海角大神

As China鈥檚 influence grows in the Americas, Trump hints at a Monroe Doctrine 2.0

It鈥檚 the festival of Semana Santa in Peru, the Holy Week leading up to Easter and a major national holiday. Normally, the narrow road above Chorrillos Beach in Chancay would be clogged with visitors 鈥� as well as vendors trying to entice them with Inca Kola and roasted corn kernels, or boogie boards and beach towels.

But this year, Carmen Echegaray, a candy and soda vendor, is sitting alone at the one snack stand here in a fishing hamlet in Chancay, a small city north of Lima known for its picturesque beaches. Ms. Echegaray nods to the container cranes looming in the distance, part of the giant maritime port constructed by China and opened last year. It was the port鈥檚 construction, she says, that turned this once-popular sandy beach into an unappealing ribbon of wave-splashed rocks along Chancay鈥檚 cliffs.

Still, Ms. Echegaray says the arrival of the port hasn鈥檛 been all bad. 鈥淚t鈥檚 true the Chinese have taken away our pretty beach. But it鈥檚 also true they have brought in jobs.鈥�

Her son was a temporary hire in one phase of the port鈥檚 construction. Her daughter is now in training for a logistics position at what is largely an automated operation, including self-driving vehicles that zip around the newly constructed concrete docks.

With a sigh and a shrug of her shoulders, Ms. Echegaray adds, 鈥淚 guess overall it鈥檚 progress.鈥� Many in Peru see the massive new port the same way.

In the United States, however, the administration of President Donald Trump views the megaport with growing alarm. Not only was it constructed by the state-owned Chinese shipping conglomerate, Cosco; it was trumpeted at its opening last November by Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

In the first few months of his second term, Mr. Trump has presented a vision of the Western Hemisphere that hearkens back to a 19th-century spheres-of-influence approach to international affairs: The regions of North, Central, and South America should be exclusively the United States鈥� economic, diplomatic, and military domain.

This approach is disrupting the postwar global order and the system of regional alliances led by the U.S. and its allies for nearly 75 years, experts say. In the eyes of many, it鈥檚 the Monroe Doctrine redux.

Mr. Trump has now provoked those allies, casually saying the U.S. should annex Greenland, make Canada the 51st state, and, more seriously, take back the Panama Canal. In a cheeky headline pun, the New York Post declared his approach the 鈥淒onroe Doctrine.鈥�

In 1823, President James Monroe declared the Americas off-limits to the imperial European powers that had colonized them. Moreover, the United States, Monroe said, would consider an attack on, or interference in, any independent nation within the Americas as an attack on the U.S.

Two centuries ago, the U.S. worried that Spain, France, Portugal, or others might try to undermine or even take back the newly independent but weak former colonies in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Monroe and his secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, were also aware that Russia鈥檚 czar had stated an interest in both the Oregon territory and California and fancied lands as far south as Peru.

Monroe鈥檚 declaration, coming from a republic that had fought a war of independence from its own colonial power not yet 50 years prior, also expressed solidarity with the fledgling democracies of South America, which had also won independence from European control.

Today President Trump鈥檚 preoccupation with foreign dominance in the region is focused squarely on Beijing. Among his concerns are China鈥檚 influence over critical infrastructure in Central and South America, including the ports at either end of the Panama Canal, and now China鈥檚 ownership of the megaport at Chancay. This economic and diplomatic clout has made China the top trading partner of most countries in Central and South America.

China鈥檚 hunger for soybeans and other farm products has led Argentina and Brazil to reorient their agricultural production. China鈥檚 ongoing quest for rare earth minerals like lithium, needed for the world鈥檚 cutting-edge technology industries, has made it the dominant player in South America鈥檚 mining sector.

In Monroe鈥檚 time, an 鈥淎mericas for Americans鈥� doctrine resonated as new nations found common cause throwing off colonial rule. But many Central and South American nations remain wary of the U.S.

For more than a century, Washington frequently employed heavy-handed tactics with its hemispheric neighbors. Military interventions were aimed more at installing pro-U.S. regimes. The U.S. rarely nurtured democratic self-governance, and often disregarded it completely.

鈥淭he image of a supportive and cooperative United States that some leaders in Latin America saw in the original Monroe Doctrine has long since been replaced by a disdain for the sense of domination and bending of the region to the United States鈥� will,鈥� says Britta Crandall, a political scientist specializing in Latin American studies at Davidson College in North Carolina.

鈥淥riginally the Monroe Doctrine was more nuanced and complex than that,鈥� she says. 鈥淎nd certainly there is no longer any interest in protecting Latin America from an imperial Europe. But what we are hearing from Trump 2.0 is very much the Monroe Doctrine of unbridled meddling in the hemisphere.鈥�

Others go further, noting that the belligerence and interventionist rhetoric President Trump has freely expressed this year is more similar to a corollary to that 19th-century doctrine: the aggressive 鈥渂ig stick鈥� approach introduced by President Theodore Roosevelt.

