The toppling of General Zhang is 鈥榓 Shakespearean moment鈥� for China
Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission, pictured at the Western Pacific Navy Symposium in Qingdao, China, April 22, 2024, is being investigated for corruption and disloyalty.
Ng Han Guan/AP/File
When Chinese Gen. Zhang Youxia visited the sprawling U.S. infantry base at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 2012, he leaped at the chance to fire an American M240 machine gun, unlike other generals in the delegation.
A distinguished combat veteran of China鈥檚 1979 war with Vietnam and later battles, General Zhang stood out in the People鈥檚 Liberation Army, the military wing of the Communist Party and an organization imbued with political commissars at every level. His battlefield credentials made General Zhang a natural to help lead a campaign to modernize the PLA and ready it to 鈥渇ight and win鈥� wars after he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping were elevated, a few months later, to China鈥檚 powerful Central Military Commission (CMC).
Yet those strengths 鈥� as well as his close family ties with Mr. Xi 鈥� did not save General Zhang from a dramatic downfall this past week. As vice chairman of the CMC, second only to Mr. Xi in the PLA command, and as Mr. Xi鈥檚 chief military adviser, General Zhang became one of the highest-ranking PLA officers to be investigated for corruption and disloyalty as part of Mr. Xi鈥檚 sweeping purge of the Chinese military.
Why We Wrote This
For years, China has been working to tackle widespread corruption within its massive army. But with the toppling of a popular general and former ally, Chinese leader Xi Jinping may be sacrificing military readiness to bolster his own power.
鈥淚t鈥檚 a huge deal ... a Shakespearean moment in Chinese politics,鈥� says Jonathan Czin, a China expert at the Brookings Institution.
And one that has ripple effects far beyond the fall of a single general. The unprecedented purge will likely go after officers associated with General Zhang next, affecting morale within China鈥檚 rapidly expanding military, one of the world鈥檚 largest and most formidable armed forces. For China-watchers, this week鈥檚 developments offer a rare glimpse into the inner workings of the military, suggesting that a Taiwan invasion is not imminent. It could also signal that political infighting is intensifying as Mr. Xi heads toward a fourth five-year term in 2027, with no clear successor.
Ousting General Zhang marks 鈥渁 real shift,鈥� says Mr. Czin, a former senior analyst of Chinese politics for the U.S. intelligence community. 鈥淭his is really Xi going after one of his own,鈥� he says. 鈥淣obody is safe ... and it shows just how cold-blooded Xi is willing to be.鈥�
Turning on an old friend
Both Mr. Xi and General Zhang are 鈥減rincelings,鈥� or sons of revolutionary leaders, and their fathers were comrades during China鈥檚 Civil War. They were friends growing up in nearby compounds in Beijing, and Mr. Xi promoted General Zhang, seen as his closest military adviser, in 2022, and kept him on past the retirement age.
General Zhang 鈥渉ad everything Xi could want 鈥� loyalty, pedigree, intelligence, respect, and a long-standing relationship,鈥� says Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, who hosted General Zhang鈥檚 2012 U.S. visit as director for China at the U.S. Defense Department. 鈥淥bviously, something came between them.鈥�
A Sunday editorial in the official PLA Daily accused General Zhang and his prot茅g茅 and fellow combat veteran, Gen. Liu Zhenli, of disloyalty. It stated they 鈥渟eriously trampled upon and undermined the CMC Chairman Responsibility System鈥� 鈥� a reference to Mr. Xi鈥檚 leadership 鈥� and endangered Communist Party rule.
Mr. Xi sent a message with the harsh and public disgracing of General Zhang, who could have been allowed to retire quietly, Mr. Czin says. While China鈥檚 high-level politics are shrouded in secrecy, some experts believe General Zhang鈥檚 influence is such that Mr. Xi may have been concerned he could act as an alternative kingmaker if he and his network were not thoroughly discredited. General Zhang also sits on the party鈥檚 powerful ruling Politburo.
Yet on a practical level, he 鈥渨as the one active-duty PLA officer who could give Xi the best, most objective advice鈥� about PLA capabilities and shortcomings, the risks of a Taiwan invasion, and 鈥渢he human cost of military conflict,鈥� Mr. Thompson says.
Indeed, both General Zhang and General Liu 鈥渨ere very rare commodities in the PLA today,鈥� says Shanshan Mei, a political scientist at Rand specializing in Chinese defense policy. Their front-line experience was 鈥渧ery much in alignment with the direction of where [Mr. Xi] wanted the PLA to go,鈥� she says.
The bombshell announcement leaves the CMC with only two members 鈥� instead of the usual seven 鈥� at the pinnacle of China鈥檚 2 million-strong military: Mr. Xi, the chairman, and Gen. Zhang Shengmin, a career political commissar who runs the Discipline Inspection Commission, the chief investigator running Mr. Xi鈥檚 anti-corruption drive.
Corruption has long been widespread within the PLA, fueled in recent decades by 鈥渁 tsunami of money鈥� to support China鈥檚 military buildup, says Evan Sankey, a policy analyst at the Cato Institute focused on U.S. policy toward China.
The latest wave of high-level purges started in 2023 and focused on misconduct by senior leaders of China鈥檚 strategic-missile force and equipment department. It expanded to topple China鈥檚 then-defense minister, Li Shangfu, and in October 2025, nine other top generals were dismissed.
Mr. Xi has used the anti-corruption campaign as a political tool to eliminate rivals 鈥� real or perceived 鈥� and steadily increase his dominance. And General Zhang鈥檚 investigation takes this to a new level.
Will this weaken China鈥檚 army?
The fall of General Zhang, who was highly regarded inside the PLA, is likely to hurt the military鈥檚 esprit de corps, experts say.
鈥淭his is a big blow to morale and trust in the PLA,鈥� says Dr. Mei. 鈥淓veryone will be panicking and risk-averse.鈥�
And while day-to-day military operations such as training and exercises are unlikely to be impacted, experts say Mr. Xi鈥檚 hollowing out of the CMC could mean that a major military campaign, such as an invasion of Taiwan, is less likely at present. Even reconstituting the CMC by promoting younger, less seasoned officers will take time.
鈥淲ithout an experienced leadership that trusts one another, it would be very difficult for him [Mr. Xi] to have command and control over a force in a very dynamic wartime situation,鈥� says Mr. Thompson.
China鈥檚 ultimate aim of unifying with Taiwan 鈥� the island democracy of 23 million people that the Communist-led government claims as its territory but has never ruled 鈥� will not change, says Dr. Mei. 鈥淏ut who is going to command this kind of complex operation?鈥�
The personnel shake-up suggests that in the short term, Mr. Xi may not have 鈥渁 big plan to wage a war鈥� over Taiwan, she says. 鈥淚 don鈥檛 think it鈥檚 logical for anyone who wants to do that now to gut your own high command.鈥