海角大神

Belarus may be set for war with Ukraine. But at what cost to itself?

Eight months ago when Russia invaded Ukraine, one of its key fronts was launched from Belarus. Since then, Russia鈥檚 only major ally has remained on the sideline of the conflict between its two neighbors.

But now, Belarus appears to be edging toward directly joining in the war, under pressure from Moscow. And experts say that by doing so, it may ultimately be hastening its own absorption by Russia.

At a meeting this month to discuss the 鈥渋ncreasing threat level鈥� emanating from NATO states to the west, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin to augment Belarus鈥� 70,000-strong army with about 9,000 Russian troops.

Social media has been full of reports of Russian troops arriving in Belarus, and also apparently showing trainloads of Belarusian heavy equipment moving eastward. Experts differ as to whether this means Russia is drawing on Belarus鈥� large stocks of Soviet-era tanks, mobile artillery, and armored vehicles to replenish its own forces, or if the equipment is being sent for modernization in Russian factories.

The level of military cooperation, which will create at least one joint Russian-Belarusian division-sized force, is something new.

Russian troops invaded Ukraine last February from Belarusian territory, but Belarus鈥� own forces did not participate. Kyiv is warning that the new military grouping might be preparing to open a whole new front against Ukraine. Even if Mr. Lukashenko remains disinterested in committing his army to the war, the existence of a credible striking force hovering in the north will be a continuing worry for Kyiv.

Few options for Minsk

Minsk insists that it fears Western 鈥減rovocations,鈥� given the concentration of exiled Belarusian opposition figures in neighboring NATO countries such as Poland and Lithuania, who might try to create trouble for Russia amid the current Ukraine war turmoil through political destabilization in Belarus.

Belarus has theoretically been part of a 鈥渦nion state鈥� with Russia since 1999, one that confers a lot of advantages to Minsk. But in practice, Mr. Lukashenko has resisted full integration and political subordination, playing a complicated game of ceding to the bare minimum of Moscow鈥檚 demands while flirting with the West and keeping the levers of local control firmly in his own hands.

Yet his ability to do that was deeply compromised when his rule was threatened amid mass protests two years ago. He quashed the uprising, but doing so left the West enraged at his suppression of opponents and Russia as his only source of political and economic support.

Even though Mr. Lukashenko鈥檚 rule seems more entrenched than ever, the insertion of Russian troops into the country is a new move and suggests that a permanent merger of the two security establishments is in the offing.

鈥淲e are moving toward the full-fledged erosion of Belarus鈥� military and political sovereignty at the very least,鈥� says Artyom Shraibman, a Belarusian political scientist who currently lives in Ukraine. 鈥淭he options for Lukashenko are narrowing. Much will depend on the results of the war. Will Russia be able to stabilize the front? How will Russia鈥檚 mobilization work out? Will Belarus get directly involved or not? What if Russia loses the war, or it reaches a stage of nuclear escalation with the West? Too many questions without answers.

鈥淏ut it鈥檚 becoming harder and harder for Lukashenko to play the game of keeping his autonomy while using Russian resources,鈥� he says. 鈥淔or now, Belarusian trade with Ukraine is about zero, while sanctions have greatly reduced trade with the West. Russia is increasingly the only option for trade, finance, and political support, and the only question is how long it will take to completely absorb Belarus into Russia鈥檚 sphere. I suppose Russia might lose the war before Belarus completely loses its sovereignty, but the process right now is very alarming.鈥�

An unpopular conflict?

Russia鈥檚 wartime exigencies may be not only accelerating the pace of Russia鈥檚 efforts to integrate Belarus, but also changing Moscow鈥檚 concept of the future Russian Federation. If Moscow wins the war in Ukraine, it will result in large parts of eastern Ukraine being permanently digested by Russia. With that process underway, Moscow鈥檚 planners may have less patience for the bureaucratic complexities of the union state, and look for more direct ways to incorporate Belarus into an expanded Russia.

鈥淲hat we are seeing right now is connected with urgent military needs,鈥� says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a leading Moscow-based foreign policy journal. 鈥淭he big new military grouping in Belarus could be used to attack Ukraine from another angle, or at least divert Ukrainian forces from other fronts. I don鈥檛 think either Putin or Lukashenko is entertaining any grand long-term thoughts.

鈥淟ukashenko has clearly made the decision to be helpful because he has no other options but to bet on Putin and Russia,鈥� he says. 鈥淭he future of Belarus鈥� relationship with Russia 鈥� whether it will become part of Russia or something else 鈥� will depend on how things progress on the battlefield. If Russia fails in Ukraine, that will have huge repercussions in all areas, including Belarus.鈥�

Most analysts doubt that Mr. Lukashenko wants to get directly involved in the conflict.

鈥淭he Belarusian army is about 70,000 men, but its combat-ready component is much smaller,鈥� says Andrey Suzdaltsev, an independent Belarusian expert living in Moscow. 鈥淭he army is really too weak to actually face the Western-armed Ukrainian forces with their fighting experience. By forming this joint grouping with Russia, Lukashenko wants to imitate participation in the special operation without actually doing anything.鈥�

A of 1,000 Belarusians conducted in September by Andrei Vardomatsky, a leading Belarusian sociologist currently living abroad, found that support for Russian actions in Ukraine is roughly split, with 41.3% approving and 47.3% opposed.

But when asked about direct participation in the war, Mr. Vardomatsky says, 鈥�85% of respondents gave a negative answer, and 11% said they would react positively to it. Asked how they feel about using Belarus鈥� territory and military infrastructure to implement Russia鈥檚 military actions in Ukraine, more than 62% said they were against and 29% said they were positive.鈥�

鈥淗e鈥檚 in the same boat with Putin鈥�

Alexander Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow, says he does not know the purpose of the joint force currently gathering in Belarus. But he suggests it鈥檚 probably a hedge against unexpected developments on Russia鈥檚 western flank and a bid to bolster Mr. Lukashenko鈥檚 grip on power. If it worries the Ukrainians and makes them divert forces, so much the better, Mr. Khramchikhin adds.

Russia is facing troubles around the post-Soviet region, aggravated by Western meddling, and needs to take actions to boost stability, says Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the Kremlin-funded Institute of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Moscow.

鈥淭he situation is causing a more rapid consolidation of ties with friendly countries, like China and Belarus,鈥� he says. 鈥淟ukashenko has realized that he鈥檚 in the same boat with Putin, and he faces threats from NATO. That鈥檚 why this military grouping has been formed, and the integration process in general is speeding up.鈥