鈥淭his willingness to talk military action against neighbors, whether it鈥檚 Greenland or Canada or Panama, wasn鈥檛 even a whisper in the document of 1823,鈥� says Evan Ellis, professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College鈥檚 Strategic Studies Institute. 鈥淭he message to the Europeans, but also to the new democracies to the south was, 鈥榃e stand together as the Americas in our common pursuit of security and prosperity.鈥欌��

For Professor Crandall, the doctrine鈥檚 revival under President Trump is in part an effort to give some intellectual heft to what is otherwise a largely transactional approach to the hemisphere.

鈥淚f we are witnessing the resurrection of the Monroe Doctrine when many of us thought it was dead,鈥� she says, 鈥淚 think we can see in that a desire to apply a veneer of historical legacy and legitimacy to this effort to keep China out.鈥�

Tensions over who controls the Panama Canal

Perhaps no country in Latin America captures so sharply the complex and hegemonic relationship the U.S. has had with its hemispheric neighbors as Panama.

The U.S. has been a dominant force in Panamanian affairs for more than a century, from advocating for Panama鈥檚 independence from Colombia in 1903 to completing the construction of the Panama Canal and running it until it was transferred to Panama on Dec. 31, 1999.

In fact, no other fixture in Latin America symbolizes so intensely the visceral and contradictory pangs many people feel toward the U.S. than the Panama Canal.

On a sticky-hot Thursday in March, Alejandro Ortiz leans on the rail of a second-story observation deck overlooking the canal鈥檚 Miraflores locks.

鈥淭he canal is important for the world, but it belongs to Panama,鈥� says Mr. Ortiz, who recently retired from a 30-year career in neighboring Colombia鈥檚 air force. He is in Panama for a private security conference. 鈥淭rump wants other countries to have eyes only for the U.S., but that won鈥檛 happen. It鈥檚 not how geopolitics work today,鈥� he says.

Latin American nations, especially in South America, have been looking to China more in recent years. 鈥淲e know the U.S. is the world power in many themes, not just military. But they are no longer a hegemony. China is growing and incorporating more into Latin American markets,鈥� he says. 鈥淲e have African countries looking for closer relations, too.鈥�

In recent years, Central and South American countries have had more of a 鈥渞elationship with the U.S. than a dependency on it,鈥� says Mr. Ortiz, who considers that shift a good thing. 鈥淏ut still, it鈥檚 an unbalanced partnership, and it鈥檚 unrealistic for Trump to expect us to all turn back to how things were three, four decades ago.鈥�

Below him, an empty chemical tanker, a tourist-filled cruise boat, and a small tugboat spewing black exhaust are cozy together in the first section of the Miraflores locks as they idle here before heading toward the Atlantic Ocean.

In the distance behind them stand the steel towers and cranes of a port at the Pacific entrance of the canal. Operated by China, this port has taken center stage in U.S. accusations that the Panama Canal is controlled by China and is now posing economic and security threats to the U.S.

Since 1998, the port has been run by a Hong Kong-based conglomerate. In March, it agreed to sell its stake to a group of American companies, including BlackRock Inc. (The sale has been delayed due to pushback and political pressure from China.)

Despite these high-stakes geopolitical maneuvers, when it comes to canal operations and neutrality, what owns and runs these ports doesn鈥檛 matter, says Jaime Troyano, who has spent the past 26 years as a Panama Canal historian.

Any ship, no matter what country it鈥檚 traveling from or operated by, is steered through the canal by an employee of the Panama Canal Authority, a government agency responsible for the operation and management of the canal.

鈥淚t鈥檚 something not very many people grasp,鈥� says Mr. Troyano. 鈥淣o matter who is running the port out there, for a boat to enter the canal鈥� neither China nor the U.S. is involved, he says, motioning toward the Pacific.

Still, President Trump鈥檚 second administration has put a laser focus on canal operations. There were two official U.S. visits to Panama within the first four months of his presidency, and the military is reportedly preparing plans to intervene in how the canal is run, regardless of Panama鈥檚 stance on the topic.

Some 6 miles away from the Miraflores Visitor Center, in the historic neighborhood of El Chorrillo, Alexandra Celprado says she grew up hearing about her grandmother鈥檚 quick thinking the night of Dec. 20, 1989 鈥� the day the U.S. invaded Panama.

