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President Obama must understand the nationalism of China's President Xi

China's President Xi Jinping is both a nationalist and a reformer. President Obama must understand the motivations for Mr. Xi鈥檚 nationalism, so that as the two leaders meet at a summit in California today, the US-China relationship will benefit. And the world will applaud.

Supporters of Chinese President Xi Jinping use fans to protect from the sun while waiting for the arrival of President Xi in Indian Wells, Calif., June 6. President Obama and Mr. Xi, seeking a fresh start to a complex relationship, are retreating to a sprawling desert estate for two days of talks on high-stakes issues, including cybersecurity and North Korea's nuclear threats.

Jae C. Hong/AP

June 7, 2013

What to make of President Xi Jinping, China鈥檚 new senior leader, who holds his first summit with President Obama June 7-8 in California? The hope is that Mr. Xi is a reformer who will guide China through domestic transformation and to responsible statecraft. The fear is that Xi is a nationalist who has set China on an aggressive, expansionist course of bullying its neighbors and confronting the United States.

The fear seems not unfounded. China has intensified its territorial claims, from islands disputes with Japan to vast areas of the South China Sea. Xi frequently inspects People鈥檚 Liberation Army (PLA) forces, especially naval fleets, exhorting China鈥檚 military to 鈥済et ready to fight and to win wars鈥 and 鈥渢o win regional warfare under IT-oriented conditions.鈥 Xi, who in his late 20s served as an officer in active military service, instructs the PLA they 鈥渕ust win every war.鈥澛

Xi holds China鈥檚 top three positions: general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), head of the ruling party; president of China, head of state; and chairman of the Central Military Commission, head of the military. Xi will likely lead China for a decade.

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Just after becoming Party chief in late 2012, Xi announced what would become the hallmark of his administration. 鈥淭he Chinese Dream,鈥 he said, is 鈥渢he great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.鈥

Xi鈥檚 Chinese Dream is described as achieving the 鈥淭wo 100s鈥: 1) The material goal of China becoming a 鈥渕oderately well-off society鈥 by about 2020, around the 100th anniversary of the CPC; 2) The modernization goal of China becoming a fully developed nation by about 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People鈥檚 Republic of China.

The Chinese Dream has four parts: Strong China (economically, politically, diplomatically, scientifically, militarily); Civilized China (equity and fairness, rich culture, high morals); Harmonious China (amity among social classes); Beautiful China (healthy environment, low pollution).

鈥淎 moderately well-off society鈥 is where all citizens, rural and urban, enjoy high standards of living. This includes doubling 2010鈥檚 GDP per capita (approaching $10,000 per person) by about 2020 and completing urbanization (affecting roughly 1 billion people, 70 percent of China鈥檚 population) by about 2030. 鈥淢odernization鈥 means China regaining its position as a world leader in science and technology as well as in economics and business; the resurgence of Chinese civilization, culture, and military might; and China participating actively in all areas of human endeavor.

What about Xi鈥檚 nationalism? If it seems at odds with these grand goals, it is not. Here are six reasons why Xi's nationalism coincides with his reform agenda.

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1) Consolidation of power. Xi was not selected by Paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping, the architect of reform, as his predecessors (Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) were, and he was not elected by the people. Conventional wisdom had it that Xi would be a weak leader. In order to realize his Chinese Dream, Xi needs to assert strength and assure control. So far, he has exceeded expectations.

2) Enabling of reform. Xi and Premier Li Keqiang are determined to enact far-reaching economic reforms, the most extensive in 15 years, but there is stiff resistance from those whose dominance would be diminished and benefits cut (such as state-owned enterprises, with ties to party power). This resistance can no longer be couched credibly in terms of ideology, so it appeals to nationalistic aspirations by accusing reformers of 鈥渨orshipping Western ways,鈥 鈥済lorifying Western models,鈥 鈥渃aving in to Western pressures.鈥

Xi鈥檚 proactive nationalism is a strategy of 鈥渙ffense is the best defense鈥 鈥 an inoculation, as it were, against the political virus (meme) of being labeled 鈥渟oft鈥 or 鈥減ro-Western.鈥 Reformers in China are generally associated with pro-American attitudes and thus subject to fierce public criticism, even ridicule. By establishing himself as a strong-willed nationalist, operating independently of the US (e.g., his first foreign trip was to Russia), Xi secures economic reforms by distinguishing them from serving Western/American interests.

It is no coincidence that Xi鈥檚 first China-US summit follows his multifarious and emphatic exemplars of nationalism. When Xi now enacts reforms, how can he be accused of bowing down to Western/American ideals, when his international actions and assertions, from safeguarding China鈥檚 sovereignty to supporting China鈥檚 armed forces, are so assured and decisive?

3) Legitimization of CPC rule. To perpetuate its one-party rule (which China鈥檚 top leaders truly believe is essential for the well-being of the country), the CPC has constructed a grand narrative that is founded on three critical claims: Only the CPC can continue to improve citizens鈥 standard of living (and ameliorate severe social and economic disparities); only the CPC can maintain a stable, unified country and construct a happy, harmonious society; and only the CPC can effect the 鈥渞ejuvenation of the Chinese nation,鈥 which stresses a firm command of 鈥渃ore interests鈥 (i.e., sovereignty and territoriality) and increasing global respect.

4)聽Maintenance聽of stability through unity. China faces numerous internal tensions, especially a class-divided populace (rich-poor, urban-rural, coastal-inland) that has erupted within one generation. Moreover, an increasingly complex society can fracture along multiple fault lines. Pollution, corruption, health care, housing, migrant workers, workers鈥 wages, social cynicism, and changing values, among other raging issues, threaten to fragment society 鈥 and all are exacerbated by the most energetic social media on Earth. Only Chinese nationalism, which resonates intrinsically and passionately across Chinese society, can provide sufficiently strong social glue.

5) Differentiation from predecessors. Top Chinese leaders must combine historical continuity with their own distinguishing theories and practices. How shall Xi fare? Economic growth rates must decline, and even more foreboding, a host of domestic tensions (or crises) are coming his way 鈥 take public anger at corruption and pollution. Hence, another rationale for nationalism. In the past, nationalistic surges were triggered largely by external events (such as America鈥檚 accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999). Xi is making nationalism the core of his leadership; his nationalism is proactive, riding the high road of patriotism and using pride as his differentiator.

6) Personal belief. Xi has deep-seated patriotic convictions, the product of family, life, and career. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a founder of New China and a leading reformer under Deng Xiaoping. In 2006, when Xi Jinping was party secretary of Zhejiang Province, he told me about Chinese pride and patriotism as motivating China鈥檚 historic resurgence, words remarkably similar to his recent pronouncements.

So is Xi a reformer? A nationalist? The answer is that he is both, because only by being a nationalist can he be a reformer. American policy must understand Xi鈥檚 nationalism, so that when the reigning superpower meets the rising superpower, both can benefit. The world would applaud.

Robert Lawrence Kuhn, the official biographer of former Chinese president Jiang Zemin, has long-time relationships with China鈥檚 leaders and the Chinese government. He is a strategic advisor to multinational corporations and the author, most recently, of 鈥淗ow China鈥檚 Leaders Think.鈥

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