海角大神

Why China may not be cheering Myanmar鈥檚 military takeover

As Myanmar鈥檚 security forces detain democratic politicians and clash with thousands of protesters crowding the streets to decry this month鈥檚 military coup, questions are swirling about whether the regime鈥檚 chief foreign backer 鈥� China 鈥� bore a hand in the overthrow of the fragile democracy.

China鈥檚 staunch, decadeslong support for Myanmar鈥檚 often brutal military rulers, coupled with Beijing鈥檚 immense economic sway in Myanmar, sometimes dubbed China鈥檚 鈥渨est coast,鈥� has led some observers to conclude Naypyitaw鈥檚 generals must have acted with at least tacit approval from Beijing.

鈥淭his probably would not have happened without Beijing鈥檚 wink-wink nod-nod,鈥� Sen. Dan Sullivan, a Republican from Alaska, told an online forum on China last week. Beijing is 鈥渃learly focused on exporting the authoritarian model China has鈥� and would 鈥渢ake a lot of comfort in having a country like Burma fail in terms of its democratic aspirations.鈥�

Yet many experts assert that China鈥檚 current interests in Myanmar are far more complex, going beyond basic ideological affinity between authoritarian regimes. In fact, they say, the military takeover of the civilian government led by now detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi runs counter to Beijing鈥檚 top priorities for the relationship: security along their shared 1,300-mile border, stability within Myanmar, and economic links through Myanmar to the rest of the world 鈥� echoing their priorities throughout the region.

Beijing鈥檚 leaders 鈥渄o not see the return to a junta in China鈥檚 national interest,鈥� says Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. 鈥淭he coup put China in a difficult position,鈥� says Ms. Sun, who researches China-Myanmar relations. 鈥淢ost of all, the instability in the country is detrimental to what China wants to pursue.鈥�

Indeed, China鈥檚 official statements on Myanmar have reflected a concern over stability. 鈥淲e hope that all parties in Myanmar will properly handle their differences under the constitutional and legal framework and maintain political and social stability,鈥� said Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin.

And although Beijing reportedly opposed a statement by the United Nations Security Council condemning the coup, it signed onto one voicing 鈥渄eep concern at the declaration of the state of emergency imposed in Myanmar by the military 鈥� and the arbitrary detention of members of the Government, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.鈥� The U.N. statement called for the immediate release of all those detained and pressed for 鈥渃ontinued support of the democratic transition in Myanmar.鈥�

Wider aims

To be sure, China鈥檚 overarching goal in Myanmar and other nearby countries is to deepen its influence while weakening that of the United States, experts say. And Beijing has moved aggressively in recent months and years to strengthen control over border regions such as Xinjiang and Hong Kong while pressing territorial claims along the frontier with India and in the South China Sea.

In Southeast Asia, China is 鈥渢rying to consolidate their sway over their neighbors all around their periphery, and also 鈥� to drive wedges with the United States,鈥� says David Lampton, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Yet in Myanmar, the best way to achieve such ends may not be backing a military coup, especially given the strong ties and leverage Beijing had built with Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi and her government, analysts say.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping made a state visit to Myanmar in January 2020, and the two nations were enjoying cooperation on issues ranging from major infrastructure projects to resolving refugee problems caused by ethnic and sectarian conflicts. China has defended the Myanmar government over the crisis in Rakhine state, where the armed forces have waged a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the mostly Muslim Rohingya population.

Beijing showed its pragmatism in working to build ties with Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi and her semi-democratic government, in which Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi was the de facto leader but the constitution guaranteed the Burmese military control over key ministries and veto power in parliament. 鈥淭he Chinese were doing what they always do, trying to build as many connections in as many directions as they can,鈥� says Dr. Lampton, a professor emeritus of China studies at SAIS.

Analysts say internal politics was the main driver of the coup, which followed the landslide election victory in November of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi鈥檚 National League for Democracy 鈥� a victory disputed by the military-backed opposition party.

The coup has again put China in the position of having to stand up for the regime as its longtime 鈥渇riendly neighbor,鈥� although this support has undermined Beijing鈥檚 image in Myanmar and overseas.

鈥淏urmese public opinion sees China as a supporter of propping up the military once again and abandoning the 鈥榣ady鈥�,鈥� says Ms. Sun, using a nickname for Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi. 鈥淭his puts China in opposition to the Burmese people.鈥�

demonstrated outside the Chinese Embassy in Yangon on Thursday, holding posters calling on Beijing to 鈥渟upport Myanmar, don鈥檛 support dictators,鈥� according to Reuters.

In repeated statements, China鈥檚 Foreign Ministry spokesman Mr. Wang seemed to echo concerns about popular opposition, saying, 鈥淐hina hopes that parties in Myanmar will put people鈥檚 will and interests first.鈥�

Wary generals

For its part, the nationalistic Burmese military has demonstrated over the years that it harbors deep suspicions of China鈥檚 intentions in the country, a worry shared to different degrees by many Southeast Asian governments. The military is nervous about Beijing鈥檚 alleged backing for insurgent militia groups along the border, and has in the past stirred up anti-Chinese sentiment. It has also canceled infrastructure projects central to China鈥檚 interests in the country.

In contrast, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi鈥檚 government entered into major infrastructure projects with China, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor 鈥� an initiative worth billions of dollars that includes a railway and deep-water port 鈥� as part of China鈥檚 Belt and Road project. It had also signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free trade agreement that includes China, Myanmar鈥檚 biggest trading partner.

One of China鈥檚 major strategic goals in Myanmar is to gain access, through ports and pipelines, to the Indian Ocean, and thereby reduce dependence on the potential chokehold of the Strait of Malacca.

鈥淐hina鈥檚 interest in Myanmar is connectivity. If it becomes an international pariah, then what can China connect to?鈥� asks Ms. Sun.