As U.S. tanks thundered into her community and helicopters landed on residential streets, Ms. Celprado鈥檚 grandmother grabbed her husband鈥檚 Panama Defense Forces uniform and set it ablaze. She wanted to rid the home of anything that might be mistaken as support for Gen. Manuel Noriega, the dictator for whom 鈥渓os Yanquis鈥� came to search. Today, bullet holes from the invasion still pock building facades and lampposts.

I was brought up and educated 鈥渢o fight for Panama, to love my country, and to help my people,鈥� Ms. Celprado says, adding that her father worked in the Canal Zone when she was growing up and her family benefited from that economically.

鈥淚 don鈥檛 hate the United States; I never have, but I have to stand up for my country,鈥� she says of the claims that the canal belongs to the U.S. and that China is taking over.

鈥淢onroe has been dead for almost 200 years,鈥� says Olga de Obald铆a, executive director of the Foundation for the Development of Citizen Liberty, a chapter of Panama鈥檚 Transparency International. 鈥淗e鈥檚 dead and buried, and his big stick was buried with him.鈥�

Trump administration worried about Chinese influence in the Americas

When Peru鈥檚 foreign and defense ministers made a trip to Washington in early May, the point of the high-profile visit was not a photo op for a handshake at the State Department or a bilateral public statement on tariffs.

Instead, it was an 鈥渆nhanced honor cordon鈥� at the Pentagon, hosted by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. In his public remarks, Mr. Hegseth made very clear the meeting鈥檚 purpose: to underscore the threat China poses in the Western Hemisphere.

鈥淏eijing is investing and operating in the region for unfair economic gain, and together, in order to prevent conflict, we need to robustly deter China鈥檚 potential threats in the hemisphere,鈥� he told his Peruvian guests. 鈥淧utting America first also means we鈥檙e putting the Americas first.鈥�

China鈥檚 megaport at Chancay did not come up in public comments. But growing concerns in the Trump administration and in Congress about the port 鈥� and what some see as its potential to serve as a beachhead for Chinese military activity 鈥� formed a backdrop for the visit.

For some, Chancay could be President Trump鈥檚 next target in his bid to secure the hemisphere and confront China鈥檚 rising economic and political influence. He has already floated the idea of slapping special tariffs on goods arriving at Chancay.

The port is shaping up as a key element of China鈥檚 Belt and Road Initiative, a global strategy to build ports, railroads, and other economic infrastructure in more than 150 countries. When ultimately completed with 15 docks, the megaport at Chancay is expected to be the principal conduit for shipping South America鈥檚 raw materials and agricultural products to China, as well as for importing Chinese products into Latin America. China鈥檚 ambassador to Peru has described the port鈥檚 potential to make Chancay the 鈥淪hanghai of South America.鈥�

In many ways, the sprawling facility is the center of a wider hub-and-spoke system of ports for China-Latin America trade 鈥� similar to the system that major airlines use for organizing their principal flight routes, says the Army War College鈥檚 Dr. Ellis.

鈥淚f one power has the exclusive rights to use the hub in such a system, as China does with Chancay, that can pose a problem to the interests of others drawn to trade and investment with the region,鈥� he says.

Then there are the growing qualms over what some see as Chancay鈥檚 potential as a 鈥渄ual-use鈥� facility. A vocal minority in Peru worries about the port鈥檚 potential use by China鈥檚 military in the event of a conflict in the Pacific.

鈥淭he current lack of clarity and transparency surrounding the port of Chancay raises questions and suspicions about what the future uses of the port might be, and 鈥� especially now with Mr. Trump in the White House 鈥� puts Peru at the center of the U.S.-China geopolitical game,鈥� says Gregory Paredes, a retired Peruvian navy commander and prominent Chancay critic. 鈥淭he silence from our authorities over what the port is and isn鈥檛 only feeds suspicions about the dual-use potential.鈥�

Mr. Paredes notes that a Peruvian congressional commission found the potential for China鈥檚 use of Chancay 鈥渨orrisome鈥� in a 2023 report 鈥� and perhaps contrary to the interests of Peru. 鈥淲hy not be crystal clear about what Chancay can and cannot be, so we can avoid problems with our friends in Washington?鈥� he asks.

Still, others in Peru consider such worries overblown at best. Indeed, many see instead a bright future in which the giant port enhances South America鈥檚 economic integration and prosperity. This in turn would be positive for the U.S. and its relations with the region.

鈥淚nstead of a menace, envisioning Chancay as a port that can enhance our regional integration and cooperation would be a great advantage,鈥� says Diego Garc铆a-Say谩n, a jurist at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and former Peruvian foreign minister.

鈥淯nfortunately, we [in Latin America] are very weak on economic and political integration,鈥� he says, 鈥渁nd we know we can鈥檛 expect any leadership in this area from the current powers in Washington.鈥�

Is Monroe 2.0 mismatched with the 21st-century world?

