New S. Sudan peace deal is 'cease-fire lite'
Agreement signed in Addis Ababa is technically a 'cessation of hostilities.' That means the UN will not monitor the peace, the warring parties and their mediator will.
Nhial Deng Nhial, leader of South Sudan's delegation, signed a cease-fire Jan. 23 to end more than five weeks of fighting in the young country. Cease-fire talks took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
REUTERS
A version of this post originally appeared on the blog. The views expressed are the author's own.
Yesterday in Addis Ababa a was between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Army in Opposition (SPLM/A in Opposition).The agreement enters into force 24 hours from the time at which it was signed.
Contrary to what some media are reporting, this cessation of hostilities is not the same as a ceasefire, and I would recommend reading this very informative Watch International post on the to understand the difference between the two.
That said, an astute fellow analyst hasthat the cessation of hostilities has some elements of a ceasefire:
"Practically, since this agreement also includes provisions for a joint monitoring and verification mission, it mirrors a lot of the components of a ceasefire. However, unlike a lot of ceasefires, it doesn't call for the United Nations to be involved in monitoring violations. Instead, it leaves that in the hands of the two parties, plus their mediator, the regional IGAD organization."
Therefore, it may be more appropriate to refer to this cessation of hostilities as a "diet ceasefire" or "ceasefire lite."
The signing of this cessation raises a number of questions on the way ahead, which I will pose below:
Is theSPLM/A in Opposition as cohesive as it's made to appear in the agreement?
I've long doubted that Riek Machar has a monopoly on anti-government force since the crisis started last month, andtheSPLM/A in Oppositionmay not be able to control violence perpetrated by SPLA defectorsoror by the resurgent White Army, which has .In fact, there's a chance thatSPLA defectors and members of ethnically-defined localized armed groupsmay see no benefit in adhering to a cessation of hostilities between political elites.
What comes after the cessation of hostilities?
It is very important to recognize that the cessation is not a peace agreement that spells out political and military power-sharing arrangements, reconciliation initiatives, and plans for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Rather, it's better to think of the cessation as a "time out" thateffectively freezes parties to armed conflict in place, requires them to disengage from fighting, and allows for humanitarian access.
I think the cessation of hostilities is an enabler thatat least gets the warring parties apart long enough to set up a formal peace process that could address these deeper issues.
Who are the guarantors to this cessation of hostilities?
Although this is not a peace agreement, I think we can draw some insights from that body of academic literature.
Glassmyer and Sambanis (“Rebel-Military Integration and Civil War Termination,”Journal of Peace Research, May 2008 vol. 45 no. 3, pp. 365-384) andHoddie and Hartzell ("Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Agreements, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 40, no. 3, 2003, pp. 303-320) argue that the presence of third-party actors can verify compliance with the terms of a peace agreement and can act as guarantors of security.
In some cases -- and I would argue that South Sudan is one of them -- third-party actors need to have the diplomatic clout to convene warring parties and ensure implementation and the military power to deter or physically separatewarring parties if the agreement falls apart.
In the present case of South Sudan, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which brokered the talks, is responsible for setting up a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) which will establish a Monitoring and Verification Team (MVT) that is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the agreement.
However, the issue of who can provide a military deterrent is unclear. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is not mentioned in the cessation agreement but even if it was, UNMISS is still of receiving the to strengthen the mission, plusGRSS is in awith UNMISS over what it perceives to be the UN's impartiality in South Sudan.
IGAD has alsoa 5,500 person force to be sent to South Sudan, and there is a chance that this force could consist of IGAD member states but contribute to the new UNMISS mandated force strength.
However, the problem with IGAD troop contributors is that they may be perceived as impartial like Sudan orUganda,or like and Ethiopia, and may be militarily overextended due to their commitments to other peacekeeping missions.
That leaves Djibouti and Somalia as potential troop contributors to an IGAD force, so I'm just going to hazard a guess and say that by default,UNMISSwill have to be the military guarantor of the cessation of hostilities -or there will be no guarantor at all.