Trump promises a quick end to the war in Ukraine. Russia is not convinced.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Donald Trump meet in Osaka, Japan, June 28, 2019.
Kevin Lamarque/Reuters/File
Moscow
Incoming President Donald Trump says he will make ending the war in Ukraine a top priority in his administration, and that it will end quickly.
Many Western experts cast doubt on his assessment. But there鈥檚 another, perhaps more surprising party who disagrees: Russia itself.
The Russians are clearly signaling that they find the jumbled ideas they hear coming out of the Trump camp, at least so far, to be mostly nonstarters. And while Mr. Trump, as his inauguration approaches, has revised his timeline for a settlement from 鈥24 hours鈥 , that doesn鈥檛 address the yawning gulf between Moscow and Washington over how they understand the war.
Why We Wrote This
Many assume that because Donald Trump has an affinity for Vladimir Putin, his policies mirror those of the Russian president. In the case of ending the war in Ukraine, at least, there is a yawning gulf between the two men鈥檚 outlooks.
Both disagree sharply on the war鈥檚 causes, the shape of a possible compromise settlement and, especially, what kind of independent Ukrainian state 鈥 if any 鈥 might emerge from a deal. And that could result in the war continuing far longer than would square with Mr. Trump鈥檚 promises.
Diplomacy first?
One thing both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Mr. Trump鈥檚 people agree on is that a summit between the two leaders is desirable; talks about setting one up are reportedly underway. That鈥檚 more complicated than it sounds. There has been virtually no high-level or political dialogue between Moscow and Washington for about three years, so any preparations will have to start from scratch.
鈥淎 lot of advance work will have to go into it,鈥 says Dmitry Suslov, a foreign policy expert with the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. 鈥淭he contours of any possible deal will have to be elaborated through painstaking efforts by working groups at lower levels, and I wouldn鈥檛 underestimate how difficult that is going to be.鈥
Russian analysts say that the impetus from Washington to revive diplomacy represents a potential sea change. Mr. Putin recently welcomed the idea of talking with Mr. Trump 鈥渨ithout preconditions,鈥 other than a mutual desire to resolve issues through dialogue.
The new emphasis on negotiation 鈥渕eans that this yearslong effort to isolate Russia, to deal a strategic defeat to it, is over,鈥 says Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser. He argues that a Trump-Putin summit should focus on restoring diplomatic engagement as much as possible, and leave the much thornier Ukraine settlement until later.
鈥淭he threat of U.S.-Russia war is the most serious danger right now, and that鈥檚 what needs to be taken off the table,鈥 Mr. Markov says. 鈥淥nce we have resumed dialogue, we may create conditions for further negotiations. The main thing now is to end this diplomatic war, which has made it virtually impossible to get anything done.鈥
A new, divided world order
The Russians have previous experience with Mr. Trump in the White House, which they remember as a time of crushed hopes and wasted efforts. Hence, expectations of his return seem subdued in the Russian media and commentariat.
Few in Moscow seem to take seriously Mr. Trump鈥檚 startling rhetoric about a possible U.S. annexation of Greenland, the Panama Canal, and maybe even Canada.
Media commentary tends to treat it as an implied vindication of Russia鈥檚 own claims of primacy in its former Soviet region. Some argue that Mr. Trump鈥檚 ambitions to strengthen the U.S. grip on its own hemisphere heralds a new, divided world order, in which great power blocs dominate their own areas and compete for global dominance.
鈥淚 don鈥檛 think this turn to the Monroe Doctrine and a more classical type of U.S. imperialism is just Trump鈥檚 idea. It鈥檚 an emerging mood,鈥 says Mr. Suslov. 鈥淲e are certainly looking at an intensification of the struggle for the Arctic,鈥 while in the process shredding previously sacred ideas such as the sovereignty of smaller nations, he says.
As for Ukraine, recent statements by Mr. Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov make it clear that Russia is unlikely to accept any temporary ceasefire, even as a prelude to wider negotiations. In at the new year, Mr. Lavrov insisted that 鈥渨hat we need is reliable and legally binding agreements that would eliminate the root causes of the conflict and seal a mechanism precluding the possibility of their violation.鈥
With Russian forces grinding forward inexorably along the 1,000-mile front line, there seems little incentive for Moscow to stop until it gets what it wants.
Mr. Putin has frequently alluded to reached between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators back in April 2022 as a starting point for any future talks. That agreement would have required Ukrainian neutrality, substantial demilitarization, and the provision of cultural and linguistic rights for the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. At that time, Russia made no major territorial demands, and would even have left the issue of Crimea open.
What kind of Ukraine will emerge?
Now, Russia has already officially annexed the four regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia at a high price in blood (though the only region of those that they fully occupy is Luhansk). Analysts say it will require all those lands to be ceded to Russia under any peace agreement.
Territory is not Moscow鈥檚 primary concern, they add, but rather it is the orientation of the Ukrainian state that emerges from any settlement. 鈥淩ussia accepts the existence of a sovereign, independent Ukraine,鈥 says Mr. Markov. 鈥淲e oppose a Ukraine that鈥檚 an anti-Russia Western client state.鈥
In addition to neutrality, Russian analysts argue, a new Ukraine will need to accept effective demilitarization and acquiesce to being part of a Russian sphere of influence. They say that would probably involve subservience in foreign policy, and openness to Russian capital flows, as well as cultural and political influences.
That is probably the biggest sticking point for the incoming Trump administration. While Mr. Trump has conceded in various statements that Ukraine may have to sacrifice territory and at least defer NATO membership, he does seem to agree with for a Ukraine that would be otherwise aligned with the West.
鈥淚 doubt that Trump has much capacity to make concessions,鈥 says Mr. Suslov. 鈥淗e does not want to appear weak. And we have already seen how he comes under pressure from all sides when he seems conciliatory toward Russia.鈥
Mr. Suslov says it鈥檚 likely that talks will begin while the fighting still rages, and probably a lot remains to be decided on the battlefield.
鈥淎t least we may see negotiations taking place, and that is good. But they will likely be tense and difficult, and most likely accompanied by escalation of war and sanctions. I do not see much reason to be optimistic.鈥