Washington has been abuzz with chatter over the prospects of a Monroe Doctrine 2.0 ever since President Trump declared in his second inaugural address that the U.S. 鈥渨ill once again consider itself a growing nation 鈥� one that increases our wealth, expands our territory ... and carries our flag into new and beautiful horizons.鈥�

Then Mr. Trump raised the possibility of taking back the Panama Canal 鈥� by force if necessary. Within days of Secretary of State Marco Rubio鈥檚 visit to Panama in March, Panama promptly announced its withdrawal from China鈥檚 Belt and Road Initiative. Partisans crowed, 鈥淢onroe is back!鈥�

Some pundits posit that Mr. Trump is aiming to expand the doctrine globally, citing his trade policy based on coercive tariffs, the driving force of his nationalist economic policy.

But across much of Latin America, and especially in South America, the return of the Monroe Doctrine is widely seen as nationalist nostalgia. Disruptive and a sign of an era of big-power competition? Yes, some say. But it鈥檚 a policy ultimately mismatched with the 21st-century world, many believe.

鈥淣o, there will not be a new 鈥楳onroe-ismo,鈥欌�� says Manuel Rodr铆guez Cuadros, a former Peruvian foreign minister. 鈥淭he 鈥楢merica First鈥� and unilateral actions of Trump will lead countries to adjust their relations with the U.S.,鈥� he adds. 鈥淏ut no one expects the aspect of banding together as a hemisphere that was part of the original.鈥�

Indeed, many diplomats and international relations experts cite two overriding reasons that, ultimately, the Monroe Doctrine does not fit the Trump 2.0 moment.

First, China is not a distant threat, as the European powers were in 1823, but a well-established and even, in some South American countries, dominant economic presence and trade partner that would be difficult to replace.

鈥淭o a considerable degree, the resurgence of the Monroe Doctrine is related to a perceived need to do something about the Chinese presence in the region,鈥� says Jorge Heine, a former Chilean ambassador who is now a professor of international relations at Boston University. 鈥淏ut I must break the news to Mr. Trump and his administration: That horse is already out of the barn,鈥� he says.

Since 2000, when the U.S. and the European Union were Latin America鈥檚 principal trading partners, China has increased trade with the region fortyfold to become its dominant trade partner.

鈥淧eru now exports more to China than to the EU and the U.S. combined,鈥� Ambassador Heine says. 鈥淎bout a quarter of all agricultural imports to China come from South America鈥檚 southern cone alone. Is the U.S. going to replace that?鈥�

There is also the critical question of infrastructure. Noting that Latin America鈥檚 low rate of infrastructure investment sits above only sub-Saharan Africa in global rankings, Mr. Heine says it should be a mystery to no one why so many Latin American countries have signed on to China鈥檚 Belt and Road Initiative.

鈥淪ome in Washington see that as a threat,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut the reality is that American and European companies aren鈥檛 generally involved in the big infrastructure projects the region needs.鈥�

It鈥檚 a perspective backed up by experience, others say. 鈥淢any people in business and other sectors would like to see more interest from our friends to the north,鈥� says Dr. Cuadros.

鈥淏ut the reality is that two decades of U.S. neglect of Latin America opened the door to a role for China that is not going to be reversed.鈥�

Second, the ideas behind the doctrine 鈥� or at least those first laid out by Monroe 鈥� do not fit the current moment because it would entail a revival of the sense of community and common cause within the Americas. No one senses that is happening.

鈥淎 true return to the Monroe Doctrine would mean a renewal of the republican spirit and hemispheric solidarity that was a glimmer in the original document,鈥� says Jos茅 Antonio Meier, a former Peruvian deputy foreign minister and ambassador.

鈥淏ut in today鈥檚 Washington, the regional multilateralism that gained ground in the 1990s and which was a descendant of that aspect of the Monroe Doctrine is now dismissed as 鈥榳oke,鈥欌�� he says.

With multilateralism off the agenda, the countries of Latin America are going to pursue their interests with a variety of partners, Dr. Cuadros says 鈥� especially since the region鈥檚 historical partner is squarely focused on its own interests.

鈥淭he Monroe Doctrine had a Pan-American perspective that you could say was the original 鈥楢mericas First,鈥� meaning all of the Americas together,鈥� Dr. Cuadros says. 鈥淏ut now with Trump it鈥檚 鈥楢merica First,鈥� which subjugates the common interests of all the Americas to those of the United States.

鈥淚n that reality,鈥� says the Peruvian, 鈥渙ur only choice is to watch out for ourselves and work with the whole world.鈥�

Howard LaFranchi reported from Chancay, Peru; and Washington. Whitney Eulich reported from Panama City.