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Saying sorry: What's behind Turkey's new thaw with Russia

In a shift, Prime Minister Erdo臒an has expressed regret for shooting down a Russian fighter last year. What's less clear is whether his move signals a long-term shift in regional alliances.

The diplomatic crisis moved fast last November when Turkey shot down a Russian jet fighter, accusing it of violating Turkish airspace during a bombing run in Syria.听

Russian tourism to Turkey鈥檚 popular Mediterranean resorts dropped 92 percent. Sanctions were imposed on Turkish agriculture.听Top officials exchanged scathing and uncompromising rhetoric.

President Vladimir Putin declared that Turkey's 鈥渞uling clique鈥� had carried out a 鈥渃ynical war crime,鈥� and vowed: 鈥淲e will keep remembering what they did. And they will keep regretting it."听

But last week, after several back-and-forth gestures, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an sent a letter to Mr. Putin expressing regret for the shoot-down 鈥� using the words 鈥淚鈥檓 sorry,鈥� according to the Kremlin. And almost as quickly as the crisis began, reconciliation got under way as part of a broader Turkish charm offensive that includes Israel and even Egypt.

At stake are more than thousands of sunbathing Russians. The new Turkish pragmatism aims听to ease the country's isolation and听defuse the multitude of tensions it faces in the region 鈥� even as it dreams, like Russia, of creating loose regional alliances that will serve its own interests.听Mr.听Erdo臒an says the reconciliation steps are听鈥渂ased on the win-win principle鈥澨齠or听all sides.

But the question is whether Turkey鈥檚 bid to restore friendships is tactical or strategic, even as it marks by most accounts diplomatic progress in a neighborhood torn by terrorism and sectarianism.

Fadi Hakura, a Turkey expert at the Chatham House think tank in London, sees clear-eyed realism at work.听Turkey鈥檚 鈥渃hange of heart,鈥� he says, is due to economic challenges and 鈥渢he fact that Turkey鈥檚 ability to influence the government in Syria has been effectively checkmated by Russia 鈥� and its [own] regional isolation.鈥� 听

Turkey and Russia still hold diametrically opposed views about the fate of Syria鈥檚 President Bashar al-Assad 鈥撎鼸rdo臒an wants him gone and backs anti-Assad rebels, while Russia has committed military forces to keep Mr. Assad in power.

So long as 鈥渢hose [Syria] objectives are mutually exclusive, there is very little likelihood of a genuine reconciliation,鈥� says Mr. Hakura.

Yet Turkish state television lingered over a meeting of Turkish-Russian foreign ministers last week, as if to show Turkey back in the diplomatic game. And pro-government media are talking up a face-to-face meeting between Erdo臒an and Putin that could come within weeks. The moves seem to be further realization of a promise from Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, who said in May that Turkey would 鈥渋ncrease the number of friends we have and decrease the number of enemies.鈥�

The view from Russia

The view from Russia may be more committed, and aimed at a more strategic regional adjustment.

Russia is 鈥済oing deeply鈥� into this reconciliation, and Putin鈥檚 decision to meet Erdo臒an so quickly 鈥渕eans Putin believes there are serious grounds to achieve serious things,鈥� says Pavel Felgenhauer, a defense columnist for Novaya Gazeta in Moscow.

Russia, he says, wants Turkey's help to limit NATO presence in the Black Sea, and is likely trying to take advantage of a NATO ally that has been 鈥済iven the cold shoulder鈥� by the West and America, on issues from European Union membership to Turkey鈥檚 crisis with Russia. Turkey also听has been alienated by US backing for certain Kurdish factions fighting the self-declared Islamic State in Syria 鈥撎齣ncluding American special forces units who were photographed fighting alongside and wearing the insignia of a Kurdish group deemed 鈥渢errorists鈥� by Ankara.听

鈥淩ussian intentions are clear: Russia wants Turkey to be a very important partner in the Middle East, like Israel, like Tehran and Turkey, all together under Russian auspices,鈥� he says. 鈥淚 mean, nations that barely talk to each other, but all friends of Russia, and acting together under Russian auspices, pushing the Americans out and creating a new order in the Middle East.鈥�

Turkey also may harbor interest in joining with fellow Sunni nations and Israel to push back the influence of Iran.

The US and the Saudis 鈥� which, like Turkey, back anti-Assad factions in Syria 鈥撎齪ushed hard for Turkey to reconcile with Israel, which it did last week, six years after Israeli commandos killed 10 Turkish citizens on the aid ship Mavi Marmara as it tried to break the Gaza blockade.

鈥淭hat would give a counterbalance to the increasing power of Russians and Iranians, siding with the Shiites in the northern part of the Middle East, so there can be a 鈥楽unni crescent鈥� of some sort, supported by Israel, and mainly anti-Iranian,鈥� says Ersin Kalaycio臒lu, a political scientist at Sabanci University in Istanbul.

Such a deal might also help wean Turkey off Russian gas. Israel鈥檚 newly found gas reserves might help Turkey diversify, giving Turkey a 鈥渂argaining chip at the table with Russia鈥� and giving Russia another reason to swiftly reconcile, 鈥渢o undermine any cozy [energy] deal between Turkey and Israel, says Professor Kalaycio臒lu.听

鈥淪o there are multiple calculations and multiple layers here, pushing all these countries together, as quickly as possible,鈥� he says.

How lasting will this charm offensive be? Hakura sees a direct link between Turkey鈥檚 foreign policy and its domestic politics.

In the years after 2002, when Erdo臒an and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) pursued a reformist political agenda at home, Turkey鈥檚 foreign policy was 鈥渂alanced and flexible,鈥� he says.

In recent years, 鈥淓rdo臒an鈥檚 domestic confrontational politics was reflected in terms of antagonism, hostility, and abrasiveness abroad,鈥� says Hakura. That domestic hard line has not eased. 鈥淭hat indicates clearly that Erdo臒an鈥檚 foreign policy changes are ... not a genuine change of heart.鈥� 听

Still, pro-government columnists are enthusing about changes in Turkish diplomacy that could 鈥渟ignal a new balance of power," writes Yahya Bostan, in the Daily Sabah.听Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, he suggests, 鈥渁re slowly moving to form an alliance of stability in the Middle East.鈥�

Please follow Scott Peterson on Twitter @peterson__scott听