海角大神

Both Trump and Putin chose to start wars that have proved difficult to stop

They鈥檙e the odd couple of world politics: strategic rivals, with a personal bond. Yet now, U.S. President Donald Trump and Russia鈥檚 Vladimir Putin also share an unwelcome distinction that risks tarnishing the strongman image the two men have long sought to project.聽

Both leaders launched wars against comprehensively outgunned foes 鈥� Iran and Ukraine 鈥� in the expectation of a quick and easy victory, only to find themselves mired in costly conflicts with steadily diminishing prospects of prevailing by force, or even exiting on their own terms.

This week, however, their paths diverged.

Mr. Trump acted decisively to try to end his Iran war.聽On Wednesday, the president signed a memorandum of understanding with聽Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that聽lays the groundwork for a 60-day ceasefire, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and further negotiations on core issues, including Iran鈥檚 nuclear program.

Mr. Putin, by contrast, is showing no sign he鈥檚 ready to end his war on Ukraine, more than four years after launching a full-scale invasion.

That contrast has raised a critical question for America鈥檚 Western allies, who strongly back Ukraine, and for Ukraine itself 鈥� a question figuring prominently at this week鈥檚 annual summit of G7 countries.

It is whether the chastening insights Mr. Trump may have gained from his own war of choice could weaken his broadly pro-Russia view of the Ukraine war, potentially bringing new pressure on Mr. Putin to move toward a negotiated resolution.

The signals coming from the G7 meeting, hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron in the spa town of Evian-les-Bains, were mixed.

Mr. Trump told reporters his focus remained on Iran. While he said the humanitarian cost of the Ukraine war still convinced him it had to end, it had 鈥渘o impact on us, other than we sell weapons鈥� to the Ukrainians. 鈥淲e鈥檙e thousands of miles away.鈥�

As the summit progressed, however, the president seemed receptive to efforts by allied leaders to get him to urge the Russian leader to the negotiating table.

Mr. Trump also met face-to-face with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, despite pre-summit guidance from U.S. officials that no such meeting was planned.

The argument the president heard at the summit had two thrusts. The first was that NATO allies had stepped up their commitments and were now providing the lion鈥檚 share of Western support for Ukraine.聽The second was that the war itself was changing, and momentum shifting in Kyiv鈥檚 favor.

A statement from the G7 summit, issued in the early hours of Wednesday, included a strong commitment to Ukraine.

Citing 鈥渘ew momentum鈥� in the war, it promised increased 鈥渁ir defence capabilities, additional systems and interceptors, and long-range capabilities鈥� for Ukraine.聽

It also said summit leaders were 鈥渞eady to consider鈥� something critical for Kyiv: allowing it a license to make its own U.S.-designed Patriot missiles to intercept nightly barrages from Russia.聽

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney told reporters he sensed a 鈥渃hange in orientation鈥� on Ukraine from Mr. Trump. The U.S. leader鈥檚 position now seemed 鈥渢ougher toward Russia and more realistic, in our view, about the situation on the ground.鈥�

If Mr. Carney鈥檚 assessment turns out to be true, it would represent a dramatic shift in the American president鈥檚 relationship with President Putin.

Mr. Trump has frequently spoken warmly about the Russian leader. 鈥淚鈥檝e known him a long time,鈥� he remarked after one telephone conversation this spring. And he has told reporters they speak more often than is publicly revealed.

While he has occasionally criticized Russia鈥檚 attacks on Ukrainian civilians, he has leaned heavily toward Russia鈥檚 view of the war, even repeatedly blaming Ukraine for starting the conflict.

His envoys in earlier efforts to secure a peace deal 鈥� real estate investor Steve Witkoff and the president鈥檚 son-in-law, Jared Kushner 鈥� have held a series of meetings with Mr. Putin in the Kremlin.聽

They have yet to visit Kyiv.

Especially after the political and economic pressures that Mr. Trump has been facing during the protracted Iran war, he will understand how difficult it could prove to get Mr. Putin to take a diplomatic exit ramp.

For Mr. Trump, falling short of his early aims for the Iran war 鈥� regime change, for instance, or Iran鈥檚 鈥渦nconditional surrender鈥� 鈥� could yet draw political pushback at home. Yet for the Russian president, the pushback would more likely come from his own military or security forces.聽

Still, President Trump could yet adopt a tougher line toward Mr. Putin, and a more balanced diplomatic approach to the war in Ukraine.

And if so, one driver might turn out to be the strongman approach to politics that both leaders share: their determination to project personal strength and their affinity for others in positions of dominant power.

In the past, that has brought Mr. Trump down on Russia鈥檚 side 鈥� a point driven home early in his second term when he berated Mr. Zelenskyy in the Oval Office and told the Ukrainian leader he held 鈥渘o cards鈥� to play in the war.

Now, he may recognize that his reading of the power equation was wrong: that, yes, it鈥檚 true that Ukraine, like the Iranian regime Mr. Trump took on, can鈥檛 win outright against huge military odds.

But that it鈥檚 also unlikely to lose, much less surrender, anytime soon.