海角大神

China asserts itself in GPS turf war

It plans to use the same signal frequency for its version of GPS that Europe had carved out. The overlap could block Europe from using its satellites for security reasons.

Race: This March 2008 photo shows a satellite for Galileo, Europe鈥檚 version of GPS. China plans to launch the first satellite for its own satnav system, Compass 2, in June.

Maartje Blijdenstein/AFP/Newscom/File

March 25, 2009

At the European Union鈥檚 embassy in Beijing, a recently built extension bears the name 鈥淕alileo.鈥 It celebrates one of Europe鈥檚 most high-profile and symbolic partnerships with China, but it might soon have to be rechristened.

China鈥檚 membership of 鈥淕alileo,鈥 the European-led version of America鈥檚 Global Positioning System (GPS), has soured to the point where the two sides are locked in a dispute over radio frequencies, as China races ahead with its own network of satellites.

Cooperation has turned to confrontation.

Without an agreement, China would be able to frustrate European military forces鈥 efforts to deny a future enemy crucial satnav capability. Some expert observers suggest that may even be Beijing鈥檚 goal.

As the EU prepares to sign contracts this year with satellite builders and China plans the June launch of the first satellite in its own 鈥淐ompass 2鈥 constellation, 鈥渂oth are at stages of program development that make this an urgent question,鈥 says Glenn Gibbons, editor of 鈥淚nside GNSS鈥 magazine.

GPS, Galileo, and Compass, along with the Russian 鈥淕lonass,鈥 are building the satellite infrastructure for an increasingly important technology used for purposes ranging from nuclear missile guidance, through mapping, to steering a mobile-phone user to the nearest Starbucks.

Their designers are publicly committed to making these systems inter-operable, and their signals part of the global commons. If China and Europe resolve their spat, 鈥渢hey should be synergistic,鈥 says Mr. Gibbons. 鈥淭ogether they could create a more robust and reliable system of signals.鈥

From cooperation to competition
More than a decade ago the EU, unhappy with its dependence on the US-owned and controlled GPS, set out to build its own system and invited other countries to join.

When China signed up in 2003 it was a major coup for then-French President Jacques Chirac鈥檚 vision of a 鈥渕ultipolar鈥 world in which US influence would be diluted. Later, however, the Europeans got cold feet, denying Beijing a seat on the Supervisory Authority, which owns and oversees Galileo, for security reasons.

鈥淭he Chinese felt insulted and disrespected,鈥 says Taylor Dinerman, a US space expert. China鈥檚 treatment at Europe鈥檚 hands 鈥渞eally moved the Chinese schedule ahead鈥 in the construction of Beijing鈥檚 own system, adds Eric Hagt, a space analyst at the World Security Institute, a Washington-based think tank.

鈥淲e felt that we were not treated equally,鈥 explains Shen Dingli, a national security expert at Fudan University in Shanghai. 鈥淚n fact, China has no big need to join Galileo and Europe forced China to understand this.

鈥淎s a major power,鈥 he adds, 鈥淐hina needs to assure its national economic and security independence. These will in turn assure its political independence.鈥

China: Securing a strategic space
That thinking echoes Europe鈥檚 own reasons for building Galileo. The problem for Europe is that China has chosen for Compass the same signal frequency as Galileo will use for its encrypted, security-oriented Public Regulated Service (PRS).

There is no law against that, so long as the Compass signals do not interfere with Galileo鈥檚. But in the event of a conflict, it means that European forces could not jam Compass鈥檚 publicly available signal 鈥 which an enemy could use 鈥 without jamming its own secure signal.

鈥淭he question arises whether this is payback for being booted out of Galileo,鈥 suggests Mr. Hagt.

European Commission spokesman Fabio Pirotta says that Brussels is 鈥渉opeful to be able to reach some form of solution to the issue鈥 since 鈥渨ithout technical agreements ... there is a risk of interference that would make signals of both systems unusable for the users.鈥

After two recent rounds of negotiation, however, China still has not responded to engineering suggestions the EU has made to solve the problem. There are signs it will go ahead with its program regardless.

鈥淲e hope to get agreement [with Galileo] before we launch鈥 the first Compass 2 satellite scheduled for June, 鈥渂ut we cannot wait to do the validation and development of the system,鈥 Jing Guifei told an international satnav summit in Munich earlier this month, according to a participant.

鈥淭o make China move [to a new frequency] the Europeans have to offer good enough compensation,鈥 argues Professor Shen. 鈥淚f that frequency has unique military advantages, we are not going to trade. Otherwise, it is up to the Europeans to think what they shall do.鈥

US, Europe also tussled over turf
In a similar dispute a few years ago, when Washington felt that Galileo鈥檚 proposed signal frequency was too close to its own GPS frequency, Europe was persuaded to find a new spot on the spectrum by offers of US technological help with Galileo. It is unclear whether Europe might make a similar offer to Beijing, or whether Beijing would accept it.

The dispute illustrates the difficulty of building a seamless, interoperable network of global navigational satellite systems (GNSS) that would reinforce each others鈥 accuracy and reliability.

鈥淭here are a lot of reasons to make these systems noncompetitive and nonconfrontational,鈥 says Gibbons. 鈥淓veryone would benefit from building the market by increasing the number of places where GNSS navigation and timing can be used reliably.鈥

Unfortunately, he adds, 鈥渁lthough all four talk about interoperability, they are separate, independent critical strategic systems operated by countries that do not always have the same strategic interests.鈥