heads Iraqi force training for the US-led coalition in Baghdad, says victory in Mosul is 鈥渋nevitable鈥� and likely to be a turning point against IS in its existing format. But he offers the caveat that losing Mosul 鈥渄oes not mean that [IS] is defeated by any stretch of the imagination."

鈥淚t is the beginning of the end. And [IS] knows that,鈥� Anderson said in a Pentagon conference call Wednesday. 鈥淲e鈥檝e already seen signs of leaders abandoning their posts in Mosul, because they know what鈥檚 coming. They know that Mosul is going to fall.鈥�

Better story for Abadi, US

But how it falls may determine the shape of politics in Iraq for years to come, analysts say.

鈥淚f Abadi can do this without the Shiite militias, it鈥檚 another feather in his cap for him, for the Counter Terrorism Service, for the Iraqi Army 鈥撀燼nd it begins to rebuild faith in the state,鈥� says Knights of WINEP.

鈥淭he reason why the Shiite militias got so strong is because people said, 鈥業n Iraq鈥檚 time of need, the state collapsed, and the militias and the people were the ones who saved Baghdad.鈥� Well, that was true,鈥� says Knights. The US was seen as 鈥渢widdling its thumbs鈥� while the enemy was at the gates of Baghdad.

鈥淣ow the narrative is a little different. What did the government do? It took back Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah, Baiji, Geyara, and Mosul,鈥� says Knights. 鈥淎nd what did the US do? It did a lot. What we鈥檝e done is manage to change the narrative over the past year, and that鈥檚 really important.

鈥淚 think a lot of salutary lessons have been learned out of this war,鈥� adds Knights. 鈥淭he Shia are tired of fighting [and] the Sunnis know the government in Baghdad is the legitimate government 鈥� that came and liberated them. They might not love it, but people in the Deep South of the US don鈥檛 love Washington, either, but they deal with it.鈥