Why bombings and jailbreaks won't tip Iraq back into civil war
The highest monthly death toll since 2008 is not a good sign for Iraq, but fears of another sectarian war miss the reality that Iraqis have a lot to lose in a repeat.
In this July 29, 2013 file photo, people clean up after a car bomb attack hits a Shiite mosque in the neighborhood of Bayaa in Baghdad, Iraq. The United Nations mission in Iraq says more than 1,000 people have been killed in violence across the country in July, the highest monthly death toll in years.
Hadi Mizban/AP/File
Baghdad
At checkpoints across Baghdad, plainclothes intelligence officers watch for suspicious cars while police scan vehicles with metal wands in a largely futile attempt to detect bombs.
Despite the Iraqi government鈥檚 attempt to combat a record wave of bombings, the attacks across central and southern Iraq are paralyzing the country, leaving many Iraqis to suffer through a long hot summer with neither public services nor security.
But seven years after an Al Qaeda bombing of a Shiite shrine聽touched off a civil war, attacks aimed at reigniting聽a sectarian battle聽have failed to provoke wider conflict. Although the country continues to reel from the explosions, enough has changed since 2006 that even continued attacks are unlikely to bring Iraq back to the brink of war,聽officials and many analysts say.
鈥淭here are car bombs but there are restraints also. We鈥檝e been there and we don鈥檛 want to go there again,鈥 says Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, whose own ministry was hit by a truck bomb four years ago.
"Before people said 鈥楴o, we will not be involved in the political process. We鈥檝e been robbed, we鈥檝e been cheated, and that鈥檚 why we鈥檙e going to fight',鈥 says 聽Mr. Zebari, referring to widespread Sunni boycotts of Iraq鈥檚 first elections. 鈥淣ow the situation is completely different because all the communities are engaged in parliament, in government, in running their provinces, in administration as a whole.鈥
Invested in stability聽
While little of it trickles down, Iraq鈥檚 oil revenue has helped make participating in government an appealing option for both Sunni and Shiite factions willing to lay down arms and enter the political process. Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr has gone from commanding a militia that played a main role in Iraq鈥檚 sectarian violence to a mainstream political figure who has so far kept his movement鈥檚 armed wing in check.
National elections, which in 2010 resulted in a fragile coalition government cobbled together by Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, are only a year away.
鈥淏elieve me, everyone is preparing for next year 鈥 that鈥檚 why no one has an interest in blowing up a sectarian war,鈥 Zebari says.
The Iraqi government, under heavy criticism for security breaches聽that allowed the bombings to happen聽and a historic prison break last week, has fired or arrested security officials and reinforced checkpoints in and around Baghdad with intelligence officers. However, the interior ministry says that until it has a replacement, it will continue to use explosive detection devices purchased from a British businessman that have been found to be useless. The businessmen has been jailed for fraud in Britain.聽
Paralysis
More than 4,000 civilians have been killed this year 鈥 a fraction of the casualties during the height of Iraq鈥檚 sectarian war in 2006 and 2007, but聽a warning sign regardless.聽In July alone, at least 1,057 Iraqis were killed in attacks, according to United Nations figures 鈥 the highest monthly toll in five years.
While the bombings have not brought the country to a standstill, they are making it difficult to move forward.
鈥淭he current level of violence is paralyzing society, it is paralyzing economic activity,鈥 says Gyorgy Busztin, acting head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. Busztin says Iraq鈥檚 deep political divisions 鈥 particularly with the Sunni community 鈥 are affecting security while lack of opportunities for young men make them easy targets for recruitment to Al Qaeda.
"Regrettably politicians have failed to come together to address the most burning problems of society,鈥 says Busztin. 鈥淎 significant proportion of Iraqis feel they do not have a say in their future 鈥 they are outside the realm of the political process and they are grossly under-represented in the administration and the security apparatus."
Hamstrung from the top
While Shiite communities remain the main targets, attacks have also hit Sunni mosques and neighborhoods, including dozens of leaders of the Sahwa 鈥 unofficial security forces made up largely of Sunni tribes which fought against al-Qaeda with US and Iraqi forces.聽
While the Sahwa still serve a key role in protecting many Sunni cities they have been largely abandoned by a wary Shiite-led government.
Interior ministry officials say security forces are now in "open war" with Al Qaeda, but many officials and analysts believe political disarray and competing and often-leaderless intelligence and security services have limited their ability to fight.
鈥淭he capabilities have really not been good,鈥 says Zebari, who believes pro-Saddam loyalists with more extensive networks than Al Qaeda are partly behind the attacks. 鈥淚t鈥檚 not the issue of numbers. Iraq has nearly a million men under arms. It is the leadership, it is the management, it is the logistical backup and it is intelligence 鈥 this is an intelligence war with terrorist networks to break them, to penetrate them, to pre-empt them.鈥
The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, while welcomed by almost all Iraqis, left glaring deficiencies in the country鈥檚 intelligence capabilities, according to analysts familiar with Iraqi intelligence operations.
鈥淭he attempt to develop analytical organizations is not going well,鈥 says one analyst who asked to remain anonymous. 鈥淭hey鈥檙e still stuck in doing things the old way with the old people.鈥
US offers of assistance with intelligence gathering and analysis, including electronic intercepts, have encountered resistance from some Iraqi politicians as well as US lawmakers wary of sharing secrets with an unpredictable ally. All of those factors have limited the capability of Iraq鈥檚 counterterrorism forces.
鈥淥nce in a while they get lucky but none of the things needed are happening to allow them to penetrate the already de-centralized al-Qaeda cells,鈥 says the analyst.